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Foreword: Professor the Hon. Stephen Martin,  
Chief Executive, CEDA
The Australian Federation has largely worked well, delivering politi-
cal stability and economic prosperity for over a century. However, it 
can do better. Reforming the Federation has been a recurrent issue 
and is once again a priority on the national agenda, which is why 
CEDA has undertaken this timely research.
The key to ensuring our Federation is delivering responsive and 
efficient government has always been striking the right balance 
between the various functions of government.
Reliance on constitutional law and court decisions that test whether the balance is 
right should be minimised in a properly functioning federation. 
With the Federal Government’s white paper due next year, the time is right to examine 
appropriate responses and policies that will ensure our Federation has that balance.
This latest research from CEDA, A Federation for the 21st Century, examines key 
issues for our Federation and what can be done to improve the current structure and 
policy outcomes. Importantly, it examines a range of different approaches as the best 
outcomes will likely be achieved not by a single solution but by a combination of differ-
ent approaches.
The report identifies key areas where changes such as how taxes are allocated to 
states could improve the delivery of core services including public transport, educa-
tion, roads, health and welfare. It also describes how a range of reforms, from VET 
to the NDIS, have the potential to radically reshape the nature of the Federation and 
make it far more citizen-centric and responsive to the needs of Australians than ever 
before. 
Another key proposal is the creation of a Federation Reform Council to monitor and 
evaluate the effectiveness of reforms to our Federation.
This should be an important component of any changes, not only to help ensure prog-
ress is made, but to also ensure that there are no unintended consequences of such 
change.
In addition, CEDA is recommending a series of Federation Conventions be held in 
conjunction with the white paper process to encourage the participation of as many 
people as possible in what must be a significant national conversation on this issue. 
I hope this publication can assist in helping to start that dialogue.
Thank you to the authors and the CEDA Advisory Group for ensuring once again 
CEDA has delivered a quality report. 
I would also like to thank our research sponsor, Australia Post, for their support, which 
has made this publication possible.
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Foreword: Christine Corbett, Executive General 
Manager, Postal Services, Australia Post 
As Australia’s oldest continually operating organisation, Australia 
Post has steadily expanded and evolved in parallel with Australia’s 
national development over the past 205 years. 
Prior to federation, for instance, the six colonies operated com-
pletely separate postal services that were united on 1 March 1901 
to form a single Postmaster-General’s Department (the PMG) under 
the newly formed Commonwealth. 
So, the federation of Australian colonies in 1901 remains the pivotal historical moment 
in the creation of the national postal service that we all know today as Australia Post. 
Therefore, we are delighted to have the opportunity to support this CEDA research 
project, A Federation for the 21st Century, which makes an important contribution to 
our national discourse. 
In contemplating potential changes to our federal arrangements, this research project 
encourages the community to consider the ideal format for governing our nation. It 
also brings into sharp focus the most effective method of delivering truly citizen-centric 
services for all Australians. 
This research is an important input into these considerations, and a vital point of refer-
ence for policymakers as they lead and respond to community views.
Australia Post is more than a passive observer in our nation’s affairs and institutional 
arrangements. We are responsive to changes in community needs and expectations, 
and we are constantly seeking opportunities to provide our services in new ways. As 
we make the shift into the digital economy, for example, we are expanding the array 
of trusted services we provide via our 4400 postal outlets across Australia, as well as 
online. 
Australia Post has always been – and will remain – a vital provider of trusted services 
that connect people and communities throughout Australia. 
As with the Federation, the precise manner in which this purpose is discharged will 
inevitably continue to evolve, but our central purpose and reason for existing will not 
change.
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I N T r O D u C T I O N
Approaches to reform  
in the Federation
Greg Smith and Nathan Taylor
Greg Smith is an adjunct professor of economic 
and social policy at the Australian Catholic 
University. He has over 30 years’ experience as 
an Australian economic and public policy adviser. 
He has played a major part in most of the major 
tax and superannuation reforms, and many 
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leader in Treasury including as head of the Budget and Revenue 
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policy agenda. He has developed CEDA’s 
research programs on public policy setting, 
examined the issues associated with Australia’s 
population, and developed reform agendas for 
Australia’s macro economy and within the healthcare, energy and water 
sectors. Nathan has held a series of policy roles at the RBA, CCI WA, 
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An increasing number of Australians feel that the Federation is failing them, that the 
coordination of the three spheres of government is rife with inertia, conflict and inca-
pable of addressing the challenges confronting the nation.1 This perspective fails to 
appreciate the relatively unique capacity of the Australian Constitution to foster dia-
logue, sometimes rancorous and sometimes consensual, and to achieve meaningful 
reforms, as evidenced most recently by radical expansions of the social safety net. 
The relative unknown nature of the Australian Constitution in the general population, 
compared with its US cousin, is a sign of its strength, not its weakness. 
Examining Australia’s Federation presents a unique opportunity, one that involves 
assessing the role and nature of government itself. Most public policy discussions 
focus on restricted aspects of government, either specific programs or the way in 
which government is addressing a specific problem. Rarely is the broader framework 
and structure of government activity evaluated. This is unfortunate because, as out-
lined in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2, and contrary to the perceptions of many Australians, 
the nation’s Federation is a source of the economic success the country has enjoyed. 
Research by Withers and Twomey2 highlighted a range of ways in which it has benefited 
the nation. These include the six Cs that Terry Moran AC elaborates on in Chapter 4.2: 
1. Checks on power;
2. Choice in voting options;
3. Customisation of policies;
4. Cooperation;
5. Competition; and
6. Creativity in addressing policy challenges.
These benefits are not theoretical. In Chapter 4.1, the Hon. John Brumby describes 
how high levels of migration out of Victoria to more economically successful states 
spurred policy innovation and was a major motivator for introducing reforms when he 
was both Treasurer and Premier. 
The papers contributed to this report tell the stories of adaptation and reform in 
many areas of the Australian Federation. In this Introduction, the various approaches 
to reform are summarised and placed within a broad framework of change facing 
the roles of government in society. Since its foundations were laid in the late 19th 
Century, Australia’s Federation has adapted on many fronts, including in relation to the 
roles of government itself. The 20th Century unfolded in ways unimagined when the 
Constitution was being framed, and the 21st Century already looks very likely to alter 
the nature of government to at least the same degree. 
What governments do
There are many frameworks and theories about the roles or functions of government. 
There are also several theories about those systems of government that have more 
than one level, mainly federations. In Chapter 1.2, Professor Bhajan Grewal provides a 
review of economic theories on the subject. 
Often these ideas present what governments do as a set of ‘functions’ under various 
defined heads of power (for example, education, health services, immigration, defence), 
with different functions allocated to the various tiers of government. What the Australian 
states do in expenditure terms along these functional lines is outlined in a later section.
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There is also a second way to classify what governments do, which differentiates the 
roles they carry out. These roles focus on different purposes for government action, 
delivering different outcomes. They cut across the functional divisions, though not 
every role is required for every function. At a conceptual level, the Commonwealth, 
state and territory and local tiers of government together mainly carry out four broad 
types of role:
1. Formulating policies and applying them through laws, regulations and enforcement;
2. Providing specific public services for individual, household or community benefit;
3. Redistributing income (or consumption), directly or indirectly; and
4.  Providing channels for articulating and representing democratic voice and demo-
cratic systems for making public policy choices.
A key point to recognise is that it is quite common that, for any given function, 
responsibilities for these four roles can be allocated across more than one level of gov-
ernment. This is a key driver of entanglement in the Federation. To illustrate, consider 
education:
• Policy and law (such as the mandating of school attendance, or accreditation and
regulation of providers) usually reside with the states;
• Specific service provision may be by states or by non-government providers, or
both;
• Distributional objectives through funding models and/or student assistance may be
pursued by the Commonwealth or states, or both; and
• Democratic processes will likely reflect community claims at both levels.
Whether we consider functions or roles, why do we have more than one level of gov-
ernment, and how should powers be allocated across them? 
There are two broad ways of answering these questions, and each has major implica-
tions for the possible directions and prospects for reform in the federal system.
The first, most common, way focuses on the first three roles of government: policy, 
service provision and redistribution. It usually invokes a theory of functional alloca-
tion in a federation, based on the idea that some things are best done at national, 
and some at subnational, levels. The specific answers are based on assessments of 
concepts such as scale economies, spatial externalities, the principle of subsidiar-
ity, information costs, regulatory costs, jurisdictional competition and innovation, and 
nationally efficient markets. Different answers may be given for the different functions 
of government.
While attractive for many reasons, this approach faces two main problems: 
1.  Different roles within a function (say distributional and service delivery) may be
pursued by different (including multiple) levels of government; and
2.  Many issues in practice involve interacting functions, for example, indigenous out-
comes in education depend on indigenous outcomes in health, housing, justice,
income support and so on. At the level of communities, or geographies, functional
separations often break down in practice.
The second way to view the allocation of responsibilities is more political. This concen-
trates on the last of the roles of government: providing democratic voice and systems. 
Governments and federations are not just about ‘who does what’ but also about how 
democracy works in generating public policy decisions. Federations are relatively 
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modern constructs in which founders held or faced ambivalent perceptions about 
government itself. On the one hand, they held ideals about the possibilities of (often 
new) governments, while at the same time they usually did not fully trust in the ability 
of political systems to always deliver the outcomes they wanted. Federation provided 
one form of separation and decentralisation of powers, a type of insurance against 
unwanted capture of government by hostile interests.
This second consideration might provide a further reason why there is so much ‘entan-
glement’ today between the levels of government in nearly all federations. The voting 
public, often feeling individually powerless and remote from government, prefer two 
(or more) representative government voices and more than one opportunity to vote 
their interests, in the hope that any perceived extremes in ideology or underperfor-
mance will be thereby moderated. Thus, policy entanglement, such as overlap and 
duplication, which is often said to be a main problem of federations, may well be an 
outcome, indeed a rationale, for federations that is actually desired by many as a form 
of ‘political insurance’. 
Unique features of Australian government
Returning to the functional dimension, when the Australian Federation began in 1901, 
government overall was relatively much smaller than it is today – perhaps only one-third 
as large as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). 
The nature of government radically changed during the 20th Century with the parallel 
development of new revenue sources (income tax and value added taxes) and new 
or strengthened functions, particularly the welfare state and infrastructure provision 
(together at times with very large military expenditures). This evolution of government 
is largely shared with other developed countries, but Australia has made some choices 
that have been different in key ways from those made elsewhere. These choices relate 
to the particular allocation of taxation powers, the degree of targeting of social ser-
vices, and the relatively large role for non-government providers in delivering human 
services.
These choices and the disparate growth rates of the underlying functions have had 
significant implications for the Federation. They have also resulted in Australia having 
aggregate public spending below the average of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Australia has an almost unique 
retirement income system (with compulsory private superannuation and means-tested 
public pensions) together with large private hospital and health systems (partly funded 
through quasi-compulsory private hospital insurance) and a relatively large non-gov-
ernment school sector co-funded by governments. In addition, a wide range of other 
education and welfare services are provided by private or non-government organ-
isations, with or without access to government funding support directly or through 
payments to clients. Economic infrastructure also is partly (and increasingly) provided 
through private markets, with public policy objectives met more through regulation 
than direct provision. 
The character of the federation that has emerged in Australia partly reflects the fea-
tures of this evolution. For example, the role of the non-government sectors has often 
been assisted mainly by Commonwealth funding policies, tax expenditures, or direct 
client assistance often in functional areas where there is state service provision. Where 
this leads to the development of markets for services, there is some shift in decision-
making powers from service delivery agencies to their clients.
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What the states do now
The formation of the nation’s Federation represented a formal collaboration of the self-
governing colonies – which became states – of Australia. In federating, they determined 
a rather limited number of functions would be the preserve of the Commonwealth, 
with the remainder remaining in their discretion, as Professor John Cole discusses in 
Chapter 1.1. 
The states have extensive powers, but the exercise of many of them does not neces-
sarily carry great fiscal cost. Looking at the aggregate spending of the states and 
territories on the traditional functional basis, it is notable that just a few dominate the 
budgets (refer to Table 1). 
TABLE 1  
STATE AND TErrITOrY GENErAL GOVErNMENT SPENDING (2012–13)
Function Spending 
($b)
Percentage of total 
state spending (%)
Commonwealth spending* 
($b)
Health 57.7 27.1 61.1
Education 52.7 24.8 29.3
Social security/Welfare 15.3 7.2 131.7
Public order and safety 21.4 10.0 3.9
Transport 23.2 10.9 5.6
All other 42.5 20.0 N/A
Total spending 212.8 100.0 N/A
Plus net new capital 11.0 N/A N/A
Own source revenue 118.3 55.6 N/A
*  Includes specific purpose transfers to the states that, when spent by them on the relevant function, 
are included in their spending. 
Source: ABS Government Finance Statistics, Catalogue 5512.0, May 2014.
Table 1 shows that three functions – health, education and welfare (HEW) – are 
together especially important in state budgets. A small part of that spending relates to 
policy and regulation of these sectors, but the major part is spent on service delivery 
essentially for the benefit of the household sector, allocated either as universal entitle-
ments or as needs-based services. In these three areas, the Commonwealth also has 
a major, often larger, funding and/or service delivery role. In these areas also, private 
or other non-government service providers are very well established and often receive 
full or partial funding from the Commonwealth and states, either directly or indirectly. 
To some degree, the Commonwealth and state-funded functions are substitutable. 
The result in considerable measure is dual, or at least parallel, service provision in 
the health, education and welfare sectors, with one set of services predominantly 
state supplied or funded and other sets largely (and often separately) Commonwealth 
funded. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
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Federation or economic reform
Governments, and federations, are about more than just economic issues. However, 
one of the main drivers of reform proposals for federal institutions and arrangements is 
the contribution that it could make to economic reform.
In general, the main goals of economic reform are higher productivity and competitive-
ness. The economic dimensions for federation reform have several strands, including:
•	 Increased efficiency, mobility and competition in national markets through national 
or harmonised regulation, or standards, and through mutual recognition of qualifica-
tions or accreditation;
•	 Increased efficiency through reducing duplication and overlap in functions; and
•	 Improved accountability and efficiency of decisions on the supply of public goods, 
through seeking closer links between spending and taxing responsibilities.
Economic reform in Australia has also particularly focused on developing the role of 
efficient prices in resource allocation. Efficient prices can play a key role not only in 
competitive markets, but also in areas of market failure (such as monopoly infrastruc-
ture) and in the provision of public sector services.
A number of public sector reform options are premised on the development of pricing 
or price-related mechanisms. Examples include:
•	 Privatisation and market development in utilities; 
•	 Casemix funding for hospitals; 
•	 The development of a market for disability services; 
•	 Needs-based loadings (prices) for school funding; 
•	 Road tolling; and 
•	 In part, contested markets for higher education.
In the mainstream areas of government service provision, many innovations in these 
areas have resulted at present in a complex range of parallel systems of delivery and 
funding. Federal financial outcomes are often a by-product rather than direct driver of 
these arrangements. Equity and efficiency outcomes (in areas like health and schools) 
are not always straightforward as a result, and of course are strongly contested in the 
various fields. It is beyond the purpose of this Introduction to explore these issues 
in any detail, but they are noted here because they underpin a close link between 
any possible approaches to federation reform, particularly reform of financial arrange-
ments, and economic reform for the delivery of services in these sectors. 
Recent policy reforms, at various stages of implementation and acceptance, to health, 
education, National Disability Insurance Scheme and, potentially transport, illustrate 
the deep relationships between federation issues and economic reform issues. 
Professor Peter Noonan and Dr Vince FitzGerald’s case study in Chapter 4.3 outlines 
how this has informed the transformation of the Vocational Education and Training 
(VET) sector, from a government supply-driven model to a customer-centric one, with 
public and private providers each offering services in a national training market. In 
Chapter 4.2, Terry Moran AC discusses the application within healthcare. All these 
reforms establish an efficient price for a service. This price can be varied for socioeco-
nomic or geographic locations, and attempt to create a level playing field for providers 
to compete. 
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In the case of healthcare, when the efficient price was introduced in Victoria in 1993, 
referred to as Casemix funding, it resulted in the Government paying hospitals based 
on the number and type of patients they saw. This approach replaced ad-hoc nego-
tiations between the state and individual hospitals with an equitable treatment for all 
patients irrespective of their individual location or service provider. Setting an efficient 
price for a service also provides invaluable information for managers and clinicians, 
allowing them to identify inefficient practices and target unnecessary costs. The merit 
of Casemix can be proxied by comparing the cost of treatment in Victoria, which has 
operated the system for the longest period, with other states (refer to Figure 1). 
A 2011 intergovernmental agreement would have seen the South Australian and 
Victorian Casemix model adopted at a national level for growth funding. After a 
transition period, this approach was anticipated to generate $928 million a year in 
healthcare saving.4 While recent Commonwealth budget decisions appear to reverse 
this decision, the reform has the potential to provide considerable benefits. It can be 
observed (refer to Table 1) that the separate funding by the states of their share of 
HEW markets, at an aggregate level, underlies the shortfall in their own revenues rela-
tive to their own spending (this is known as vertical fiscal imbalance). The states rely, 
in aggregate, on revenue transfers from the Commonwealth because they are unable 
to meet the service delivery costs of the HEW functions.5 If instead, state service pro-
viders had the same or similar funding bases as non-government service providers, 
with the Commonwealth meeting the major part of the cost directly or by subsidies or 
assistance to clients, the current level of (indeed perhaps all) vertical fiscal imbalance 
would disappear.
Approaches such as these illustrate alternative role assignments cutting across func-
tions. The Commonwealth would have primary responsibility for funding assistance, 
meeting distributional goals across these sectors rather than just in part. The states 
could retain existing HEW regulation responsibilities, as well as continue as large-scale 
service providers.6 
FIGURE 1 
rECurrENT COST PEr CASEMIX-ADJuSTED SEPArATION BY HOSPITAL PEEr GrOuP  
(2011–12)
Source: Productivity Commission Report on Government Services 2014. 3
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Of course, whether this extension of the economic reform agenda would be a desired 
outcome or not, taking account of social, political, practical and other issues, remains 
open to differing views, and it is only one of several possible reform approaches. An 
outline of this and other alternative approaches is provided in the next section.
Nonetheless, this discussion illustrates the point that the reform options for federal 
financial arrangements fundamentally depend on decisions about how the policy, 
service and redistribution roles of government are organised in these main functional 
areas. Australia already has a wide range of models in play, with each level of govern-
ment actively engaged both jointly and separately. Some services are directly provided, 
some are subsidised, some form part of the social transfer or tax expenditure systems, 
some are client reimbursed, some are universal and some are means tested. 
As a result of this multiplicity of approaches, the examples of Commonwealth and 
state policy interfaces are very widespread, even in areas in which constitutional provi-
sions may have otherwise appeared to have clearly separated them. 
Alternative approaches to reform
Jurisdictions are ‘owners of powers’ usually within a spatial context. Federations 
involve having more than one such owner of powers sharing the same geographic 
space. This is not unique to federations. Unitary states usually have more than 
one jurisdictional level, with some form of local government undertaking a range of 
functions.
A broad typology of possible reforms to a federation includes:
•	 Changes to the spatial structure of subnational jurisdictions. In this collection, pro-
posals along these lines have been raised in relation to local government reform in 
Chapters 3.2 and 3.3. However, at the level of the Australian states there has been 
little interest in adjusting the numbers or borders of jurisdictions, apart from state-
like self-government being conferred on the two main territories.
•	 Changes to the vertical allocation of roles or functions, by either:
 –  Reallocating existing, largely unchanged, functions from one level to another (for 
example, the Commonwealth taking responsibility for aged care); or
 –  Undertaking major reform to the roles or functions themselves with consequences 
for the Federation. In this collection, for example, the creation of a national train-
ing market (refer to Chapter 4.3).
•	 Changes to funding arrangements, tax powers and intergovernmental transfers, 
either:
–  Based on transferring existing revenue bases, such as the transfer of a portion of 
the income tax, to fund education in the states (refer to Chapter 4.2); or
–  As an outcome of tax reform. For example, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
reforms that abolished some state taxes and created a new basis for general 
revenue transfers to the states, or more extensive use of road-use charging or 
property tax (refer to Chapter 4.2). 
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This typology reflects the fact that quite different reform goals can be identified in the 
federation debates. Some are focused largely on concepts of jurisdiction itself, while 
others are more focused on broader notions of economic reform. The former pays 
direct attention to the allocation of powers, while the latter is directed mainly to how 
powers are exercised. 
Several alternative approaches to reform of the Federation emerge from the collec-
tion of papers in this study. This is not to say that these approaches are all mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, several papers combine elements of more than one approach. The 
main approaches are:
1.  Federation reform as a periodic reassignment of distinct functional powers: This 
approach usually emphasises the benefits of competitive federalism, both horizontal 
and vertical, with clearer accountability for outcomes. The allocation of functions is 
determined typically on the basis of subsidiarity principles embodying a range of 
other considerations that inform judgements about the best levels of government for 
different roles and functions. In some cases, the approach may argue for changes 
in the numbers or boundaries of jurisdictions. Sometimes the functional allocation 
advocated is simply to revert to the original constitutional provisions, although this 
is not always possible or straightforward. Aspects of this approach (although they 
are not limited to it) can be seen particularly in Chapters 1.2, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
2.  Federation reform as new or improved models of intergovernmental cooperation: 
This approach typically sees many of the functions of government as intrinsically 
interwoven so that cooperation is essential for most successful outcomes. The 
reform issue is often cast as one of ensuring that all parties can come to the table 
as equals and that information and learning systems support accountability and 
continuous performance improvement in the delivery of agreed outcomes. This 
approach, in principle, does not demand any particular vertical assignment of 
functions be applied, but rather only that there be robust ways of coordinating the 
shared jurisdictional interests in them. This approach has particularly played a large 
part already in efforts to develop more competitive, seamless national markets. 
Again, several papers in this collection pay attention to this approach, including 
Chapters 2.2, 3.5, 4.1 and 4.4. 
3.  Federation reform as reassignment of revenue bases: The focus of this approach 
is vertical fiscal imbalance, either generally or in specific areas (such as transport/
road funding), so the implication is generally to strengthen the relative fiscal inde-
pendence of the states. The solutions here may or may not involve reform of tax 
bases. Usually they are constrained by the constitutional assignment of excises to 
the Commonwealth, which may be too difficult to overturn, so ruling out sales and 
consumption taxes at state level. Given the administrative advantages of national tax 
collection, revenue sharing arrangements have been suggested, as have systems 
that would give the states the right (in the personal income tax) to separately set 
their own tax rates. Revenue base sharing is also an issue in the interface between 
states and local government, as both share real property-related tax bases. In 2000, 
the entire net revenues of the new GST was assigned to the states in a major set 
of changes that combined tax and federation reform. Revenue arrangements play a 
major part (along with others) in Chapters 3.4 and 4.2.
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4.  Federation reform as an integral outcome of an economic reform approach to 
government roles and functions: A significant part of economic reform in Australia 
over the past 30 years has involved consequential changes to arrangements in 
the Federation. The motive was economic reform – increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of economic activities – rather than pursuit of a federation agenda in 
its own right. Some have involved the creation of competitive markets with public 
or private (and other non-government) suppliers, or both. Others have involved 
privatisation. As already noted, the development of efficient pricing in many areas 
of government (especially HEW and remaining infrastructure areas such as roads) 
may have the potential to further co-deliver economic reform and federation reform. 
Efficient pricing can support service models that strengthen the roles both of clients 
and of decentralised management of service delivery. They could lead to different 
role assignments in the Federation or different cooperative arrangements. Elements 
of these approaches are already evident in several areas (such as Casemix models 
for hospitals, the disability services market and so on) but these have tended to be 
pursued separately rather than as part of a broader or coordinated reform agenda. 
Chapter 4.3 is a case study of this approach, and several chapters have drawn 
attention to it in areas like transport and hospitals. 
Examples of these four approaches have been pursued over recent years and each 
has supporters in this collection of papers. It is likely that all four will have a place in 
the complex interplay of federation developments in coming years, although the likely 
balance between them is not easy to predict. 
Choosing approaches
The task set in this research is not to provide final answers on the choice of approaches 
to reform of the Federation. Rather, it is to illustrate the considerable range of issues 
that underlie debates about the Federation and the several distinct approaches to 
reform that can be taken in response.
It seems unlikely that a single answer, a sweeping single solution, will resolve all issues. 
However, it must also be recognised that choosing any one approach, while it may 
meet some specified objectives, could also carry the cost of compromising other 
objectives. This argues for careful consideration of the issues and attention to objec-
tives and priorities.
There are risks of unintended consequences. While the future is always uncertain, 
we should at least take care to fully analyse and consider any major changes that 
might now be proposed. The Federation, in practice, has not evolved along the lines 
expected by the original framers of the Constitution. Provisions intended for one 
purpose have come to be used for others. There is always a risk that this could apply 
again to any recasting of the Federation.
CEDA urges a particular emphasis on the several economic reform dimensions of 
federation reform.
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Endnotes
1  Brown, A J 2012, Australian Constitutional Values, November survey, accessed from: www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_
file/0011/471719/Griffith-University-Constitutional-Values-Survey-Nov-2012-Results1-EMBARGOED.pdf 
2 Twomey, A and Withers, G 2007, ‘Federalist Paper – Australia’s Federal Future’, A report for the Australian Federation, April.
3 Productivity Commission Report on Government Services 2014, Health, p. 10.46. 
  Note: The data from different jurisdictions is not directly comparable across jurisdictions due to different accounting treatments and 
different population mixes. However, they do represent a proxy that, in combination with other measures, suggests Victoria operates a 
more efficient healthcare system. 
4 Duckett, S and Breadon, P 2014, Controlling costly care: a billion dollar hospital opportunity, Grattan Institute, p. 10. 
5 The extent of vertical fiscal imbalance varies from state to state so this observation ignores issues of horizontal fiscal capacity.
6  This approach would generally apply only to potentially market-type services delivered for direct household-sector benefit such as most 
health, education and care services but not to all HEW functions, for example regulatory policy and its enforcement, population-wide 
programs, and services such as child protection. 
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A Federation  
for the 21st Century
The creation of the Australian Federation in 1901 marks the 
midpoint in the nation’s history since colonisation. After over 
a century of internal peace and economic prosperity, it is 
important to look at the way in which Australia’s governments 
operate and to ensure they are suitable for the new millen-
nium. The Federal Government’s White Paper on the Reform 
of the Federation is creating a rare moment of public and pro-
fessional interest in the issue. This is timely as, to compete 
internationally and to meet the expectations of the commu-
nity, Australians require governments capable of innovation, 
adaptation and a clear set of responsibilities for the provision 
of the vast range of services expected of them. 
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Over the course of the last century, the Federation of Australia has served the nation 
well. Acting as representative voices for a dispersed and increasingly diverse popula-
tion, the different jurisdictions have managed to adapt to radical changes in society 
broadly and in government itself. When Australia federated, the size of government 
was a third as large as it is today. Even with this expansion, Australia has aggregate 
public spending below the average of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries. Withers and Twomey highlighted a range of ways 
in which Federalism has benefited the nation, and “research suggests that federal-
ism may have increased Australia’s prosperity by $4507 per head in 2006 and that 
this amount could be increased by another $4188 or even more if Australia’s federal 
system were more financially decentralised”.1 
Fully realising the benefits of federalism requires the different jurisdictions to be capable 
of acting independently, innovatively and with accountability. A number of contributions 
in this report identify the substantive vertical fiscal imbalance – the Commonwealth 
collecting the majority of the revenue and the states having the majority of the expen-
diture responsibilities – as a key source of dysfunction in Australia’s Federation. Yet 
a series of major reforms have the potential not only to radically reshape the way in 
which governments deliver services but also redress the worst aspects of vertical 
fiscal imbalance. These issues are all considered in the contributions to this study. In 
particular, this report: 
•	 Outlines the historical context of Australia’s Federation, why it is still relevant to the 
nation and the theoretical benefits of this form of governance; 
•	 Discusses the critical interdependencies, and assigning roles and responsibilities 
within a federation; and 
•	 Outlines a series of important reform options to improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of Australia’s Federation. 
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Contributions 
Context 
To deconstruct the misconceptions that exist about Australia’s Federation, Professor 
John Cole provides insights into the world’s first peaceful formation of a continental 
government. The historical context of Australia’s Federation outlines the forces at 
work when the Federation was formed. This would be a precursor to full nationhood, 
as certain aspects of modern Australia, such as a national defence force, were not 
deemed the responsibility of the Commonwealth but of Great Britain. 
Professor Bhajan Grewal’s contribution, Economic perspectives on federalism, 
describes the main theories on federalism and their consequences for assigning 
responsibilities. These theories extol federalism virtues, principally through maximising 
the ability of government to satisfy diverse preferences. The contribution notes that 
any constitutional assignment of responsibility is bound to evolve over time. It also 
observes that without strong coordinating mechanisms between the states, the role 
of the central government will expand. Such a coordinating mechanism does not cur-
rently effectively exist. 
Australia is generally presumed to lack the cultural diversity that many other federa-
tions were formed to accommodate, for instance Switzerland where there are four 
national languages. In Federalism and diversity in Australia, Professor Nicholas Aroney 
outlines the second-order diversity within Australia, which is not defined by ethno-
cultural concentrations but by cultural and economic measures, such as religion, 
types of industry, commerce and disposable wealth. This contribution tracks how this 
diversity has changed since federation and how these differences are becoming more 
pronounced with time. 
Key findings: 
•	 The federalist debate succeeded when it engaged the imagination of the broader 
population rather than being limited to policy elites; 
•	 When signed, the Constitution was an agreement of its time with a range of issues 
considered too intractable to resolve prior to federation; 
•	 Any constitutional arrangement of power between jurisdictions evolves over time, so 
there is no perfect federal structure – however, the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance 
drives excessive centralism in Australia, which undermines some of the positive 
aspects of a federation; and 
•	 Australia’s considerable diversity is not defined by ethno-cultural concentrations but 
by cultural and economic measures, such as religion, types of industry, commerce 
and disposable wealth. This diversity is growing over time. 
Critical interdependencies  
While federations have the potential to bring considerable benefits over unitary govern-
ments, they also create the potential for considerable entanglement between different 
spheres of government. Understanding these interactions can improve the efficiency 
of the Federation. 
In The culture of Commonwealth and state relations, Adjunct Senior Research Fellow 
Jennifer Menzies describes how the innovative potential of the Federation is not being 
realised because of the rancorous nature of many government interactions. The 
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consequence is bland policy homogenisation. This contribution identifies a key issue 
being the Commonwealth’s role confusion and its desire to use its financial clout to 
force its way into areas outside its usual jurisdiction. The solution is to accept the 
states as the laboratories of service delivery experimentation and have the Federal 
Government with a role in encouraging successful innovation. 
Australia’s Federation has exhibited a long-running centralist trend, often abetted by 
High Court decisions that have underpinned a perception by the Commonwealth that 
it can spend money on any subject it chooses. In The legality of federal government 
expenditure, Professor Anne Twomey details the expansion of Commonwealth spend-
ing power, its consequences for a healthy federation, and the ramifications of the 
recent Williams High Court case decisions. 
In Regulatory setting within the Australian Federation, Dr Tina Hunter describes the 
burden generated by regulation and how Australia’s Federation exacerbates that 
burden. The three ways in which the states can reduce the regulatory burden they 
create are discussed. The contribution lays out a model for reducing regulatory overlap 
via the harmonisation framework that develops non-binding guidance for the states to 
develop their coal seam gas extraction industry.
The abolishment of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Reform Council 
ended an experiment that had put Australia at the global forefront of measuring gov-
ernment performance. In Performance comparison in Australian federalism, Professor 
Alan Fenna describes how the proposed reduction in specific purpose payments in 
2007 resulted in a comprehensive initiative attempting to measure government perfor-
mance and policy outcomes. Quantifying policy outcomes is a critical component in 
scrutinising how well jurisdictions deliver on their functions. However, good evaluation 
does not guarantee the best approaches to policy problems re-adopted. 
Key findings:
• The Commonwealth is often portrayed as the saviour of the Federation, whereas
its ability to drive reform is frequently just a reflection of its role as the collector
of the majority of tax revenue – a more beneficial arrangement would involve the
Commonwealth acting as the eyes and brains of the Federation, creating best prac-
tice policy development and encouraging adoption through funding arrangements;
• The Commonwealth was initially restricted to spending only a fraction of its own
source revenue, being required to return the remainder to the states – at the time of
federation it was feared that if the Commonwealth had more funds available than it
required it would result in ‘waste and extravagance’;
• Recent High Court decisions determined that the funds raised by the Commonwealth 
do not belong to it, but are public funds, providing an opportunity to return to coop-
erative federalism;
• Australia has the legal tools to reduce the regulatory burden generated by the
Federation; however, they require political will being exercised; and
• The benefits of cooperative or even competitive federalism are enhanced when the
best performing policies are identified and promoted. This is a role for a central body
to identify and promote good policies.
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Determining roles, responsibilities and functions 
In Criteria for assigning roles and responsibilities in the Federation, Professor Kenneth 
Wiltshire explains how Australia’s Founders followed the American example of sepa-
rating powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary while also dividing them 
between the national and state governments. Again, like the American model, limited 
powers were attributed to the national government while the residual would reside 
with the states. However, the powers of the national government have grown strongly, 
abetted by the High Court and a pronounced vertical fiscal imbalance. This contribu-
tion outlines the history of efforts to address overlap and duplication in Australia and 
other comparable federations, and notes that these frequently fail. It also discusses 
the importance of revenue sharing when considering expenditure responsibilities. 
Local government is an often-neglected sphere of Australia’s government, which is 
unfortunate as its close community connection could enable responsive service deliv-
ery. As Professor Percy Allan AM points out in Virtual local government, the sector is 
frequently deemed administratively inefficient. Amalgamations can be perceived as a 
means of addressing this problem. However, beyond a very small population level, 
local governments do not improve their efficiency as their size increases. The reason 
is that the economies of scale for the services that local government deliver vary con-
siderably and so amalgamation is a blunt instrument to drive efficiency. An alternative 
model is to create virtual local governments whereby local democracy can be main-
tained while service is adjusted to the appropriate level that captures its economies of 
scale.
In The need for strong metropolitan governance within the Federation, Lucy Hughes 
Turnbull AO examines Australia’s current metropolitan planning governance frame-
works and finds them lacking. The historic impetus for small local governments, and 
the failure of state governments to be able, or willing, to fill the void, has resulted 
in suboptimal urban planning. Addressing this deficit is critical in a post-resource 
boom in which future economic growth will be generated from urban centres. Already 
Australia’s major cities generate over 80 per cent of the nation’s wealth and are strug-
gling with rapidly rising congestion and poor planning. The solution is to create discrete 
entities with the responsibility for urban planning. 
In Providing public infrastructure in Australia, Bree O’Connell and Brad Vann discuss 
the disconnect between revenue raised for transport infrastructure and its planning 
and delivery within the Federation. In particular, the gap between the collection of the 
fuel excise and the taxes on economic activity generated by infrastructure, and the 
underutilisation of congestion charges and value capture result in infrastructure being 
under delivered. This contribution reconceptualises the challenge from the perspective 
of a telecommunications carrier and suggests hypothecating taxation to the jurisdic-
tion that raises it would improve the delivery of the infrastructure.
The contribution, Roles and responsibilities in the Federation, by Nous Principal Tanya 
Smith presents a practitioner’s perspective on unpicking federal entanglements. Rather 
than rehashing funding issues within the Federation, a more productive endeavour 
is to break each function of the Federation down into its constituent parts: delivery, 
regulation and policy. On this basis, the criteria for assessing the appropriate level 
of government to deal with an issue become the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
function. Meanwhile, a large cohort of responsibilities remains shared. However, the 
inefficiency can be reduced via explicitly acknowledging the elements of responsibility 
that reside at different levels of government and working to integrate them. 
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Key findings: 
• Modern Australia is too complex to completely eliminate federal entanglements;
• Revenue raising capacity needs to be considered concurrently with expenditure
responsibilities;
• The notion that amalgamating local governments will increase their efficiency is
incorrect – they require structural change to their way of operating to achieve effi-
ciency improvements;
• Major cities are complex systems not represented by small local governments, or
state governments with a wider focus;
• The Federation fails to deliver suitable levels of transport infrastructure because of
the disconnect between the revenue it generates and the expenditure responsibility
for delivery, and how they are split between different spheres of government;
• To improve the functioning of local government and the major urban centres in
Australia:
–  Local governments could operate as a responsive sphere of government, with the
capability to deliver a wide range of services, if they adopted an efficient structure;
–  Examine the capacity of virtual local government to improve the efficiency and
capability of the local government sector; and
–  Create discrete entities with the responsibility for whole-of-urban planning.
A reform agenda 
The contribution, Reforming the Federation, by the Hon. John Brumby describes how 
effectively Australia’s Federation has served the nation. It includes a discussion of his 
personal experience with competitive and collaborative federalism. The contribution 
also discusses some of the challenges in the existing state of affairs, particularly the 
vertical fiscal imbalance. “Implementing massive cuts to the states was not the best 
way to start a process of federal reform, but it has precipitated a conversation we 
need to have about a better alignment of revenue, roles and responsibilities within the 
Federation”. This conversation should not be just between those engaged in policy but 
include the broader public in the shape and nature of government for the 21st Century. 
To dramatically reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance in Australia’s Federation, Terry 
Moran AC makes a series of recommendations in Governments, subsidiarity and 
saving the Federation. These reform suggestions are based on opportunities created 
by recent successes in the Federation, notably the successive waves of the National 
Reform Agenda, which established broad, measurable, strategic outcomes for state 
governments and embedded the idea of devolution into service delivery in Australia. 
The specific reforms suggested by Moran, which represents one approach to address-
ing the vertical fiscal imbalance, involve: 
• Recognising the primacy of state responsibility for schooling, and the Commonwealth 
acknowledging this by providing a fixed portion of income tax to fund the service;
• The states developing a land tax or property charge, with a broader base of appli-
cation but at a much lower rate than currently applies – the majority of the funds
generated from this land tax being hypothecated to improve public transport;
• State governments extending road-use charging to existing road networks within
cities which, in addition to the fuel taxes collected by the Commonwealth from spe-
cific jurisdictions, would be hypothecated to building and maintaining roads; and
• Commonwealth public service focusing on providing strategic and technical advice
to government rather than on service delivery.
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An alternative approach to reducing the consequences of the vertical fiscal imbal-
ance in Australia is the policy reform (using VET as an example) described by Dr Vince 
FitzGerald and Professor Peter Noonan in Case study of reform in the Federation: 
Vocational Education and Training. This reform proposal dramatically shifts the focus 
of government service delivery from supply to a demand-driven, citizen-centric model. 
The chapter describes the common elements of a number of recent initiatives in major 
areas of government service delivery, notably health, education and disability, which 
have the potential to significantly change the dynamic of Australia’s Federation. They 
share several key themes with VET, including: 
• Making government service provision more citizen-centric;
• Making the Commonwealth contribution to the price paid to a service provider
nationally consistent and equitable; and
• Increasing provider accountability and transparency to create a more competitive
environment.
The states retain responsibility for managing service delivery and the ability to make 
choices about the level of service provision they will fund. Adopting the activity-
based funding model in education, as has been proposed, healthcare, as had been 
agreed, and in key areas of welfare, as is being implemented in the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme, would substantially eliminate the vertical fiscal imbalance. It would 
also create a basis for providing equitable and efficient service delivery throughout the 
nation. 
Regardless what reforms are introduced to Commonwealth and state relations, there 
will remain activities that require coordination between the spheres of government. 
In Entrenched disadvantage: Helping remote indigenous communities, Fred Chaney 
AO and Professor Ian Marsh put forward a federalist innovation trialled in other juris-
dictions, but not in Australia, that addresses common failings at coordinating action 
across jurisdictions. This innovation involves three key elements: 
1. Provisional centrally determined outcomes;
2.  Local agents that have the ability to implement in response to local condition; and
3.  Accountability for the exercise of ability with feedback for other efforts. The contri-
bution compares the new federalism model with how the current COAG initiatives
aimed at addressing indigenous disadvantage are operating and recommends how
to address holes in the response.
Recommendations
Drawing on the contributions in A Federation for the 21st Century, there are a number 
of recommendations.
Firstly, to improve the operation of the Federation, it is recommended that: 
• The status and governance of the COAG must be improved through:
– Adopting a code of conduct for all participants;
–  Applying improved accountability and transparency principles for decision
making; and
–  Adopting more transparent processes with a higher degree of accountability
associated with them.
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• A Federation Reform Council be formed to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of
reforms. The Federation Reform Council should conduct outcome-based measure-
ments of any intergovernmental agreements to monitor performance and provide
the critical insights needed for policy improvement.
• A series of Federation Conventions be held to support the white paper process
and ensure the participation of as many people as possible in what is an extremely
important national conversation. The federation movement did not gain traction until
it went from being a conversation between the governing class to capturing the
imagination of the broader population. Any grand bargain will need the buy-in of the
broader Australian population to be successful.
To reduce the influence of the vertical fiscal imbalance on the Federation, Australia 
needs to either: 
• Align revenue and expenditure requirements by:
1.  Assigning a fix portion of income tax to states for the purpose of funding
schooling;
2.  State governments developing a comprehensive land tax or property charge with
the majority of the funds generated by it being hypothecated to improve public
transport;
3.  State governments extending road-use charging, and receiving the fuel taxes
collected by the Commonwealth, to be hypothecated to building and maintaining
roads; and
4.  The Commonwealth focusing on providing strategic and technical advice rather
than on service delivery; or
• Extend the activity-based funding reforms to cover health, education and welfare.
To address areas of inevitable federal entanglement, Australia should adopt a new 
framework for coordinating federal and state relationships based on: 
• Provisional centrally determined outcomes;
• Local agents who have the ability to implement in response to local condition; and
• Accountability for the exercise of ability with feedback for other efforts.
Endnotes
1 Twomey, A and Withers, G 2007, ‘Federalist Paper – Australia’s Federal Future’, A report for the Australian Federation, April, p. 5.
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Ask Australians what is celebrated on 1 January and they will inevitably answer “New 
Year’s Day”. Remember anyone ever celebrating Federation Day? Low-key jubilee 
events marked the 50th anniversary of federation in the relatively austere post-war 
period. Centennial celebrations in the more prosperous times of 2001 had to compete 
with the crowning glories of the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Federation has never had a 
hold on the Australian imagination like Anzac Day or even Australia Day. Curiously, for 
something that former New South Wales (NSW) Premier Nick Greiner described rightly 
as “fundamental to the quality of life of Australian citizens”,1 we seem uninterested and 
unengaged. 
Backyard barbecue conversations about our federal system of government are 
inevitably dismissive and absolute in their remedy, reflecting a unitary or centralist 
perspective on government. As the republican debate charged up in the early 1990s, 
Professor Greg Craven described the federal Founders’ place in the national lore 
as being “prominent only in the degree of their obscurity”.2 The same is true today 
because beyond the parliamentary precincts of our capital cities, public engagement 
with our constitutional processes remains almost non-existent. 
The vox populi on how to fix our federal system reflects discordance between public 
perceptions of how we are governed and the various traditions that underpin the 
federal principles of Australia’s constitutional arrangement – “a constitutional schizo-
phrenia”, as Professor A J Brown called it.3 The illusionary invisibility of the Federal 
Constitution in the everyday life of the people possibly explains the common miscon-
ceptions we have about our federal system of government. 
Former Governor General and High Court Justice, Sir Ninian Stephen, once mused 
about federalism: if judged by “the lack of any reaction to it”, perhaps “we should con-
clude that it is generally regarded as an acceptable enough structure of government 
[that] does not present any major problem for any concerned sector of society”.4 No 
one beyond the political class it seems is sufficiently aggrieved by the performance of 
our Federation to agitate for serious reform. 
For most of its history, Federation did not even mean independence from Britain. 
Not that Australians of any political persuasion were rushing to gain independence. It 
took the threat of Japanese invasion in 1942 and a reorientation of Australian security 
policy away from Britain towards the United States (US) before the Curtin Government 
belatedly ratified the 1931 Statute of Westminster conferring Dominion autonomy. 
The post-war influx of non-British migrants had already started in 1948 when the 
Chifley Government made Australian citizenship a formality through the Nationality and 
Citizenship Act. The Australian flag with the Union Jack in the top-left corner first flew 
in September 1901, but it would be 1953 before the Menzies Government, through 
the Flags Act, proclaimed the blue ensign our national flag. The Hon. Bob Hawke was 
Prime Minister when, in the 1980s, the last formal ties were severed with Britain. 
In the 1950s, Russel Ward wrote a history of Australia, noting that the legends colour-
ing the national character were built from “a people’s view of itself”, their experience, 
values and behaviour.5 These attributes could feed and sustain “an invented but vital 
myth”, which Inga Clendinnen found strong enough to “bind a person to the nation and 
the national culture”.6 In the case of the Federation, regrettably myths have figured not 
to bolster but to diminish the Founders’ accomplishment and obscure the central role 
that federalism has played in the Australian democracy, nation and culture. Professor 
Donald Horne called its framing a “desultory” process that left Australia with a phony 
“nationhood” seemingly marred by an absence of “struggle” in its making.7 Some cre-
dence is given to his view by the low voter turnout in the plebiscites of 1899–1900, 
which reportedly many approached “unenthusiastically”.8 In none of the plebiscites 
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that led to the passage of the Commonwealth of Australia Act through the British 
House of Commons in 1900 did a majority of eligible colonists venture to the ballot 
box to vote ‘yes’. 
In the absence of a strong collective sense of our history, the meaning and significance 
of the federal achievement has been easily diluted and apt to be manipulated politi-
cally. Federation has become confused with nationhood, for example, when it was 
a step towards, not the realisation of, the other. Prime Minister Paul Keating would 
have had people believe differently in 1993 when he argued for an Australian Republic 
invoking the Federal Constitution as if it was the key to reshaping national identity. “It’s 
hardly radical”, he said, “to suggest that our Constitution should be remade to reflect 
our national values and aspirations, evoke pride in our heritage and confidence in our 
future, and help us unite as a nation”. As to the fate of the Federation, he admitted that 
he did not believe that the states “could be easily abolished even if the nation thought 
it worth doing”.9 
Labor leaders have traditionally downplayed the importance of the Federation, or 
at least the states’ part of it, which many have wanted to abolish. In 1957, Gough 
Whitlam lamented Labor being “handicapped … by a Constitution, framed in such a 
way as to make it difficult to carry out our Labor objectives”.10 Half a century later and 
conservative leaders were joining the chorus of ruminations chewing over alternatives 
to the current constitutional framework. 
In 2005, Prime Minister John Howard spoke the political code of an unreconstructed 
centralist when he pointed to changes that had brought “a greater focus by the 
Australian people on ties to nation and to local community, and less on traditional state 
loyalties”.11 His opponent, Kevin Rudd, won the 2007 election promising a “coopera-
tive” federalism but he declared, too, there would be “no turning back” to earlier forms 
of federal arrangement. Rudd’s prediction proved correct, as did his observation on 
the need to “make our current arrangement more workable, more rational and less 
dysfunctional”.12 
For most Australians, nuanced distinction between ‘federation’ and ‘nation’ is imma-
terial and largely irrelevant. If there is such a thing as ‘federal sentiment’ today, it 
resonates closely to Australian nationalism and, as an historian wrote for an earlier 
generation, it has little to do with any “preoccupation with or conviction about the 
constitutional and political principles of federal government”.13 Over time, Australians 
have written their own story of nationhood, repudiating the shibboleths of an earlier 
era while drawing on sources of inspiration as varied as the sacrifices at Gallipoli and 
the ANZACs, mateship and a fair go, respect for multiculturalism, and more recently, 
reconciliation with the original peoples of Australia. But lost in the telling of this story is 
the importance of our Federation. The obfuscation of our history to favour the unitary 
and centralised tradition of government has seen several generations of Australians 
tilting at constitutional windmills, chasing symbolic second-order issues while leaving 
the crucial matters that determine our quality of life. Correcting this deficiency in the 
public perception of federation is essential if the third age of reform is to deliver the 
improvements our federal system so obviously needs.
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
30
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
31
S E C T I O N  1 . 1
Drivers of federation
Working the hustings at Ashfield in 1897, federalist leader Sir Edmund Barton put 
the proposition simply and famously: “For the first time in history we have a nation 
for a continent, and a continent for a nation.”14 Just three years before he became 
Australia’s first Prime Minister, Barton defined federation and nationhood as a singular-
ity. It would be an idea that was to be inviolable, indivisible and continental in scale. An 
ambition that was long in the dreaming and even longer in the making, federation has 
evolved to this day as the cornerstone of government in Australia. 
From the 1840s, successive British governments consistently encouraged self-
government for their Australian possessions, preferring initially a unitary decentralised 
model instead of sovereign separateness for each colony.15 But there was little to 
hasten colonial progress on the prospect of a federation. Across the Pacific, an 
American vision of ‘Manifest Destiny’ was being realised in the ever-westward frontier 
expansion of white settlement. Here our national dreams were less grand, reflective 
of a small population on a massive land, extending to the basics of railways, ports 
and roads – connecting the coastal cities to their catchment hinterlands but not 
necessarily to each other. 
Support for the national idea would not transcend the contrariness of colonial self-
interest, or the political inertia of the people themselves.16 The tipping point for change 
came mid-way through the 1890s when, as Vance Palmer wrote, “the genius of this 
young country had a brief but brilliant first flowering”.17 The changing demographics 
of Australia in the 1890s was a key contributor to the ‘cultural forces’ that animated 
a nascent nationalism and first steps of separation from Britain – without relinquishing 
membership of the British Empire or even British nationality.18 For the first time since 
the gold rushes of the 1850s, more than three-quarters of Australians were locally 
born. 
From it all, a new generation of leaders emerged with the savvy to ensure the federation 
idea transcended the turbulent politics of the time. Grassroots support was mobil-
ised through politically directed campaigns by movements such as Alfred Deakin’s 
Australian Natives Association and Sir Edmund Barton’s Australian Federation League. 
These groups stoked an emergent national consciousness in the two major states of 
Victoria and NSW. Some have called it the “nation’s first great political communication 
campaign”.19 The outcome was a negotiated national consensus strong enough for 
all the colonies to accede to diminished power and prerogative. Although, as Alfred 
Deakin would later recall, they did so with “thought or hope of gain”20 through the 
payback of a federal compact. 
The great distances and degree of separateness of the six colonies as well as the 
diversity of their economic interests should not be underestimated in mitigating the 
chances of an easy political integration. Had not the colonies federated as states 
within the Commonwealth in 1901, their very different development trajectories later 
quite possibly would have lessened the prospect of a union, especially Queensland 
and Western Australia (WA). As it was, both these large outlying resource-rich states 
were to join a federation that essentially had already happened. Geoffrey Blainey rightly 
called the “coming together of the six Australian colonies in 1901” as having “a touch 
of the miraculous” about it.21 
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Security
Difficulties and barriers notwithstanding, as the 19th Century neared its close, there 
were many good reasons for the six British Australian colonies to form a federation 
– starting with what Roger Wilkins termed “geography and historical accident”.22 The 
imperial rivalries of the European powers provided the initial push for federation in the 
early 1880s when a great deal of local insecurity arose from French and German incur-
sions into neighbouring Melanesia. They left no doubt that the South Pacific was not 
off limits to further colonialism. Besides these broader regional threats arising from 
Britain’s longstanding strategic rivals, public alarm was voiced periodically about the 
threat of the ‘yellow hordes’ to the north. Then, as now, border security was an issue 
for Australians, and inter-colonial cooperation aimed at restricting Chinese immigration 
would in time be the precursor to the first Commonwealth Parliament’s White Australia 
policy.
Living at the farthest end of the European world and far from each other in a large 
undeveloped land, purportedly protected by the global reach of the Royal Navy and 
the prestige of membership of the British Empire, local colonists still found reason 
to be uneasy about their security. The British military posture in the Pacific had been 
diminishing since 1870 and the need for great self-reliance was confirmed in 1887 by a 
visiting British adviser to the Victorian Government. Major General J B Edwards called 
for “the federation of the military forces of the Colonies,” a “common Defence Act” and 
an increase in defence expenditure.23 It was enough for Sir Henry Parkes, speaking 
at Tenterfield in May 1889, to restate his support for the federal cause. He called on 
his fellow colonial leaders “to set about creating this great national Government for all 
Australia … to better preserve the security and integrity of these colonies”. 
Breaking down barriers
Beyond concerns of security and defence, arguments in favour of federation were 
propelled by a growing demand to break down local barriers to trade and commerce 
in favour of a common market. Isolated regional economies dotted the continent, 
loosely linked by rail networks that had developed inland from the ports to serve indi-
vidual hinterland catchments and constituencies.25 Travel from one part of the country 
to another inevitably involved changing modes of transport several times. In 1883, 
when rail connected the two main cities of Sydney and Melbourne, they were still 
18 hours, different rail gauges and a customs post apart. A thriving coastal shipping 
sector provided the main transport for industry. The capital cities and provincial ports 
were the transport hubs of regional commerce dotting the coastline from Townsville in 
the north to Albany in the west. 
In the early 1880s, Britain dominated Australian colonial trade, accounting for 75 
per cent of its commerce.26 Over the next two decades however, investment in local 
manufacturing and gradual improvement in connecting communications and infra-
structure resulted in growth in inter-colonial trade to outstrip that of Britain. As internal 
trade grew, so too did business interest in a common national market that would be 
stimulated by the removal of internal customs and tariffs. By 1901, trade between the 
colonies amounted to £55 million or 39 per cent of total trading activity.27 
The financial and commercial collapses of the early 1890s and consequent privations 
of economic depression provided a sobering reminder of the need to strengthen local 
resilience by expanding the economy across colonial boundaries. London bankers 
were also clear in their message that credit would only flow again to Australia once 
there was a federal government and national economy. These demands for a national 
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playing field for banking, finance and commerce would underpin later broad accep-
tance of the primacy of Commonwealth law over state laws, and concurrency for the 
federal system in matters relating to bankruptcy and insolvency.
Achieving a common national market that benefited all sections without unduly 
harming any particular constituency was impossible. So it was the main question 
dominating debate in the lead up to the final plebiscites in 1899 and 1900. The feder-
alism-as-economics argument cuts both ways. By the end of the decade “arguments 
against union in the prescribed terms consisted almost entirely of hard-headed special 
economic pleading”.28 
The core economic debate about federation occurred between, on the one hand, the 
agriculturalists and miners who shared the imperial preference for free trade; and on 
the other, the industrial protectionists who were largely comprised of manufacturers 
from Brisbane, Melbourne and Adelaide. Their shared fear was the reasserted com-
mercial dominance of NSW and Sydney. Free trade was to win out in the federation 
deal, but only as it affected trade between the states. After 1901, the barriers were 
uniformly applied against overseas products and services, and protectionism was to 
be a feature of Australian government economic policy for most of the 20th Century.29 
Voting on federation
Where colonialists lived and what they did for a living strongly predicted how they 
voted on federation – if they voted at all. For regions like the Riverina and northern 
NSW, where regional economies and communities were bifurcated by colonial bound-
aries, federation meant an end to the daily intrusion of bureaucracy through customs 
and excise imports. Some even dreamed of a national railway system without 
competing differential freight rates. Not surprisingly, the various regional views on fed-
eration reflected how locals saw it serving or threatening their economic interests. In 
Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley in southern Queensland, small farming communi-
ties fiercely resisted the federalist cause, believing they would lose their metropolitan 
markets to competition from the south. Brisbane manufacturers felt the same about 
Melbourne factories. 
Further north, those in northern and central Queensland, frustrated at the poor level of 
government from Brisbane and wanting the benefits of national markets, saw a federal 
government as an improvement. Many still dreamed also of one day breaking away 
from Brisbane. With these regional divisions, the ‘yes’ vote in Queensland just scraped 
through by the barest margin. 
In WA, it was a similar story of division between sectoral interests. The old rural 
families voted to stay out while the newly arrived gold miners voted like their home 
states back east. The WA Government worried about a loss of customs revenue and 
all the smaller states wondered at being dominated by NSW and Victoria. 
Tasmania, Victoria and South Australia (SA) all recorded more than two-third majority 
‘yes’ votes. In NSW, the vote was always near evenly divided because, as the most 
populous and oldest state, it had most to gain and lose – to win as a centre of trade 
and commerce, to lose because it would pay most for federal expenditures. 
How persuasive the business interest was in carrying the federation cause is difficult to 
assess. Historian Brian de Garis rightly noted that “crucial though it is, microeconomic 
reform makes a poor rallying cry for nation-builders”.30 
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Closing the federal deal
By the 1890s, the federal idea was already well practised and the Australian colo-
nists could look no further than the US and more recently Canada for inspiration and 
lessons about how best to structure a system of national governance covering vast 
expanses of territory, different regional economies and diverse populations. 
The first constitutional convention
In March 1891, the first constitutional convention came together in Sydney at the invi-
tation of Premier Parkes. Leading agents of the smaller states, including Queensland’s 
Sir Samuel Griffith, Tasmania’s Inglis Clark and SA’s Charles Kingston, produced a 
working draft upon which nearly a decade of debate would build. It was a draft agree-
ment between contracting parties, a conservative legalistic document inspired by the 
American example of constitutionally defined checks and balances but embracing also 
the Westminster model of responsible government. The British-sourced inspiration 
brought with it the inherent ambiguities attached to the role of the Crown, the primacy 
of the House of Commons within the Parliament and the obligations of ministerial 
accountability to Parliament – all based on recourse to tradition, tacit convention and 
common law.
More socially homogenous and self-assured in their cultural identity and British heri-
tage than their north American compatriots, Australians took a narrower approach to 
considering and defining the point of federation, at least as it would eventually appear 
in the Federal Constitution. Missing was any acknowledgement of the indigenous 
peoples or mention of human rights, statements of philosophic principle or self-evident 
truths. Instead, practical sentiment couched the utilitarian arguments for and against 
the federal concept. This can be explained by the crucial early agitation for a national 
parliament coming not from the governed but the governing class – the colonial 
politicians and business leaders who could see a bigger picture, a larger commercial 
opportunity in larger markets, uniform laws and a stronger system of national defence. 
In the broad history of Australian federation, the 1891 convention remains important 
because it was then that both the reasoning for, and the actual scope of, federal 
power was established. Besides agreeing that trade and commerce between the 
states should be “absolutely free”, the colonial delegates readily identified the func-
tions to be assumed exclusively by a federal government, which became section 51 of 
the Constitution. These included exclusive responsibility for:
•	 Customs and tariffs; 
•	 Monetary affairs and currency; 
•	 External relations and defence; 
•	 Posts and telegraphs (communications); 
•	 Banking and insurance; 
•	 Marriage; 
•	 Copyrights and patents; 
•	 Company law; and 
•	 Maritime and immigration. 
Responsibility for quarantine was to be the single health function assumed by the 
Commonwealth. The proposed federal government would also enjoy concurrent 
powers of taxation with the states. With the jurisdictional content of federation agreed, 
the 1891 convention also restricted membership of the future Commonwealth to just 
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the existing Australasian colonies, including New Zealand. States could be created in 
future but only in the very unlikely event of the agreement of the majority of voters in 
the affected existing state(s) and the Commonwealth Parliament. 
The 1891 convention was a false dawn. Momentum for a federation quickly died 
for want of public interest as the 1890s descended into “one of the most troubled 
decades of Australian history [when] political fears and passions were stirred by finan-
cial and industrial strife and deepened by the economic problems of drought”.31 
Relaunching the debate
Not until signs of economic recovery appeared and colonial politics stabilised rela-
tively in 1894 was NSW Premier George Reid able to respond to the urgings of the 
federalists and relaunch the issue, albeit this time on a platform that would involve the 
electorate beyond the political class. Much has been made of the grassroots revival of 
support for federation arising from meetings at Corowa in 1893 and Bathurst in 1896 
that served as platforms for civic nationalist movements like the Australian Natives 
Association and the Australian Federation Association. They were important protago-
nists for the cause, keeping the federation flame alight in good years and bad, mainly 
in south-eastern Australia and particularly among the border communities along the 
Murray River.
Politics was changing as was public expectation in the role of governments. By 1895 it 
was clear to the colonial leadership that something so fundamental in the democratic 
governance of a country could not happen without the involvement of the general 
population. But to workers focused on organising unions, improving their parliamen-
tary representation and achieving better working conditions, federation was a side 
issue they saw as serving the interests of the employer and propertied classes. For the 
small minority of republicans, the federalists were voices drowning out the more revo-
lutionary idea of a break from the monarchy and Britain. An early historian of federation 
rightly concluded that overall “among the politically active minorities in the Australian 
community federation … was supported by centre or liberal groups, and by moderate 
conservative and labour leaders; and it was opposed by both extremes of political 
opinion”.32 Like many of the other major themes of the time, federation brought into 
focus questions about the role and size of government and what could be expected 
by the specialisations that multiple levels of government afforded. 
For almost a year from March 1897 to March 1898, the second National Australasian 
Convention was to conduct its business in Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne. This 
time, popularly elected delegates convened to develop a federation model that would 
“enlarge the powers of self-government of the people of Australia”. But with nearly 70 
per cent of the population living in NSW and Victoria, the actual allocation of electoral 
power and the reconciliation of federal and democratic principles were to prove prob-
lematic for the convention. Fortunately for the federal movement, Queensland was not 
represented in either meeting, being preoccupied with dealing with its own northern 
secessionists. Had the Queenslanders with their well-known penchant for states’ 
rights been present, it is unlikely that a draft Constitution Bill and a national plebiscite 
on the question would have been achieved.
Two issues dominated the convention debates on how to achieve a workable 
federation: 
1. The rights of the states as reflected in the powers of the Senate; and 
2.  The structure of public finance and taxation once the Commonwealth was 
established. 
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Deakin was later to assess that the federal idea was “given a decidedly more demo-
cratic” basis in 1897 by provision being made for both Houses of Parliament to be 
popularly elected, albeit the Senate on the basis of an equal state allocation.33 
Orthodoxy had it that the Senate was to be elected and work to protect the power and 
interests of the states as a party to the federal contract. An historical miscalculation of 
major significance, the notion had been questioned back at the 1891 convention by 
Queensland delegate John Macrossan. He’d rightly predicted that, “The influence of 
party will remain much the same as it is now, and instead of members of the Senate 
voting, as has been suggested, as states, they will vote as members of parties to 
which they belong”.34 
By 1897, Alfred Deakin had formed the same conclusion that the Senate being held 
hostage to the whims of the smaller states was a fear already made obsolete by the 
discipline of party politics.35 People and politics, not states, would be the denominator 
in the Senate as much as the House of Representatives.
And yet, with the convention being comprised so overwhelmingly of the leadership of 
the various colonies, on the question of Senate powers and its ability to frustrate and 
deny the will of the House of Representatives, the delegates simply could not abandon 
their state inhibitions. The federalist spirit was not yet creative enough as to conceive of 
a workable mechanism for breaking deadlocks between the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. NSW was already counting the costs, foreseeing the cross-subsidies 
to the smaller, poorer colonies. The prospect of the small states having powers within 
the federation that extended well beyond their capacity to contribute financially was 
almost a deal breaker for NSW. 
A follow-up meeting of the Premiers early in 1899 was needed to resolve the deadlock 
issue. They resolved that in cases of deadlock between the two houses of Parliament, 
following dissolution of both houses, the will of the people would be asserted by 
simple majority support for the passage of a Bill in a joint sitting of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. The Senate was to have equal power with the House 
of Representatives in every respect except it could reject but not amend or initiate 
money Bills, and not amend Bills to initiate taxation or increase charges.
In the rather rushed wrap-up to the convention in March 1898, delegates bundled a 
range of intractable issues for short discussion, and included additional Commonwealth 
functions in industrial conciliation and arbitration. The Constitution once again pro-
vided for a federal supreme or High Court. Some topics, such as the regulation of 
the waters of the Murray-Darling Basin, were dealt with abstractly to get them across 
the line, with every expectation that they would be unpacked again after federation. 
A decade earlier, Barton had learned from the wily Parkes that some issues like tariffs 
would be best left to a Federal Parliament or there would never be a federation. 
So it was that the most important foundation of federation was not completed through 
the convention process but was consigned to future governments for resolution. A 
big question it was. How to secure a sustainable and equitable financial basis and 
recurrent funding formula for the federal arrangement? With the new Commonwealth 
Government set to assume responsibility for the customs function from which the 
states derived most of their tax income, what would be their future? Manning Clark 
reported the delegates’ dilemma, anticipating the later issues of vertical fiscal imbal-
ance and horizontal equalisation: 
“ If the Federal Parliament were empowered to levy customs duties, what sources of revenue 
would be left to the colonial parliaments? If the Federal Government had a surplus revenue, 
on what principles would that surplus be divided between the six colonial governments? 
Would it be by population, or by area, or by financial need?”36 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
36
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
37
S E C T I O N  1 . 1
The answers would not come before 1901. To secure the compact, Tasmanian 
Premier Edward Braddon provided a way forwards by coming up with a ‘holding 
pattern’ strategy. To be ever known as ‘Braddon Blot’, this decision by the conven-
tion actually confirmed the states’ dependency on the Federal Government from the 
start, and marked the birth of the vertical fiscal imbalance. For the first 10 years of the 
Commonwealth, the Federal Government was not to spend more than 25 per cent 
of customs and excise revenue, and it was to repatriate the remainder back to the 
states. Other financial assistance could be provided by the Commonwealth “on such 
terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit”.
Before the expiration of this provision at the end of 1910, the Commonwealth and 
states would have to work out a new deal. The deal was done, but the federal 
arrangement was incomplete in several crucial respects – to the later detriment of the 
Australian people.
Shaping Australian federalism
In a world different to the real one, perhaps the Founders could have better seen that 
their creation would in time contribute to an erosion of state powers and autonomy, 
dominance by the Commonwealth, and a deteriorating imbalance of sovereignty and 
fiscal efficiency. In this respect, the demands of a negotiated consensus in 1899–1900 
led them to several major miscalculations that have shaped Australian federalism and 
will be difficult to correct without broad community support for reform – on the magni-
tude almost of the establishment of the Federation itself. 
The key sources of dysfunction that can be traced back to the Founders are:
•	 The denial of regional democracy and growth of the Federation; and 
•	 The absence of a sustainable federal financial framework.
The most basic miscalculation by the framers of the Constitution was to believe that 
the Senate would protect the constitutional integrity of the Federation by being a 
bastion for states’ rights and powers. It simply never happened. The Senate issue 
was significant because it distracted delegates from the more important challenge of 
how to sustain and grow the Federation. To this end, a fundamental design fault in the 
Federation was its stillborn territorial shape, clinging as it does to boundaries devised 
in London more than 150 years ago. 
By turning its back on the creation of new states, Geoffrey Blainey rightly saw that 
Australia had missed “one of the advantages of federalism”.38 Instead, the Founders 
and their successors as state leaders consigned regional Australia to “a frozen territo-
rial structure which is widely regarded as delivering neither the level of national unity 
nor the serious political decentralisation which many Australians have long desired”.39 
In the current era of cost shifting between levels of government, the need for “better 
regional governance arrangements” is an oft made plea by the local government 
sector.40 But regional development authorities and larger local authorities have little 
chance of bringing development integrity to their part of Australia so long as they lack 
the sovereignty that comes with statehood. And their chances of improved resourc-
ing would be more likely achieved by the restoration of a stronger financial basis to 
the states than by some oblique reference to the merits of local government in the 
Constitution.
The other great continental federal democracies, the US and Canada, increased their 
number of states over time, in the process ensuring their federations more closely 
reflected the interests and needs of the regions. If the principle of subsidiarity is to 
count for anything then separation and creation of new states has to be part of the 
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federal reform process and core to a regional development strategy that has regions at 
its core. This may become a vital consideration given the spread of Australia’s natural 
resources, climate change adaptation strategies, future settlement patterns and the 
likely focus of development ahead. 
It is difficult to see how the boundaries of a federation for the 21st Century can be 
recast to more closely account for regional identity and development if all the players 
– including Commonwealth, states and territories – are not prepared to create more 
representative states. Certainly the governments of Queensland and WA have little 
incentive in the current federal setting to carve off their royalties-earning resource-rich 
mining regions far removed from the major population and cost centres in the south of 
both states.
The biggest critical lapse on the part of the Founders was their failure to enshrine 
a sustainable basis to the financing of the Federation. The creeping encroach-
ment of the Commonwealth on state functions over the past 80 years has been a 
complex process, but at its core, it has been the flawed financial model of federation. 
Governments of neither persuasion have sought to revisit the constitutional basis of 
the problem. Both sides of politics have sponsored reforms that have contributed to 
the massive expansion of the Commonwealth beyond its core areas of sovereignty 
commissioned in 1900. 
The problem was rooted in the minimalist expectations of the Founders in which so 
little was done to amend state government functions, while rather blithely they were 
stripped of their main source of revenue. In 1900, it was inconceivable that the pro-
posed Commonwealth would become more powerful than the states. Even as some 
of the colonies were introducing progressive income and land taxes to boost their 
revenues, few convention delegates blanched at the granting of concurrent powers of 
taxation to the Commonwealth. In an era of minimal government and taxes, it was not 
a big deal. After all, total taxation of all levels of government as a proportion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1901 was only five per cent – compared with 23 per cent 
for the Commonwealth and four per cent for the states today.41 
The unwitting upshot was a flawed constitutional model delivering a fiscal imbalance 
that would require the parties to the federal contract to periodically negotiate new 
bridging funding for the states. In the continuing absence of an agreed constitutional 
basis to taxation and public revenues, that fundamental shortcoming of the Federation 
now defines the shape of public policy in just about every field of government. It 
explains why today total Commonwealth funding to the states amounts to nearly 
one-quarter of the Federal Budget and 40 per cent of state revenue. Commonwealth 
involvement intrudes into every aspect of the affairs of state and territory governments 
in contractual arrangements, such as the 144 National Partnership Agreements, which 
were meant to enshrine ‘cooperative federalism’. 
Back to the future? A federation for the 21st Century
It’s all a far cry from what the Founders of Federation thought they were launching 
on 1 January 1901. The perverse anti-federal outcomes are now so obvious as to 
arouse a broad spectrum of complaint preparatory to proving the case for reform. The 
Federation has become, for Professor Ross Garnaut, “the worst of all possible worlds” 
where the “states do not have the fiscal freedom … to deliver the potential benefits 
of Federation … and the Commonwealth does not have the capacities for effective 
central exercise of the powers of government”.42 
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Veteran political commentator, Laurie Oakes, damns the federal compact as a “mess” 
and points to Prime Minister Tony Abbott complaining of the “dog’s breakfast of 
[overlapping] responsibilities” between federal and state governments.43 Treasurer Joe 
Hockey anticipates the Commonwealth withdrawing from service delivery: “We’ve got 
to sort out the Federation … Canberra is a long way from the services – we are not 
good at it”.44 Former NSW Premier Nick Greiner is more embracing of broad reform, 
declaring that the “present, multifaceted, wasteful, ineffective shambles that passes 
for federalism should [not] be the Australian way for the 21st Century and beyond”.45 
Leading sections of the media are calling for “a vigorous national debate on the role of 
federal and state governments”.46 It all sounds reminiscent of a constitutional conven-
tion back in 1898, including the quiet profile of the Labor Party on the issue.
At the centenary of Federation, an opportunity was missed to revisit the founding 
propositions, and as a nation to consider how best to ensure the federal arrangement 
remained valuable and relevant in the lives of Australians. For Australia to make the 
most of the future and realise the great promise of its human, economic and natural 
capital, a new age of reform is needed with an agenda broadly informed by its people. 
To be vital and relevant, Australia’s next and third age of reform must embrace the 
crucial defining themes of the 21st Century, but also build on the achievements of its 
history. 
The next age of Australian reform will need to be more than an ideas weekend in 
Canberra; it will take some years and maybe even several terms of government to 
crystallise the essence of the agenda into a broad consensually supported mandate. 
But it can be done. Australia has braced through challenging times before during 
which it has digested major, sometimes unpalatable, reforms and emerged stronger, 
more unified and more competitive. Two previous reformist eras have delivered the 
Australia of today – the latest as recently as 1983 to 2000, the age of economic liber-
alisation, when the Hawke-Keating-Howard governments dismantled the old edifices 
of a heavily regulated and protected economy, and opened Australia to the world. 
A hundred years earlier, the first age of Australian reform was even more auspicious. 
The Australians of that era rose to the challenge of ending the colonial paradigm, 
plying instead the long road to federation, the beginnings of nationhood, and the 
making of the Australian Constitution and with it the realisation of the Commonwealth 
of Australia. Much of the subsequent history of Australia during the 20th Century owes 
to the fact of Federation – making it the most important Australian reform of all.
The great political accomplishment of the Australians of the 1890s was to see that 
reform and national invigoration on the big issues was neither unprecedented nor 
impossible. Ultimately, if there is a legend to be built from Federation that can bind 
people to its cause as an instrument of Australian democracy, such inspiration will be 
found in Corowa where the governed of Australia first told the governing class, that the 
big defining decisions about ourselves as a people cannot be made by anyone but the 
people. The challenge now is to bring the people positively to the discussion. 
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The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to outline economic concepts, principles and 
theories about decentralisation and federalism; and to draw lessons for the future of 
Australian federalism. 
The presumption in doing so is not that every federation must follow the same theo-
retical prescriptions so that all federations have identical patterns of assignment of 
functions. It is natural for each country to design its own assignment pattern reflecting 
its historical, cultural, economic and social circumstances. The expectation, however, 
is that in fashioning its assignment patterns, each country should be guided by certain 
fundamental principles and rules so that its chosen assignment pattern has internal 
coherence and integrity.
Five different economic perspectives reflect the prevalent conceptions of the structure 
of the public sector in a federation: 
1. The public goods perspective; 
2. The organisational costs perspective; 
3. The public choice perspective; 
4. The market preserving federalism perspective; and 
5. The incomplete contracts perspective. 
Together, these perspectives have helped identify, analyse and popularise (in recent 
years through the international agencies, such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund) the virtues of fiscal decentralisation. 
The public goods perspective on federalism focuses on determining the most effi-
cient organisation of the public sector by matching the governance structures with 
the benefit spans of different public goods; local public goods are assigned to local 
governments, state public goods to state governments and national public goods 
to national governments. This so-called principle of fiscal equivalence (between 
governance structures and public goods provision) will also uphold the principle of 
subsidiarity because the only public goods assigned to the national government are 
those that cannot be efficiently provided by the subnational governments. Such fiscal 
equivalence between the two hierarchies (of levels of governments and public goods) 
is considered to improve allocative efficiency of the public sector. 
The organisational costs perspective aims to assign responsibilities in such a way that 
total organisational costs of the public sector are minimised. Indeed, it is suggested 
as part of this theory that constituent assemblies should be established to monitor 
the organisational costs and to undertake periodic reassignment of functions between 
levels of government when warranted by the changing nature of people’s preferences 
or technologies for producing or providing certain public goods. The organisational 
costs theory acknowledged, for the first time in economics literature, that assignment 
patterns of federalism need to be monitored and evaluated because they are dynamic 
and likely to change in response to economic and technological developments. 
The public choice perspective is based on the premise that in the absence of appro-
priate institutional constraints, the natural tendency of a government is to use its 
monopoly over taxation to keep public expenditure growing. This perspective favours 
fiscal federalism because the diffusion of tax powers across levels of government is 
considered helpful in limiting the concentration of taxing power at any one level of 
government and thereby keep growth of the public sector in check. 
According to the market preserving federalism perspective, federalism enhances 
economic efficiency by creating market preserving conditions. By devolving regulatory 
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authority from central government to local governments, the interventionist role of 
the central government is constrained. At the same time, subnational governments 
are also constrained by the competition with one another. But, competition among 
subnational jurisdictions enhances efficiency only if all governments operate under 
hard budget constraints and have to bear full responsibility for their fiscal choices. 
Accordingly, this perspective does not favour intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which 
are considered to weaken fiscal discipline and accountability of governments. 
The basic premise of the incomplete contracts perspective is that in the fundamen-
tal sense, a federal constitution is also like an incomplete contract, and this feature 
creates strong incentives for each contracting party to gain influence over other 
parties. Intergovernmental financial transfers are an important instrument for, and 
source of, gaining such influence. 
In the traditional literature on public finance, intergovernmental fiscal transfers were 
viewed, somewhat naively, as simply transferring budgetary resources from one gov-
ernment level to another, without carrying with them any hidden risks of centralisation 
or fiscal domination. Viewed through the prism of incomplete contracts, however, fiscal 
transfers turn out to be powerful weapons for gaining influence, because governments 
are now recognised to actively seek to acquire for themselves a position of power over 
their contractual partners so that they can influence the future of government policies 
and intergovernmental relations. From the standpoint of the evolution of federalism 
over time, therefore, a fiscal transfer should never be considered a neutral transaction; 
it is rather a potential instrument of intergovernmental control. Given the highly cen-
tralised pattern of taxation revenues and the considerable extent of decentralisation of 
public expenditures in Australia, fiscal transfers from the Commonwealth to the states 
have indeed contributed to the growing power of the Commonwealth. 
In the context of incomplete contracts, even the traditional distinction between con-
ditional and unconditional fiscal transfers becomes far less important, as it is the total 
dependence of one level of government on another that determines the dynamics of 
intergovernmental relations and power plays.
Several lessons are drawn from this discussion: 
1.  Federalism is a desirable form of public sector for satisfying diverse preferences for 
government services within a national polity and for efficiency enhancing innovation 
and experimentation in governance. 
2.  Constitutional assignment of responsibilities is unlikely to remain static forever and 
must evolve over time. Some of this evolution will occur through constitutional 
amendment, but some will without constitutional amendments (for example, via 
interpretations of the Constitution by the High Court of Australia). It is important, 
therefore, to ensure that the extra-constitutional evolution does not undermine the 
federal character of the constitution. 
3.  Decentralisation of tax powers forms the core of federalism and influences the 
dynamics of its evolution. It has certainly played a key role in the evolution of 
Australia’s federalism in the post-war period. 
4.  Independent research into theoretical and empirical aspects of fiscal federalism must 
be promoted. Both external and internal dynamics influence the longer term stability 
of federalism. New situations require innovative responses. The national govern-
ment is as much a part of the political competition in a federation as the subnational 
governments. Independent research can be extremely valuable in developing and 
analysing the implications, costs and benefits of available alternatives. 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
44
S E C T I O N  1 . 2
5.  Organisational structures for effective intergovernmental coordination must be 
developed to enable subnational governments to take part in horizontal coordina-
tion without the involvement of the national government. In this respect the historical 
record of the Australian states is disappointing. The states’ apathy and inability to 
productively work with one another has created time and again an institutional 
vacuum to be filled by Commonwealth intervention – which has almost always 
resulted in greater centralisation. States are not entirely blameless in this regard and 
they have wittingly or unwittingly allowed this vacuum to emerge, and allowed the 
Commonwealth to expand its policy space at their expense.
The principle of subsidiarity
Central to any discussion of decentralisation and federalism is the principle of subsid-
iarity. This principle is anchored in the concept of sovereignty of the individual; all other 
levels of social organisation are given a subsidiary role, taking up only those tasks and 
responsibilities that are beyond the capacity of the individual. 
In the context of assignment of governmental functions, this principle suggests that 
powers and responsibilities should be assigned to the lowest level of government 
practicable. This principle supports maximum local inputs into governmental decisions 
to ensure maximum responsiveness to local needs and preferences. 
The division of powers and responsibilities in the Australian Constitution can be viewed 
broadly consistent with the subsidiarity principle, as only a limited number of func-
tions (that cannot be effectively discharged by state governments) are assigned to 
the Commonwealth, and all other functions remain with the states. The practice of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations has evolved quite differently, however, and the 
Commonwealth Government is heavily involved in many state functions, including 
education, health, transport, housing and the environment. 
Five economic perspectives on federalism
Economic theories of federalism originated in the mid-1950s as an offshoot of the 
modern theory of public goods.1 Since then, new theories have emerged, reflecting 
deeper understanding of the democratic governance and the public sector. Together, 
these perspectives on federalism have helped identify, analyse and popularise the 
virtues and the limitations of fiscal decentralisation. 
The following five economic perspectives do not in themselves provide a blueprint for 
an ideal assignment of responsibilities in a federation. However, they do provide valu-
able principles, concepts and criteria, which can guide the practitioners of federalism 
by providing better understanding of the nature of federations and of the patterns of 
intergovernmental relations. 
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The public goods perspective
The main focus of the public goods approach to federalism is the diversity of prefer-
ences for public goods and assigning governmental responsibilities in a federal system 
to satisfy diverse preferences with maximum efficiency. Early in the development of the 
modern theory of public goods, it became clear that market pricing of public goods 
would be impossible due to the free rider problem. Charles Tiebout hypothesised, 
however, that the free rider problem might not be insurmountable for public goods that 
subnational governments provide. This is because preferences for these goods must 
be revealed by consumers moving between local government jurisdictions in their 
desire to reside in the particular jurisdiction in which the provision of public goods best 
matches their preferences.2 This mobility between local jurisdictions has been likened 
to ‘voting with feet’ and is considered a signalling mechanism for revealing consumer 
preferences for subnational public goods. On this reasoning, it was claimed that fiscal 
federalism was the most efficient form of public sector.3 
The insight that different public goods have different geographic domains has been 
the key in answering the next question: Which public goods should be provided at the 
national level and which at subnational levels? 
Public goods are distinguished from private goods on the criteria of non-rivalness and 
non-exclusion. The public goods theory of fiscal federalism is based on the premise 
that any public good retains its ‘publicness’ within a particular geographic domain, 
beyond which it no longer remains non-rival in consumption. Different public goods 
have different geographic domains. Thus, a public good like national defence remains 
non-rival and equally available to all citizens of a nation. In contrast, a public good like 
street lighting retains its publicness only when it is consumed within a relatively small 
geographic area. 
The notion of geographically based public goods provided the basis for establishing a 
hierarchy of public goods.4 Public goods that retain their publicness over only a local 
government area, for example, street lighting and traffic control, may be labelled ‘local’ 
public goods. Those that retain their publicness over wider areas, for example, educa-
tion and healthcare, may be appropriately labelled ‘state or provincial’ public goods. 
Public goods that retain their publicness for the whole nation, for example, immigration 
policies, national currency management and national defence, may be called ‘national’ 
public goods. By the same logic, public goods such as world peace or global climate 
can be added to this hierarchy as ‘global’ public goods. 
Once a hierarchy of spatially arranged public goods has been established, it was 
suggested that a federation would represent the optimal organisation of the public 
sector if the hierarchy of public goods perfectly corresponded with the hierarchy of 
the governance structures – the so-called principle of perfect correspondence or fiscal 
equivalence.5 
By matching the governance structures with the benefit spans of different public 
goods, the principle of fiscal equivalence ensures that the principle of subsidiarity is 
also upheld, because only those public goods are assigned to the national govern-
ment that cannot be efficiently provided by the subnational governments. Such perfect 
correspondence between the two hierarchies is considered to ensure that all objec-
tive benefits of local public goods are exhausted within the boundaries of the local 
governments, which are empowered to make all decisions regarding the production 
and supply of these local public goods. Similarly, the benefits of ‘state’ public goods 
should be exhausted within the boundaries of state governments, and so on. On this 
reasoning, it has been claimed that “the best distribution of authority is the one which 
exists in a federation”.6 
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The organisational costs perspective
The proponents of the organisational costs perspective on federalism reject the claim 
that a theory of federalism can be based simply on the notion of geographic boundar-
ies of public goods. The starting point of the organisational costs theory is that the 
structure of the public sector must be determined in full recognition of all organisational 
costs of a public sector, including the costs the voters incur in signalling their prefer-
ences for public goods (through political participation, voting and mobility), and the 
costs all levels of government incur in administration and coordination.7 This approach 
aims to assign responsibilities in a way that minimises total organisational costs. 
Functions should be reassigned between levels of government from time to time, as 
necessary, to ensure that organisational costs are kept at the minimum possible level 
all the time. Indeed, it is suggested as part of this theory that constituent assemblies 
should be established to monitor the organisational costs and to undertake periodic 
reassignment when warranted by the changing nature of people’s preferences or tech-
nologies for producing or providing public goods. 
Formulated in the late 1970s, the organisational costs theory reflected the widely 
shared concerns about the escalating costs of the public sector in many developed 
countries. Coupled with the stagflation of those years (when high rates of inflation co-
existed with slow economic growth), this theory acknowledged that intergovernmental 
relations in every federation must be subjected to continuing scrutiny and review to 
minimise public sector costs. This is not all that this theory was proposing. This theory 
was also calling for monitoring, and adjusting to, the evolution of federalism over time 
– something that had been ignored in the public goods perspective. The organisa-
tional costs theory acknowledged that assignment patterns of federalism need to be 
monitored and evaluated because they are dynamic and likely to change in response 
to economic and technological development. 
The public choice perspective
Inspired mainly by the writings of James Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch, the public 
choice perspective is based on the premise that in the absence of appropriate insti-
tutional constraints, the natural tendency of a government is to use its monopoly over 
taxation to keep public expenditure growing. The public choice approach favours 
fiscal federalism over unitary government because the multiplicity of governments is 
considered helpful to limit the concentration of taxing power of each level of govern-
ment and thereby contain the growth of the public sector. 
In a debate on the subject, the founder of the public choice perspective, James 
Buchanan, emphasised that even if the division of functions between the national gov-
ernment and subnational governments is inefficient, there would still be an argument in 
favour of delegating some power to subnational governments as a means of control-
ling the central government authority.8 Thus, fiscal federalism provides not only greater 
scope for the satisfaction of heterogeneous preferences for public goods – something 
that would not be possible in a centralised public sector – it also dilutes the concen-
tration of authority over taxation. Federalism also contains the threat of potential exit 
(via inter-jurisdictional mobility), which in turn constrains the governments’ power to 
exploit. 
Unlike the previous two perspectives, the public choice perspective on federalism 
provides little guidance, however, regarding which level of government should have 
responsibility for which functions. 
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The market preserving federalism perspective
In the 1990s, Weingast,9 and Qian and Weingast,10 and others contributed to the 
development of a new perspective on federalism. According to this perspective – the 
market preserving federalism perspective – federalism enhances economic efficiency 
by creating market preserving conditions. The main argument is that by devolving 
regulatory authority from central government to local governments, the intervention-
ist role of the central government is constrained. At the same time, regulatory power 
is assigned to subnational governments that are also constrained by the need to 
compete with other subnational jurisdictions. If they do not compete, they are faced 
with the threat of voters moving to other (better) jurisdictions. Thus, competition 
among subnational jurisdictions acts as a powerful force for enhancing experimenta-
tion and innovation in the provision of local public goods. 
What if the subnational governments compete with one another by lowering taxes 
and increasing public spending? This type of competition – the so-called race to the 
bottom – is not unknown to have occurred in most federations from time to time. To 
prevent such subversive competition, a key condition of the market preserving federal-
ism is that subnational governments must operate under hard budget constraints. For 
this to happen, the market preserving federalism perspective does not favour intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers because such transfers undermine fiscal accountability by 
weakening the link between spending decisions and revenue raising decisions. 
While the emphasis on maintaining the fiscal discipline through hard budget constraints 
is understandable, a serious weakness of the market preserving federalism perspec-
tive is that it ignores the objective of horizontal equity across subnational jurisdictions. 
Taxable capacity is rarely distributed equally among subnational jurisdictions in any 
federation, with the result that some jurisdictions can raise more revenue that others 
even if the same tax rates are applied. Unless appropriate mechanisms are developed 
and implemented for horizontal fiscal equalisation, levels of government services will 
be different across states or provinces even if tax rates are identical. 
To reduce the effects of horizontal fiscal imbalances of this type, arrangements for 
horizontal fiscal equalisation are made in most countries, including Australia, Canada, 
Germany, India, Malaysia and Switzerland.11 In Australia, the arrangements result in 
fiscal transfers from New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia to the other 
states and territories based on the assessments made by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission. 
The incomplete contracts perspective 
All four aforementioned perspectives have one feature in common: they are all norma-
tive constructs derived from specific premises and assumptions. They are all models 
of how a federation ‘ought to be’. In contrast, the incomplete contracts perspective 
offers a positive model derived from empirical analysis of how federal systems actually 
work and what motivates governments to engage in competition. The assumptions 
and the hypotheses in this model are derived from empirical observation and are 
based in the tradition of the new institutional economics. 
In departure from the earlier neoclassical tradition, which was primarily focused on the 
operation of markets, the new institutional economics is focused on how:
•	 Institutions (that is, rules of behaviour) affect the operations and the outcomes of 
exchange; and 
•	 Institutional inducements are reflected in the development of markets. 
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Institutions are described in this literature as humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction, and include both formal constraints such as rules, laws and con-
stitutions, and informal constraints such as norms of behaviour, customs, conventions 
and self-imposed codes of conduct.12 While institutions embody rules of the game, 
organisations are the players of the game. For example, the Australian Constitution 
is an institution formally created with the deliberate intent of defining the constraints 
on the Commonwealth Government’s legislative authority, whereas the Federal 
Parliament, state legislatures and the High Court of Australia are important organisa-
tions through which the Constitution functions. Both the institutions and organisations 
may change over time in response to external factors or changes in enforcement. 
The concept of incomplete contracts is based fundamentally on the need to transact 
business among separate entities, none of which can foresee and predict the future 
completely.13 If it were possible to observe all actions and events without error or 
uncertainty, and to foresee with assurance all future events, or to identify, plan for and 
contract for all future circumstances without incurring costs, parties engaged in eco-
nomic activity could enter into comprehensive or complete contracts. These contracts 
would not have to be revised at any time in the future because they identified and 
provided a contractual response to every situation that might arise. Of course, in reality 
it is not possible to observe the present without error or to foresee the future without 
uncertainty. Nor is it generally possible to identify and monitor all actions of all parties 
to a contract. Thus, all contracts are necessarily incomplete, in at least one of the 
two senses. Either some future circumstances will arise that are not covered by the 
contract, and in which a new decision will have to be made, or present or future inputs 
by, or benefits to, parties will not be completely observable or measurable.
The economic significance of incomplete contracts derives from the responses and 
strategies of the agents in dealing with this reality of incomplete contracts. As Hart 
pointed out, a firm may now prefer ownership of assets to contract-based exchange. 
This is because ownership also provides the firm with residual rights of control over the 
assets unlike contract-based exchange. Ownership thus becomes “a source of power 
when contracts are incomplete”.14 
It has been further suggested that in the fundamental sense, a federal constitution is 
a contract between the state and the people of a country, according to which specific 
powers to make laws are assigned between national and subnational governments.15 
Like other contracts, a federal constitution is also an incomplete contract, as legisla-
tive domain of neither national nor subnational governments is fixed forever and there 
is always room for dispute over the meaning and intent of some clauses, and for future 
amendments. Numerous intergovernmental agreements and fiscal transfers operate 
within this environment of incomplete contracts. In a federation, this incompleteness 
of constitutional contract adds a new dimension to the strategic objectives of govern-
ments. This is because incomplete contracts create opportunities and incentives for 
intergovernmental struggle for domination and power play over the specific aspects of 
governance. 
The motivation to ensure that public goods match the preferences of voters and 
that the tax costs are kept to the minimum would force governments to remain fully 
informed about the voters’ preferences and enable them to effectively respond to 
voters’ demands. Accordingly, each government seeks to ensure that: 
a) It can do more for the voters than the competing governments; and 
b)  It has maximum support and minimum opposition from the rival governments in 
implementing its policies and programs. 
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Intergovernmental financial transfers are an important feature of federal finance. Given 
the highly centralised pattern of taxation revenues and the considerable extent of 
decentralisation of public expenditures, fiscal transfers from the Commonwealth to the 
states are also key features of Australian federalism. 
In the traditional literature on public finance, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are 
viewed, somewhat naively, as shifting budgetary resources from one level to another 
without carrying with them any subtle risks of centralisation or fiscal domination. 
Viewed through the prism of incomplete contracts, however, fiscal transfers become 
powerful weapons for gaining influence. This is because governments now are rec-
ognised to actively seek to acquire for themselves a position of power over their 
contractual partners so that they can influence the future shape of intergovernmental 
relations. From the standpoint of the evolution of federalism over time, therefore, a 
fiscal transfer should never be considered a neutral transaction – it is rather a powerful 
instrument of intergovernmental control. 
The traditional distinction between conditional and unconditional fiscal transfers also 
becomes far less important in the context of incomplete contracts, as it is the total 
dependence of one level of government on another that determines the dynamics of 
intergovernmental relations and power plays.
Dynamics of constitutional federalism 
Constitutional assignment of powers in a federation will change over time. Indeed, 
every federal constitution makes provision for amendment of its clauses when nec-
essary. Australia is not an exception. What is exceptional in Australia’s case is the 
fact that much of the evolution in fiscal relations between the Commonwealth and 
the states has occurred through constitutional interpretations by the High Court of 
Australia, not by constitutional amendments. 
During the first 70 years of the 20th Century, the roles and responsibilities of gov-
ernments increased under the impact of the two world wars, the Great Depression, 
and the post-war growth in social expenditures. The initial impact of these forces 
was towards greater centralisation in federal countries, as national governments were 
drawn into broader policymaking and financing responsibilities that had been consti-
tutionally assigned to subnational governments, such as education, health, transport 
and housing. 
Since the mid-1930s, new insights gained from the Keynesian economics of mac-
roeconomic management also boosted the economic role of national governments. 
Similarly, broader community expectations about redistribution of income and wealth 
added to the economic responsibilities of national governments, both for progressive 
taxation and public expenditures. In recent decades, the processes of globalisation 
and liberalisation of rules of trade and investment have further boosted this process, 
highlighting the benefits of uniform regulatory regimes for extending the scope of 
single markets. These developments have favoured a shift towards greater uniformity 
and less diversity in government economic and social policies. In Australia, where the 
federal Constitution had assigned only limited powers to the Commonwealth, these 
developments strengthened the need for a stronger national government, particularly 
for those who viewed interstate rivalries (for example, different width railway gauges 
and fragmented internal markets) as sources of weakness, and those who recog-
nised the strategic vulnerabilities of Australia’s European population geographically 
surrounded by Asian nations and too weak to defend itself against possible external 
threats. 
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From around the 1920s, constitutional interpretations by the High Court of Australia 
started showing clear signs of being aimed at enabling the ‘Commonwealth’ 
Government to become the truly ‘national’ government for which states should not 
constrain powers over national policies.16 
Eager to implement progressive social reforms in the post-war period, Commonwealth 
administrations under both major parties, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the 
Liberal-Country Party Coalition, welcomed the trend towards greater centralisation. 
The Whitlam Administration (1973–1975) witnessed an unprecedented growth in the 
role of the Commonwealth into state subjects, many of which had been admittedly 
starved of funding in the previous decades, for instance, education, health and urban 
infrastructure. The Fraser Administration (1976–1983) promised to reduce intergov-
ernmental overlap and duplication by reforming specific purpose payments (SPPs) to 
the states, although little was changed in reality. Prime Minister Fraser did, however, 
establish the Advisory Council of Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). Its mission was 
to undertake research for improving intergovernmental fiscal relations. Together with 
the Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations (CRFFR), which had been 
established in 1972 by the McMahon Government at the Australian National University, 
the ACIR made important contributions to research on fiscal federalism.17 
The ACIR was closed down in the mid-1980s by then Treasurer, Paul Keating. A few 
years later, when he became Prime Minister, Keating also withdrew Commonwealth 
funding of the CRFFR, a decision that predictably led to the closure of the CRFFR. 
Since then, there has been no dedicated research unit focusing on fiscal federalism 
in Australia. By default, the Commonwealth public service and the business advocacy 
groups appear to have become the main source of expertise, review, evaluation and 
commentary in this field. Most often they tend to favour uniformity over diversity and 
centralisation over decentralisation. 
Keating also helped to derail the process of reform of federalism under the aus-
pices of the Special Premiers’ Conference 1990–91, which had established two 
Commonwealth-state working groups on the vertical fiscal imbalance and the ratio-
nalisation of Commonwealth SPPs to the states. Having resigned as Federal Treasurer 
after losing a Party Room challenge to Prime Minister Hawke, in October 1991, 
Keating delivered in his National Press Club address the warning that “[t]he national 
perspective dominates Australian political life because the national government domi-
nates revenue raising and only because the national government dominates revenue 
raising”.18 This generated ALP Caucus pressure on Prime Minister Hawke not to 
proceed with the proposed fiscal reforms, and the Commonwealth Government’s par-
ticipation in the scheduled Special Premiers’ Conference in Adelaide was cancelled. 
In the end, while the state and territory governments met in Adelaide, little tangible 
progress was possible without the Commonwealth cooperation on either vertical fiscal 
imbalance or the rationalisation of SPPs.19 
Meanwhile, Australia’s taxation system had become highly centralised as a con-
sequence of the High Court’s decisions on income tax and on section 90 of the 
Constitution, which prohibits the states from levying excise duties. However, as there is 
no clear definition of excise duties in the Constitution, the task of determining whether 
a particular state tax constitutes an excise duty rests with the High Court.20 In August 
1997, the High Court ruled that business franchise fees levied by all states and ter-
ritories on petrol, tobacco and liquor were in breach of section 90 of the Constitution.21 
Overnight, the states and territories lost a major source of revenue. In a swift and 
effective response of intergovernmental cooperation, the Commonwealth and state 
governments reached an agreement under which the Commonwealth would collect 
these revenues under its legislation (which is not restricted by section 90) and return 
the funds to the states and territories. 
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When the Goods and Services Tax (GST) was enacted in 2001, the Commonwealth 
agreed to return the entire revenue (less administrative cost) to the states and ter-
ritories. In recent years, due to the lopsided growth of the economies of the states 
during the resources boom, there has been debate about the manner in which the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission assesses the GST revenue shares. There has also 
been a debate whether reform of the GST should be a part of overall tax reforms. The 
fact that GST is levied by the Commonwealth makes it a part of the Commonwealth 
taxation. However, because the Commonwealth has agreed that the rates of GST will 
not be changed without the consent of the states and territories, which receive all GST 
revenue, it cannot alone decide the fate of GST. 
Federalism with shared responsibilities
The expansion in the role of the Commonwealth into state functions has created in 
Australia a federation with shared responsibilities in many functions, particularly in edu-
cation, health, transport and the environment. To function properly, policy formation 
and administration in these functions require continuing intergovernmental coopera-
tion and coordination. 
Intergovernmental cooperation has been attempted through the use of fiscal instru-
ments, for example, SPPs, combined with the creation of intergovernmental forums 
such as ministerial councils and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). The 
high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in Australia (which means continuing and heavy 
dependence of state public finances on Commonwealth fiscal transfers) also casts 
a long shadow over the functioning of these intergovernmental mechanisms and 
forums. In spite of certain isolated examples of cooperation between the two levels, 
policy environment in these functions remains heavily polluted by duplication, overlap, 
loss of accountability, blame shifting and gamesmanship. 
Some observers have described Australian federalism as “dysfunctional”,22 or 
“rickety”.23 Others have called for the abolition of the states.24 Justice Robert French, 
President of the Federal Court at the time and appointed Chief Justice of the High 
Court of Australia soon after delivering this paper, concluded his careful analysis of 
Australia’s experience with cooperative federalism in the following words: 
“ Cooperative federalism today is in part extra-constitutional. Driven by political imperatives it 
yields results on a consensual basis which go well beyond those achievable by the exercise 
of Commonwealth legislative power and the separate exercise by the states of those powers. 
In that sense the cooperative federalism movement may be seen to overshadow expansive 
interpretations of Commonwealth power under the Constitution. And in my opinion, although 
cooperative and thus respecting the formal constitutional position of the states, it contributes 
towards centralisation. For every topic which is treated as national becomes potentially a 
matter which, somewhere along the line, it can be argued is best dealt with by a national 
government. 
“ That may in turn be used in future argument favouring Commonwealth control and 
accountability in respect of such matters. If the states are not perceived by electors as 
adequately discharging their constitutional responsibilities then such perceptions will feed 
into the legitimisation of national control. A shrinking federation will continue to shrink. The 
logical outcome is the singular state of a unitary federation. That is the federation you have 
when you do not have a federation.”25 
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Conclusion
Several lessons emerge from the foregoing discussion. The first lesson is that all eco-
nomic perspectives on federalism (or decentralisation) reach the important conclusion 
that fiscal decentralisation and federalism should be the preferred form of public sector 
for various reasons, including:
•	 The ability to satisfy diverse preferences for government services; 
•	 The protection from monopoly power over taxation and public expenditures;
•	 The efficiency enhancing gains generated by the competition among subnational 
governments; and
•	 The greater scope for innovation and experimentation in government policies. 
These benefits of federalism can be strengthened if, as suggested by the market pre-
serving federalism model, subnational governments are made to operate under hard 
budget constraints. 
The second lesson is that constitutional assignment of responsibilities is bound 
to evolve over time. Some of this evolution may occur due to formal constitutional 
amendments, and some will occur without such amendments, through interpretations 
of the constitution, as has happened in Australia. It is important to ensure, therefore, 
that legal interpretations of the Constitution do not undermine the federal character of 
the Constitution. 
The third lesson, highlighted by the incomplete contracts perspective, is that decen-
tralisation of tax powers forms the core of federalism and shapes the dynamics of its 
evolution. The provinces in Canada, for example, surrendered income tax powers to 
the federal government during World War II, but got these powers back in the 1960s 
and are now able to finance provincial services with minimum reliance on federal fiscal 
transfers. In Australia, where the states also surrendered income tax powers to the 
Commonwealth during World War II, the states never got this power back and have 
become permanently and heavily dependent on fiscal transfers. After the episode of 
the Special Premiers’ Conference in 1991, the issue of state tax powers seems to 
have died out, particularly now that the states have access to GST revenue. But, GST 
is not a state tax and the states cannot change its tax base or tax rate. GST revenue is 
also allocated to individual states and territories each year on the basis of fiscal equali-
sation assessments made by the Commonwealth Grants Commission. If the states 
had access to a broadly based state tax, many of the small and inefficient state taxes 
could be abolished – improving the efficiency of the overall tax system of the country. 
The fourth lesson is that independent research into theoretical and empirical aspects 
of fiscal federalism must be promoted. As we have noted, the longer term stability of 
federalism is influenced by both external and internal dynamics. New situations require 
innovative responses. The national government is as much a part of the political com-
petition in a federation as the subnational governments. Independent research can be 
extremely valuable in developing and analysing such situations. Australia is currently 
not well served in this respect, whereas Canada and the United States have many 
sources of independent research on federalism, as have other European federations. 
And finally, organisational structures must be developed so that subnational govern-
ments can take part in horizontal coordination without necessarily the involvement of 
the Commonwealth Government. The historical record of the Australian states in this 
respect is rather poor, and has repeatedly created an institutional vacuum to be filled 
by the Commonwealth – with the result of greater centralisation. It has to be said that 
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states are not entirely powerless in this regard and that they have wittingly or unwit-
tingly allowed this vacuum to emerge and allowed the Commonwealth to expand its 
policy space. As Tony Abbott remarked in his Norman Cowper Oration, it is almost 
impossible to recall a state government objecting to an extension of federal powers to 
secure some state goal.26 
Professor Bhajan Grewal would like to thank Professor Kenneth Wiltshire, Nathan 
Taylor and Jessica Oldfield for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft 
of this chapter.
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Why is Australia a federation? 
The first and most important reason that Australia is a federation is political.2 The colony 
of New South Wales (NSW) once occupied about two-thirds of the continent. However, 
those who settled in the towns that we now know as Melbourne and Brisbane soon 
agitated for the right to local self-government. They secured this midway through 
the 19th Century through the establishment of Victoria and Queensland as sepa-
rate, independent and self-governing colonies. Having enjoyed the benefits of local 
self-government for some decades, when in the latter half of the 19th Century the 
Australian colonies began to consider the possibility of forming an Australia-wide level 
of government, they were not about to give up their rights to self-government in the 
process. Federation was a means by which both orders of government could co-exist, 
enabling the people of each state to govern themselves with a substantial measure of 
independence, while enabling the people of Australia as a whole to do so as well. 
The basic rationale for Australian federalism therefore wasn’t to accommodate cultural 
diversity between states.3 Australia is a diverse country, but its diversity, by interna-
tional standards, is not concentrated in particular states, regions or cities. Australia is 
not like Canada, where approximately 80 per cent of the French-speaking population 
is concentrated in Québec.4 Nor is Australia like Switzerland, where the speakers of 
the four national languages and adherents of the two major religious groupings are 
concentrated within particular cantons.5 In both these countries, like many others, the 
federal political structure reflects, reinforces and manages the existence of cultural het-
erogeneity that has a territorial or spatial expression. By contrast, in Australia, although 
migration patterns have caused the population to become increasingly diverse, English 
remains the dominant language, and cultural, religious and ethnic minorities are not 
concentrated into particular local areas, regions or states to the degree they are in 
many other federal countries. In relative terms, Australia is territorially homogeneous.6 
Below the surface of this homogeneity, however, there is a significant ‘second order’ 
diversity that does distinguish Australia’s states, regions and cities in important ways. 
Moreover, as a result of international immigration and domestic migration patterns, it 
seems that Australia’s states and regions are becoming more diverse, not less. While 
not marked by ethno-cultural concentrations of population of the intensity found in 
some other federations, Australia’s states, regions and localities nonetheless display 
important diversities across a number of ‘cultural’ markers, such as ethnicity, religion 
and language, as well as several important ‘economic’ measures, such as types of 
industry and commerce, and levels of income and disposable wealth. Moreover, these 
economic variations are significantly related to Australia’s fundamental demographics. 
While most of the national population is concentrated in the major cities, there are sig-
nificant state and regional variations in, for example, the relative densities of population 
centres, age profile and in the relative remoteness of human settlements. These sorts 
of differences are complicated further by significant differences in natural resources 
and industrial development among states, regions and cities, all of which feed back 
into variations in socioeconomic patterns and in certain respects relate to variations 
in ethno-cultural identity. Indeed, this last point is especially noticeable in the case 
of indigenous peoples living in remote areas, and in relation to other ethno-cultural 
minorities. 
Australia’s states and local governments in certain important respects display subtly 
different policy emphases, expressed both in budgeting priorities and broader political 
concerns, some of which appear to be related to the socioeconomic and ethno-cul-
tural characteristics of the state or locality in question. Policy diversity, though diluted 
and at times overruled by federal government measures of far-reaching extent, is a 
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fact of Australian state and local politics. Its very existence suggests a rationale for the 
maintenance and development of a system of multilevel governance. This is not only in 
the sense that policy diversity is itself a good thing for innovation and competition, but 
also because policy diversity in Australia is related to, and shaped by, ethno-cultural, 
socioeconomic and demographic differences that have a significant territorial or spatial 
expression, differences that may well increase in intensity in the foreseeable future. 
Australia’s diversity presents a highly complex, though subtle picture of cross-cutting 
cleavages that have a significant spatial or territorial expression. Contrary to the 
received wisdom, multilevel governance in Australia does have a diversity rationale. 
Policymakers in particular state and local jurisdictions have long been aware of, and 
responsive to, the unique conditions of their respective regions and localities. It is just 
that this fact has too often been overlooked when the federal system as a whole has 
been considered. 
Australia in 1901
On the eve of federation in 1901, the populations of the Australian colonies were 
overwhelmingly of Anglo-Celtic origin and shared the same basic political institutions, 
language and culture.8 The indigenous population, estimated to have been at least 
315,000 in 1788, declined rapidly to be below 100,000 by 1901. By that date, the 
settler population had grown to almost 3.8 million.9 The most significant non-British 
migrant groups – German, Chinese, Scandinavian and Polynesian10 – though repre-
senting not insubstantial populations, were far exceeded by the number of inhabitants 
already born in Australia, or recently emigrated from England, Ireland and Scotland. 
While in 1901 the overall picture was, therefore, of a relatively homogenous, predomi-
nantly British population across each of the former colonies, closer analysis reveals 
a more variegated picture. Among the Anglo-Celtic settler populations themselves, 
there were definite differences between those of English, Irish and Scottish ancestry, 
as well as between those of Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian and Methodist denomi-
national adherence.11 Further, non-British groups tended to settle in very specific 
patterns. Between the 1840s and the 1890s, more than 100,000 Chinese entered 
the Australian colonies, concentrated initially in the gold fields of Victoria and NSW, 
and later those of Queensland and Western Australia (WA).12 German immigrants were 
concentrated especially in South Australia (SA) and Queensland.13 Over 62,000 South 
Pacific Islanders also entered Queensland between 1863 and 1904, most of them 
indentured to work in sugar plantations along the north coast.14 
The settlement patterns among these and other groups meant that in 1901, while 
NSW, Victoria and Tasmania had a similar distribution of people from various birth-
places as their shares of the national population would suggest, the ‘frontier’ states 
of Queensland, SA and WA had attracted larger than their pro-rata shares of par-
ticular migrant groups. Indeed, while British settlers dominated the capital cities 
and other major population centres of each colony, the most significant non-British 
groups chose, or were obliged, to live in more rural, regional and remote areas of 
the continent. These local and regional concentrations of minority groups shaped the 
demographics, and the politics, of each of the colonies in different ways. Especially in 
relation to indigenous peoples, the nation was already displaying a significant ‘second 
order’ degree of spatially defined ethno-cultural diversity, which continues to this day. 
The presence of non-British peoples, especially in the ‘frontier’ colonies, influenced 
conceptions of ‘Australian identity’ and contributed to the later development of the 
White Australia policy at a national level.15 
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The colonial economies were also in certain respects significantly different. Sydney’s 
economy was more oriented to commerce and trade, and NSW governments tended 
to favour free trade policies. The economies of Melbourne and Adelaide, meanwhile, 
were becoming proportionately more industrial and their governments tended to 
favour relatively high tariffs as a means of encouraging and protecting local indus-
tries.16 Queensland’s economic situation was different again; its sugar industry, though 
still in its infancy, was dependent upon Kanaka labour in the north. Moreover, in the 
1890s, WA was grappling with the influx of people into the Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie 
gold fields and had only acquired powers of local self-government in 1890 – whereas 
the other colonies had enjoyed responsible government since the mid-1850s. 
As such, while Australian federalism was not consciously devised as a response to 
territorially defined ethno-cultural diversity, the different social, economic and political 
conditions of each colony reinforced the perception that each colony should continue 
to enjoy significant powers of local self-government. Federation was a response to 
the sheer size and diversity of the continent. It was also based upon an underlying 
belief in the virtues of self-government and self-determination, at a state and national 
level. The federal system was principally seen as a political arrangement that would 
preserve the capacities of the states to attend to their own affairs while creating a 
federal government with sufficient powers to address the issues they had in common. 
The goals of federation were therefore primarily political in this sense, and not specifi-
cally concerned to preserve a plurality of ethno-cultural identities as such.17 However, 
differences in the social, economic and political histories of the colonies gave rise to 
variations in local political culture, all of which were reflected in the debate over federa-
tion during the 1890s.18 Unity in diversity was the goal, and a federal constitution that 
would “enlarge the powers of self-government of the people of Australia”,19 at both a 
state and a federal level, was intended to achieve exactly this. 
Demographic patterns since federation
Since federation, the picture has changed, in some respects very significantly. In 1901, 
the relatively large populations of NSW and Victoria far exceeded those of the other 
colonies. Today, those states still have larger populations than the others. However, 
Queensland and WA have made up much of the ground, a long-term trend reinforced 
in recent decades by two key drivers of population growth, namely resources-led jobs 
growth, and lifestyle and environmental factors. 
Relative population growth in Queensland and WA has been at the expense of most 
other states and territories. Queensland’s share of the national population increased 
from 13.2 per cent in 1901 to 20.2 per cent by 2009. Over the same period, WA 
doubled its share of the population, while NSW and Victoria’s shares declined 
significantly. 
Although the net population of all states and territories has grown, the contribution 
made by the three different components of growth – natural increase, net overseas 
immigration and net interstate migration – differs substantially. This appears to have 
significantly affected the demographic profiles of the states. In 2009–10, for example, 
growth in Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory 
(NT) was due mostly to natural increase; NSW, Victoria and SA gained population 
largely through net overseas immigration; whereas Queensland and WA experienced 
relatively high positive net interstate migration, with correspondingly significant nega-
tive net interstate migration for NSW and SA.20 
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These broad differences in sources and magnitude of population growth, as well as 
more finely-grained differences in the ethno-cultural and socioeconomic drivers of 
population change, have led to significantly different sets of issues confronted by state 
governments in terms of such matters as multicultural policies, economic develop-
ment, infrastructure, and so on. The policy pressures posed by significant numbers of 
newly arrived migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds in NSW and Victoria 
are very different from the issues faced by low-growth states such as Tasmania and 
SA, which are in turn very different from those encountered by high-growth states 
such as Queensland and WA, where the majority of newcomers are predominantly 
English speaking. 
The age profiles of the states and territories are also significantly different. In 2009, 
Tasmania and SA recorded the oldest populations, whereas the NT had by far the 
youngest population. These patterns reflect longstanding migration trends where 
young people tend move to access employment or other lifestyle opportunities, often 
in a capital city, leaving an older population behind. The economic implications of 
these statistics are significant. In addition to changing distributions of population, there 
has been a dramatic urbanisation of the population as a whole. This is clearly evident 
in the share of each state and territory’s population that is resident in its capital city. In 
all cases, a sizeable shift to the capital city has occurred since 1901. Australia is now 
one of the most urbanised countries in the world.21 However, there are also important 
differences. In 2006, Queensland and Tasmania still had less than half of their popula-
tions in the capital city, and the NT only slightly more than 50 per cent. These statistics 
have a significant impact on access to goods and services, especially for very remote 
local communities in WA and the NT, many of them predominantly indigenous.
These variations between the states and territories have significant implications for 
matters that necessarily engage the attention of policymakers at local, state, territory 
and Commonwealth levels in very different ways. These matters include access to 
services, economic opportunities, costs of living, prospects of community interaction 
and political participation.
Ethno-cultural diversity
Australia has long experienced waves of overseas migration. Prior to World War II, 
most immigrants came from Western and Northern Europe. However, in the 1950s, 
people from Southern Europe, and in the 1960s, people from Eastern Europe, Asia 
and the Middle East, diversified Australia’s ethnic mix.21 These immigration flows have 
contributed to a highly complex and rich cultural diversity in most of Australia’s capital 
cities and major regions. However, when the data is closely examined, there are signifi-
cant variations across the states and territories. 
Victoria was the focus for much of the post-war wave of Greek and Italian migrants. 
The result was that by 2006, 46.7 per cent of Australians who spoke Greek and 42.1 
per cent of all Italian speakers lived in Victoria. In contrast, 67.7 per cent of Arabic 
speakers, 54.5 per cent of Hindi speakers and 53.0 per cent of Cantonese speakers 
lived in NSW. Queensland and WA presented a different picture, with many of the 
immigrants attracted to these states originating in English-speaking countries such as 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand and South Africa. Meanwhile, the NT continued to 
be the location of most speakers of Aboriginal languages. The pressures and changes 
caused by these international immigration patterns are especially prominent in WA, 
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NSW and Victoria. The national average of people born overseas is 24.6 per cent, but 
in Tasmania the figure is only 11.5 per cent, in WA it is 29.9 per cent, and in NSW and 
Victoria it is 26.5 and 26.3 per cent respectively.
Confirmation of the territorial and spatial dimensions of Australia’s ethno-cultural diver-
sity is seen in the fact that after English, of the five different languages most often 
used across Australia’s states and territories in 2006, Italian featured as the second 
most common language in Victoria, SA and WA; Mandarin was the second most 
spoken language in Queensland and the ACT; Arabic followed by Cantonese were the 
most spoken non-English languages in NSW; German was second most spoken in 
Tasmania; and Djambarrpuyngu was the second most common language of the NT.
Religious identification provides a further indication of ethno-cultural diversity among 
Australia’s states and territories. In 2006, 24.2 per cent of South Australians indicated 
they had no religion while the comparable share in NSW was only 14.3 per cent.23 
NSW also had the highest proportion of any state reporting their religion as Christianity 
(67.7 per cent) compared with 54.6 per cent in the NT and 59.3 per cent in WA.24 
Reflecting the concentration of immigrants from various non-European origins, NSW 
and Victoria also had the largest concentrations of non-Christian religions, especially 
Islam, Hinduism and Judaism. As a consequence, issues of multicultural accommoda-
tion are evidently more complex in those states, especially compared with relatively 
homogenous Tasmania. 
Australia’s indigenous population is also distributed disproportionately among the 
states and territories. It is concentrated especially in the NT (27.8 per cent), followed 
very distantly by WA, Queensland and Tasmania (each with just under four per cent). 
These figures diverge very sharply from those in Victoria, where in 2006, indigenous 
people made up only 0.6 per cent of the population. Clearly, the acute problems faced 
by many indigenous communities in the NT and the four territorially largest states 
present highly complex policy challenges, especially where those problems exist in the 
context of, and are compounded by, extreme remoteness and isolation, or concentra-
tion in heavily populated urban localities.
Speaking generally, the populations of NSW and Victoria exhibit the highest degrees 
of ethno-cultural diversity, whether measured in terms of ethnicity, language or religion, 
with the special case of the NT exhibiting an especially high concentration of indig-
enous people, many of them living in very remote communities. WA and Queensland 
form a second group with increasing numbers of those born overseas (but often 
English speaking) among their populations, as well as sizeable numbers of indigenous 
Australians. The remaining jurisdictions, especially Tasmania, comprise a third cat-
egory with comparatively much smaller shares of their populations being ethnically or 
culturally diverse. 
Multicultural policies in each Australian jurisdiction need to be constantly refined to 
take into account the unique sets of political needs and expectations that these ever-
shifting patterns of ethno-cultural diversity generate. A national government may do 
its best to respond to these forces in a manner suitable to local conditions, but its 
responsiveness to the particular circumstances of each state, territory, region and 
locality will tend to be diluted by the unfamiliarity of distance, and distracted by com-
peting expectations and priorities. 
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Socioeconomic variation
Ethno-cultural diversity is compounded by socioeconomic variation across the states 
and territories. The fundamental economic conditions of each state and territory, 
reflected in gross state product (GSP) figures, when presented on a per capita basis, 
reveal considerable differences. Here, the per capita ‘wealth’ of the resource-rich WA 
and the NT is evident, as well as the significant concentration of economic flows within 
the ACT, driven by the location of the national capital. In contrast, Tasmania and SA 
have the lowest GSP per capita, reflecting not only the economic structure of their 
state economies but also the relatively older age of their populations. There is a differ-
ence of nearly $35,000 from the highest GSP per capita in WA ($81,159) to the lowest 
in Tasmania ($46,185). 
These differences between the states and territories are further highlighted by a con-
sideration of the gross value added by particular industries in each jurisdiction, which 
varies considerably. The different economic histories and fortunes of the Australian 
states and territories have also resulted in significant variations in terms of production 
and purchasing power. Residents of the ACT ($55,300) had easily the largest gross 
household disposable income per person in 2008–09, followed by WA ($39,400) and 
the NT ($38,700). By contrast, Queensland ($33,200) and Tasmania ($33,500) had the 
lowest per capita disposable income.25 
The different economic conditions of each state and territory are generally taken 
to provide persuasive reasons for a significant degree of fiscal redistribution to be 
coordinated at a federal level. While up to a point this may indeed be the case, socio-
economic variation between the states and territories also provides good reason to 
allow sufficient room for policy flexibility and responsiveness by allowing each jurisdic-
tion to exercise a significant degree of autonomy. This is particularly underscored when 
the ethno-cultural diversity between the states is taken into account. The significantly 
different concentrations of migrant populations in the various states create unique 
(and constantly shifting) sets of policy pressures. Policy settings need to be respon-
sive to the ever-changing ensemble of socioeconomic and ethno-cultural conditions 
encountered in each jurisdiction. Australia’s shifting ethno-cultural and socioeconomic 
diversity not only has significant territorial dimensions, but it makes policy diversity 
across Australia’s jurisdictions an important and persistent imperative. 
Despite the extent of Australia’s ethno-cultural and socioeconomic diversity, powerful 
forces have long been pressing Australian politics in the direction of greater centralisa-
tion, uniformity and policy convergence. The decline in the policy autonomy of the 
states is especially caused by the fiscal dominance of a Commonwealth Government 
that collects over 80 per cent of all taxes in Australia and distributes to the states 50 
per cent of their revenue, over 40 per cent of this provided in the form of conditional 
grants.26 It is only within these budgetary constraints that the states and territories 
are free to formulate spending and policy priorities suited to the particular conditions, 
needs and aspirations of their respective populations, often driven by their particular 
socioeconomic and ethno-cultural characteristics. 
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Conclusion 
Territorial and spatial diversity is a matter of degree. Diversity can exist in various 
respects, whether ethno-cultural, socioeconomic or policy-political. Culture is itself a 
complex thing, consisting of various elements, such as language, religion, custom, 
ethnicity, relationship to land, and so on. Diversity is often marked by culture, but it can 
also be marked by other factors, such as socioeconomic conditions and the policy 
settings set by governments. Some federations are relatively homogenous in these 
various respects; others are more heterogeneous. Australia, like Brazil, Germany and 
the United States, has a single dominant language and, compared with many other 
federations, does not have any strongly pronounced ethno-cultural cleavages that are 
defined territorially. 
However, to say simply that Australia is a ‘culturally homogeneous federation’ fails 
to capture the complexity of Australia’s diversity in its important spatial and territorial 
dimensions. Australia’s states, territories, regions and localities are more diverse than 
is usually appreciated. This diversity, expressed in demographic characteristics such 
age profile, urbanisation and remoteness; ethno-cultural factors such as ethnicity, 
language and religion; and socioeconomic measures such as economic growth, pre-
vailing industries and household income, provide good reason for a significant degree 
of policy autonomy to be exercised by the states and territories, and indeed also by 
local governments. 
Contrary to the received wisdom, federalism makes good sense for Australia, given the 
sheer size of the continent, the variety of its geographical features and the diversity of 
its people. Even before federation, the colonies were more diverse than has generally 
been recognised. Certainly, the White Australia policy meant that during the first half of 
the 20th Century, Australia became in certain important respects less diverse, and this 
was accompanied by increasing government centralisation and uniformity of law and 
regulation that has only accelerated down to the present day. However, partly due to 
changes in immigration policy and partly due to economic and other factors, the states 
and territories are becoming more diverse, not less. In the context of this diversity, the 
states frequently seek out opportunities to respond directly to local expectations and 
regional conditions, albeit only within the interstices of policy autonomy still available 
to them. The room for policy diversity may have shrunk considerably, but the growing 
importance of ethno-cultural and socioeconomic diversity means that the reassertion 
of local autonomy, at a state and even at a municipal level, makes good sense for 
Australia.
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The focus of much debate on Commonwealth and state relations is usually from the 
perspective of the Commonwealth, with the states and territories coming off the worst 
in any struggle around funding and responsibility. This chapter identifies the roles 
that innovation and experimentation can play in a modern federation, and it seeks 
to unpick some of the uncritical thinking about the impacts of the dominance of the 
Commonwealth in our Federation. With an outdated Constitution and continuing 
Commonwealth confusion about its role in the Federation, it is timely to explore new 
ways of positioning the Commonwealth to collaboratively support the states in deliver-
ing the services that fall under their jurisdictional responsibility. 
American scholars have identified the value of a ‘learning’ and ‘leading’ role for a 
central government. The role is to acknowledge and support states and territories to 
remain laboratories for service delivery experimentation and innovation. It reduces the 
conflict arising from centrally imposed goals, based on compliance and penalty, on 
subnational jurisdictions. 
This chapter recommends the exploration of a truly federal culture, which would 
reduce the rancour in Commonwealth and state relations, and work towards a new 
model to harness the creativity and expertise of all levels of government in Australia.
Not all wisdom resides at the centre
There are many benefits in being in a federation, not the least being the capacity for 
policy innovation and tailoring local services for local communities.1 Yet, as a nation we 
have become bland homogenisers and turned our backs on the benefits of diversity 
inherent to a modern federation. We strive to fit all our states and regions into a one-
size-fits-all national policy approach. In the process we ignore the changing settlement 
patterns and demographics that show the emerging regional differences across the 
nation. 
How did we become so bland? Social activists, who value difference and diversity 
within their own organisations, become the first to call for a national approach to 
program or service delivery. Over time, the states have found themselves shoehorned 
into the role of the untrustworthy little brother of the Federation, with the paternal 
intervention of the Commonwealth Government required to pull them back into line 
if they head off in a new direction. Sticking up for the states in the Federation is an 
endangered exercise where in the media and popular thinking ‘national’ equals ‘good’, 
but state-based differences are characterised as parochial or vested interests. 
Having been through the annual round of that festival of football where state competes 
against state, it is hard to accept that the 80,000 NSW supporters cheering the Blues 
to victory believe territorial identification is dead. In Australia, the states and territories 
do differ from each other. Some states have a younger population, others a greater 
share of immigrants or indigenous Australians. They are at different stages of develop-
ment. Western Australia and Queensland are building the cultural institutions, ports 
and transport infrastructure that were put in place in Sydney and Melbourne more 
than a century ago when those cities became wealthy through the discovery of gold. 
The drive for homogenisation overlooks the important role that policy innovation and 
experimentation have played in Australia’s public life. Our reputation as a laboratory 
for democratic practice comes from state-based innovation such as South Australia’s 
enfranchisement of women voters in 1895 and the introduction of the secret ballot 
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in Tasmania, South Australia and Victoria in 1856. More recently, anti-discrimination 
legislation, carbon emission trading schemes, Casemix funding of public hospitals and 
climate change adaption innovations have all been initiated by the states. 
The states and territories have many legitimate concerns about their role in the 
Federation and the loss of federalist values through centralisation and Commonwealth 
dominance. This chapter seeks to unpick some of the uncritical and unconscious 
thinking that has emerged around Australia’s federal system and to reassert the case 
for diversity and difference.
The culture of the centre
Commonwealth and state relations have evolved into an unequal relationship. Through 
a combination of High Court decisions in favour of the Commonwealth Government 
and the loss of direct revenue-raising capacity by the states, the Commonwealth has 
reached far beyond its constitutional role to encroach into areas of state jurisdictional 
responsibility. This power has driven a lot of behaviours from the Commonwealth 
towards the states, and has allowed national governments to override state sover-
eignty and downplay the federal elements of our political life. 
In Australia, the Commonwealth Government has been a poor investor in resources 
and structures to manage multilevel governance.2 There is no federal culture within 
the Commonwealth and there is an ad-hoc approach to engaging with the states 
depending on the agenda of the Prime Minister of the day. In contrast, Canada, a 
comparable federation to Australia, invests heavily in resources to manage the rela-
tionship between the federal and provincial governments. Its central agency, the Privy 
Council Office (PCO), has a custodial role in managing these relationships. As well 
as having a dedicated Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, the PCO offers advice 
on intergovernmental matters including “the evolution of the federation and Canadian 
unity”.3 
This lack of a comparable federal consciousness in Australia manifests in many ways. 
The first is that the Commonwealth, both at the bureaucratic and political level, see 
any funding to states and territories as ‘their money’ rather than the nation’s, and 
that the states’ sovereignty and accountability mechanisms can be overridden with 
the Commonwealth having the right to ‘oversee’ how the states spend it.4 This was 
reinforced by the Auditor-General Amendment Bill 2011, which expanded the role of 
the federal Auditor-General to “follow the money trail” as if the state parliaments and 
auditor-generals were inadequate.5 
The states and territories often characterise their dealing with the Commonwealth 
as a culture of dismissal. Newly elected Premiers are shocked at attending their first 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting to find their attempts to make a 
serious contribution are often dismissed, as are their attempts to make a broader con-
tribution to nation building.6 Ministers received more shock treatment in the May 2014 
Federal Budget when the future growth funding for schools and hospitals suddenly 
disappeared. It now appears that National Partnership Agreements, and the funding 
formulas agreed within them, are no longer binding when the Commonwealth has a 
change of plan. This sense of dismissal permeates joint programs and initiatives. 
As the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program has shown, advice from 
state administrations on the regulatory inadequacies on the rollout was not welcomed 
by their Commonwealth counterparts. The same cycle was repeated in 2009 when 
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the proposed model for the Rudd Government’s health reforms was released to the 
media before the details were provided to the states and territories, despite the states 
and territories being responsible for the implementation of the reforms.7
Many of these manoeuvres are supported by the dark arts of divide and conquer, 
ambush, veto and withhold information.8 The Commonwealth frequently uses coercive 
practices, mainly based on its funding superiority, to get state and territory signup 
to a proposal. Commonwealth officials acknowledge the many games they play in 
intergovernmental negotiations and their propensity to enter into negotiations with a 
preconceived outcome.9 
State and territory disagreements are characterised by the Commonwealth as self-
serving and protecting vested interests. There seems little capacity within our federal 
system to manage the legitimate concerns of the states without them being cast as 
spoilers or interested only in parochial outcomes. In this, the media uncritically supports 
the Commonwealth interests. Most political commentary is generated by journalists 
based in Parliament House in Canberra. They have a world view forged by constant 
interaction with federal ministers and senior Canberra bureaucrats. The media seems 
only interested in reporting Commonwealth and state relations in terms of their block-
age of ‘national’ reforms or in depicting their behaviour as mendicant. Reporters tend 
to perpetuate the Commonwealth-centric view that if left to themselves, the states and 
territories would only squabble, so the Commonwealth must come in ‘over the top’ to 
settle the issue.
These petty irritations and gamesmanship mask a deeper problem. The value of a fed-
eration is the scrutiny and contribution that multiple governments can make to solving 
problems and implementing new programs. For many issues, the states and territories 
are closer to the impacts and implications for their constituents, yet little credence 
is given to their larger expertise in these areas. An untested assumption is that if the 
Commonwealth undertook service delivery, such as running hospitals, it would be 
done ‘better’. In Australia, we have unconsciously accepted that a national approach 
is inherently superior to seven state-based approaches. In this context, former 
Queensland Premier Beattie wrote of his desire to see a “more mature approach from 
the Commonwealth to ensure the strengths of our federal system of government are 
used more effectively”.10 
The problem of Commonwealth role confusion
In 1901, Australia’s Constitution set out what was a meaningful role for the new 
Commonwealth Government. This list of responsibilities now bears no resemblance 
to the complex intermingling of roles, responsibilities and funding agreements that 
characterise Commonwealth and state relations. What has remained consistent is 
the role of the states with their focus on service delivery. The Commonwealth’s role 
has become unstable and more so in recent years. Successive Prime Ministers 
have campaigned on issues under the jurisdictional control of the states and terri-
tories to show their commitment to the bread and butter issues of interest to most 
people. Now when the government changes federally, so do the areas for attention 
by the Commonwealth. Federal public servants have to scramble to get across new 
policy areas and programs as the reach of the Commonwealth becomes even more 
extensive. 
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This seesawing role has, in the past, reached absurd levels. As Prime Minister, Kevin 
Rudd floated a Commonwealth takeover of the health system. He wanted to quaran-
tine the states’ Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenue to pay for his reforms. He then 
settled for the Commonwealth being the ‘dominant funder’ of public hospitals.11 His 
successor, Tony Abbott, was an early advocate of the Commonwealth takeover of the 
health system, before announcing via this year’s Budget that “the states were respon-
sible for public hospitals and schools and would have to take on more responsibility 
for those areas of government”.12 
While the Commonwealth twists itself endlessly around what role it should have in the 
health system, the states keep building hospitals, running community services, manag-
ing infectious diseases and rolling out health promotion activities. The Commonwealth 
can cherry pick when and what it would like to be involved in, but the states have no 
choice. 
As the Commonwealth constantly dips into issues under the jurisdictional responsi-
bility of the states, its approach to managing that relationship is also unstable. The 
approach runs from the cooperative to the coercive, from benign neglect to micro-
management of state-based programs. This confusion about the Commonwealth 
Government’s role means there is no shared understanding in Australia of what kind of 
federation we are, and it leaves the relationship between the Commonwealth and the 
states under constant renegotiation. 
Finding a viable role for the Commonwealth
Recently, the Commonwealth cast itself as the great ‘fixer’ of Australia’s federal system. 
Using its financial advantage, money has been thrown at problems that the states 
have ‘failed to fix’. The many recent implementation failures of the Commonwealth may 
allow us to draw a line under this fallacy. The implementation of national, complex pro-
grams should not be the role of the Commonwealth, according to Labor Senator Mark 
Bishop, who recently claimed in relation to the National Rental Affordability Scheme, “it 
seems to me that the ability to properly design programs that are so complex is some-
thing the [Commonwealth] public service doesn’t really have the capacity or expertise 
to do”.13 
The question to ask is what is a meaningful role for the Commonwealth Government in 
the early 21st Century? Part of the answer will come through the White Paper on the 
Reform of the Federation in which the split of the roles and responsibilities between 
the Commonwealth and the states is one of the terms of reference. The white paper 
will allow consideration to be given to identifying what is genuinely an issue of national 
importance, what requires collaboration and coordination, and what should be left to 
state or local jurisdictions.
The establishment of the split of roles and responsibilities will present some options 
for the Commonwealth to reconceptualise its role. For areas in which it has clear 
jurisdictional responsibility, such as defence, immigration and foreign affairs, the 
Commonwealth Government remains responsible for all policy development and 
program funding. With areas of concurrent responsibility and overlap such as counter-
terrorism and disaster management, the opportunity will be to develop best practice 
collaborative models that recognise the principle of subsidiarity and make use of the 
expertise of different levels of government. For the third sphere of Commonwealth 
activity, the overlap and duplication of services for which the responsibility sits with the 
states, including health, policing and education, there is scope to reconceptualise the 
role of the Commonwealth within the Federation.
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If we accept that the states remain the laboratories of service delivery experimentation 
and innovation, then, as American scholar Shelley Metzenbaum has identified, federal 
agencies need to assume both a learning role and a leading role.14 By this, she means 
the national government adopts a different leadership role – one of identifying what 
works, disseminating findings, and helping with the transfer of promising practices and 
outcomes. This would mean shifting the emphasis from accountability and oversight 
to proactively generating “outcome-focused, evidence-based insights”.15 
How could this apply in Australia? Instead of an intergovernmental relationship 
based on compliance and penalty, there is the potential to develop a relationship 
built upon developing collective solutions to widespread problems. An example 
Metzenbaum uses is the valued relationship between the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the American states. The NHTSA collects informa-
tion about traffic injuries and fatalities. It also collects information about behaviours 
and conditions that might explain those events, and state government programs that 
address those concerns.16 The NHTSA is well regarded by the states because of its 
value add. The federal organisation collects and analyses data from across states to 
understand the patterns of problems. Based on this evidence, it identifies strategies 
to reduce fatalities and injuries as well as funding the testing of new strategies.17 The 
NHTSA prioritises returning knowledge to states and creates an environment “that 
continually harvests and re-sows the lessons of state experience”.18 
Adopting elements of this approach in Australia has the potential to move us beyond 
the cycle of conflict that characterises our intergovernmental relations when the centre 
seeks to impose their goals on subnational jurisdictions. For the states, the additional 
costs imposed on them to adopt national policy goals are never acknowledged. State 
leaders are elected with their own service delivery commitments and their budgets 
are aligned to meet those commitments. New Commonwealth goals displace those 
commitments, and states are often left with the long-term funding responsibility when 
the Commonwealth ceases investment in a particular program. A transition from com-
pliance to identifying productive and innovative approaches to problems establishes 
a more ‘federal’ role for the Commonwealth. It would allow the Commonwealth to 
exercise leadership through promoting experimentation and achievement, and dis-
seminating best practice across jurisdictions.
Such an approach by the Commonwealth would help unleash some of the advan-
tages of being in a federation, which are currently starved of oxygen in Australia. It 
would allow us to: 
•	 Value the diversity and competition inherent in a federal system; 
•	 Encourage the spread of innovation across jurisdictions; 
•	 Allow for the development of local services for local communities; and 
•	 Reduce the rancour that emerges when federal relations become confused, con-
flicted or coercive. 
It would also allow us to develop a ‘federal’ culture in which all levels of government 
could contribute to nation building by harnessing the creativity and expertise of all 
levels of government.
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The Commonwealth Government has long claimed the power to spend money on any 
subject it chooses, regardless whether it falls within its legislative powers. It has based 
this claim on the notion that it should be able to do anything that is for the nation’s 
benefit, and that it should have all the powers befitting a national government, such as 
those of the United Kingdom (UK) Government. 
History shows that this was never intended. The Commonwealth’s capacity to spend 
was always intended to be limited, with the expectation that a resulting large surplus 
would be transferred to the states to fund their greater spending responsibilities. 
From the 1970s into the 2000s, the Commonwealth built up a massive edifice of 
spending based upon little more than an aspirational view of the extent of its executive 
power and the hope that no court would be willing to knock it down. Spending, which 
had previously validly been made by grants through the states, was instead directly 
applied for the construction of local roads, programs in schools, regional development 
projects and massive pork-barrelling pre-election funding of sports grounds, surf clubs 
and community facilities. The Commonwealth treated the revenue that it received as 
its own money to use for maximum political and electoral benefit.
In a series of cases brought by individual taxpayers from 2009 to 2014, the High 
Court partially restored the original intent of the Constitution by making it clear that the 
Commonwealth:
•	 Can only undertake direct spending upon matters within its allocated legislative 
powers; and 
•	 For the most part, actually needs to legislate so that there is parliamentary authori-
sation of the expenditure of public money. 
The Commonwealth can still, of course, validly make grants to the states to spend 
money on other matters, but that requires a return to cooperative federalism. 
The constitutional framers’ intent: Keeping the surplus 
out of the hands of the Federal Treasurer
In the 1890s, the framers of the Constitution faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they 
intended to create a small central government of limited powers, leaving most func-
tions, including the most expensive responsibilities such as health and education, to 
the states. On the other hand, for political reasons, they proposed to allocate the main 
form of revenue, customs and excise duties,1 to the sole control of the Commonwealth. 
It was clear to the framers of the Constitution that a substantial amount of 
Commonwealth revenue would have to be transferred to the states. The constitutional 
convention debates of the 1890s showed that the framers were concerned that a 
large surplus inevitably leads to a “system of waste and extravagance”2 and gives rise 
to a temptation that should be kept “out of the hands of the Federal Treasurer”.3 They 
therefore did not want to leave the Commonwealth in control of the excess revenue 
that it would receive.
The framers decided that the Commonwealth should be limited to spending upon 
its own functions and that all the rest of its revenue – the surplus – should be paid to 
the states.4 The question was how to avoid any risk that the Commonwealth would 
gobble up the surplus in profligate spending, reducing the amount to be transferred to 
the states. 
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Some, such as the Premier of Tasmania, Sir Edward Braddon, thought there should 
be a fixed requirement that the Commonwealth could only spend one-quarter of its 
revenue from customs and excise duties, and that the rest had to be paid to the states. 
Such a requirement was included in the draft Constitution, but later whittled down in 
its application to 10 years, after which, it could be removed by the Commonwealth 
Parliament,5 which it did as soon as it was able.6 
Others, such as Sir John Downer, thought it unnecessary to impose any additional 
limits on Commonwealth expenditure because it was already achieved by “the limita-
tion of the subjects of jurisdiction given to the Commonwealth, and the impossibility of 
extravagant expenditure resulting from the limitation of the area of legislation and action 
of the Federal Parliament”.7 Sir John Downer was relying on the fact that under section 
81 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth could only appropriate money “for the pur-
poses of the Commonwealth” and not for any other purposes. The Commonwealth 
therefore needed to have been allocated legislative power on a subject in order to 
spend on it.
Commonwealth expenditure and grants to the states
It was well accepted in the first half of the 20th Century that the Commonwealth had 
limited spending powers and that the only way it could spend money outside of the 
subject matters granted to it by the Constitution was to make grants to the states 
under section 96 of the Constitution. For example, Justice Fullagar noted in a 1957 
case that Commonwealth funding for roads could only be made through section 96 
grants because the “Commonwealth had, of course, no power directly to appropriate 
moneys for application to the making or maintenance of roads”.8 
Section 96 stands as a clear indication that the Commonwealth cannot expend 
money in relation to some subject areas, unless it makes grants to the states to do 
so.9 In 1975, Justice Mason noted that the presence of section 96 “confirms what 
is otherwise deducible from the Constitution, that is, that the executive power is not 
unlimited and that there is a very large area of activity which lies outside the execu-
tive power of the Commonwealth but which may become the subject of conditions 
attached to grants under section 96.”10 Section 96 would otherwise be superfluous if 
the Commonwealth had the power to appropriate money with respect to any subject 
matter.11 These points have most recently been reiterated by the High Court in the 
2012 case, Williams No 1, concerning the school chaplaincy program.12 
The Commonwealth Government bridled against these restrictions, arguing that it 
should have all the powers befitting its status as a national government and that it 
should be able to spend upon any purpose it regards being for the benefit of the 
nation, regardless of the powers allocated to it by the Constitution. 
The Commonwealth therefore began, particularly in the 1970s under the Whitlam 
Government, to appropriate and spend money on subjects that were not within its 
constitutional powers. It relied upon the circular argument that the mere fact that the 
Commonwealth Parliament had decided to appropriate money for a purpose was 
enough to make it a ‘purpose of the Commonwealth’. This would, of course, render 
the phrase in section 81 of the Constitution superfluous, as all appropriations, by virtue 
of the fact that they were made, would on this reasoning be for the ‘purposes of the 
Commonwealth’. Nonetheless, some Justices of the High Court appeared to accept 
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this argument.13 These judges were influenced by both the concern that otherwise 
many past appropriations would be invalid14 and the need for the Commonwealth to 
fund worthy causes, such as exploration and scientific research.15 
A constitutional challenge to the validity of the appropriation for the Whitlam 
Government’s Australian Assistance Plan resulted in an equivocal outcome: 
•	 Three Justices upheld the validity of the appropriation; 
•	 Three Justices held that it was invalid, either because it was not an appropriation for 
the “purposes of the Commonwealth” or because the executive action implement-
ing the scheme went beyond the Commonwealth’s power; and
•	 The seventh Justice held that the states had no standing to challenge an 
appropriation.16 
There were obvious policy problems with permitting constitutional challenges to 
appropriations, as holding an Appropriation Act to be invalid, especially if this occurred 
long after it was passed, could cause serious financial problems and result in eco-
nomic instability. 
The result of the case was that the Australian Assistance Plan survived, even though 
there was no majority decision about the Commonwealth’s appropriation powers. 
While the Fraser Government retreated to the traditional and clearly valid practice of 
funding matters outside its powers through grants to the states, this practice was 
gradually eroded during the time of the Hawke and Keating governments. 
It was the Howard Government, however, that most starkly revived the Whitlamesque 
tactics of direct funding of local government, community groups, schools and other 
bodies, rather than making grants through the states. This was regarded as giving 
the Commonwealth electoral advantages by being seen as directly responsible for all 
beneficence, which was then proclaimed loudly in a proliferation of signs on roads 
and schools. It was also a tactical move to build up direct funding to such levels that it 
would discourage the High Court from striking down the validity of its spending due to 
the widespread damage it would cause.
The imposition of limits on the Commonwealth’s 
expenditure power 
Limits on the Commonwealth’s expenditure power have been progressively imposed 
in a series of three cases in the High Court:
1. Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (the Pape case);
2. Williams v Commonwealth No 1 (Williams No 1); and
3. Williams v Commonwealth No 2 (Williams No 2). 
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The Pape case
The first case was a challenge brought by Bryan Pape in 2009 to Commonwealth 
grants made to taxpayers as a means of stimulating the economy during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC).17 Rather than making the grants to the states with the condi-
tion they are paid out immediately to taxpayers, the Commonwealth wanted to gain 
maximum electoral advantage from sending out the cheques with a letter from the 
Treasurer showing who was responsible for this gift to taxpayers. 
Four Justices upheld the payments on the basis that they were a short-term response 
to a national economic emergency resulting from the GFC.18 The payments fell within 
a Commonwealth power, sometimes known as the ‘nationhood’ power, to “engage in 
enterprises and activities peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation and which 
cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of the nation”.19 
The critical aspect of the Pape case, however, was that all the Justices held that the 
power to appropriate money in section 81 of the Constitution did not support the 
expenditure of the money. The Commonwealth needed a separate power to support 
expenditure.20 This shifted the question away from whether an appropriation was for 
the “purposes of the Commonwealth” to whether the Commonwealth had a head of 
power to support the expenditure of money on particular programs. By shifting the 
question in this way, the Court avoided the problem of Appropriation Acts being held 
invalid and whether anyone had standing to challenge them. Instead, the battlefield 
moved to whether the Commonwealth had validly authorised the expenditure of the 
money. 
Members of the Court also started raising issues of federalism, which had long been 
neglected, particularly in their expansive interpretations of Commonwealth legislative 
powers.21 Chief Justice French, while accepting that the nationhood power applied 
in this case, noted that it “cannot be invoked to set aside the distribution of powers 
between the Commonwealth and the states”.22 
Justices Hayne and Kiefel observed that the federal system is one of separately organ-
ised polities of which the Commonwealth is a government of “limited and defined 
powers”.23 They pointed out that the Commonwealth’s executive power “is the execu-
tive power of a polity of limited powers”.24 
Justice Heydon added that “the Commonwealth Government, while in one sense a 
‘national government’, is only the central government in a federal nation”.25 This is in 
stark contrast to the Commonwealth’s view of itself as being the dominant govern-
ment in Australia, having the full executive powers befitting the status of any national 
government.
As a majority of the Court ultimately upheld the validity of the payments in the Pape 
case, the Commonwealth seems to have assumed that in the end the High Court 
would never strike down its expenditure, particularly as its edifice of direct expendi-
ture was now so immense and complex. In evidence to a parliamentary committee, 
an officer of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet stated that having 
taken into account the High Court’s judgment in the Pape case, “the Commonwealth 
remains able to make grants under its general powers in the Constitution”.26 
The Commonwealth Government appeared to consider that it had a general power 
to spend on anything that was for the national benefit, and that this would be sup-
ported by its executive power, without the need for legislation. The Commonwealth 
was wrong on both points, as the two subsequent Williams cases show.
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Williams No 1
Ron Williams challenged the Commonwealth’s expenditure on a chaplaincy scheme 
for schools. While his real concern was the use of chaplains in public schools, which 
he regarded a breach of the separation of Church and State, his legal advisers sug-
gested that a more effective challenge would be to argue that there was no legislative 
head of power supporting the expenditure and that its validity could not rest solely 
on executive power. The chaplaincy scheme was not supported by legislation. It was 
purely an administrative and contractual arrangement that governed the expenditure 
of money that had been appropriated as part of the budget.
The Commonwealth argued that just like any legal person, it had the capacity to 
spend money on anything, as long as it was the subject of a valid appropriation. In 
the alternative, it argued that it at least had the power to spend money on anything 
that could have been the subject of a validly enacted law authorising the expenditure, 
without actually having to enact such a law. 
The High Court rejected both arguments. In doing so, it relied upon three essential 
factors: 
1.  The principles of federalism; 
2.  The requirement that the executive be accountable to the Parliament; and 
3.  The fact that the Commonwealth was spending ‘public money’ rather than its own 
money.
1. Federalism
On the federalism front, Justices Gummow, Crennan and Bell expressed concern that a 
broad Commonwealth expenditure power would mean that the Commonwealth could 
bypass the need to make grants to the states under section 96 of the Constitution.27 
Justice Hayne noted that grants to the states must not be coercive and may be 
refused by the states if they do not accept the conditions. If the Commonwealth could 
make direct grants to bodies under its executive power, the states would get no say 
and coercive conditions could be attached.28 
Justices Crennan and Kiefel added that the very presence of section 96 in the 
Constitution was evidence that the Commonwealth’s executive power did not extend 
so far and that there are large areas beyond the scope of the Commonwealth’s execu-
tive power.29 Justices Gummow and Bell even acknowledged that “the conduct of the 
public school system in Queensland … is the responsibility of that state”.30 
Justice Kiefel expressed concern that a broad Commonwealth expenditure power 
would lead it to encroach upon “areas of state operation and thereby affect the 
distribution of powers between the Commonwealth and the states”.31 Her Honour 
considered that chaplaincy services in schools were within “the province of the states, 
in their provision of support for school services”.32
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2. Accountability
The Court stressed the importance of parliamentary accountability for expenditure 
above and beyond the limited scrutiny given to appropriations. It emphasised the 
scrutiny of the Senate and the need for Parliament to have a role in the “formulation, 
amendment or termination” of programs for the expenditure of money.33 
Justice Hayne added that above and beyond constitutional requirements for parlia-
mentary involvement, it would also be “sound government and administrative practice” 
for programs to be governed by legislation, making them reviewable both within 
Parliament and outside it.34 Government programs that are the subject of legislation, 
rather than being worked out on whiteboards or the back of envelopes, have to be 
more closely thought through, and publicly justified and defended in both Houses of 
the Parliament. This means they are more likely to be efficient and better administered 
than programs based solely on executive fiat.
3. Public money
The third point that the High Court made is that the Commonwealth is not spend-
ing its own money. Rather, it is spending public money, and must therefore be more 
accountable.35 This point can’t be stressed enough. It is not money that may be used 
to maximise the political and electoral advantage of the Commonwealth Government 
(whichever party happens to be in office). It is money raised from the public for the 
purpose of providing government services and infrastructure to the public at both the 
Commonwealth and state level. The expenditure should be based upon providing for 
those needs, wherever they are situated, not upon desires for self-aggrandisement or 
for maximising the electoral advantages of pre-election pork-barrelling.
The Commonwealth response 
The Commonwealth’s response was swift, brutal and rash. Rather than assessing the 
different types of programs that currently relied upon the executive power and whether 
they could be made the subject of valid legislation or were better dealt with by way of 
grants to the states, the Commonwealth simply legislated to validate them all in a job 
lot.36 Its legislation purported to validate past programs and authorise future programs 
as long as they could be shoe-horned within a list of over 400 programs set out in 
the regulations to the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth). The 
descriptions of these programs are in many cases extremely wide, such as ‘Diversity 
and Social Cohesion’, ‘Domestic Policy’ and ‘Regional Development’.37 
Little or no consideration seems to have been given as to whether each particular 
program was supported by a head of Commonwealth legislative power. Certainly 
this was not addressed in the very brief debate while the Bill was rushed through 
Parliament. Again, the assumption was made by the Commonwealth Government that 
it could still spend on anything that it regarded beneficial for the nation – but that there 
must now be some kind of general legislation to support it. The principles, upon which 
the High Court had relied, such as federalism and the need for parliamentary account-
ability, were simply ignored. 
One of the many programs validated and authorised was the chaplaincy program. 
Ron Williams again took the matter to the High Court.
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Williams No 2
Ron Williams challenged the chaplaincy program on the ground that the 
Commonwealth had no legislative power to support spending upon chaplaincy in 
schools. He also challenged the validity of the Commonwealth legislation that sought 
to validate all the Commonwealth’s executive expenditure programs on the ground 
that it wasn’t supported by a head of Commonwealth legislative power either.
The Commonwealth argued that the chaplaincy program was supported by:
•	 A constitutional provision that allows the Commonwealth to make laws with respect 
to ‘benefits to students’; and 
•	 Its power to make laws with respect to ‘trading corporations’ (on the ground that 
Scripture Union Queensland, to which the money had been paid, was a trading 
corporation). 
The High Court unanimously dismissed both arguments. It held that neither power 
supported Commonwealth legislation authorising spending upon the chaplaincy 
program.38 
The Commonwealth also sought to overturn Williams No 1, contending that:
•	 The principles in the case were not carefully worked out over a series of cases; 
•	 There had been insufficient argument on the issues; 
•	 The reasoning did not give a single answer about when legislation is required to 
support expenditure; and 
•	 The case had “led to considerable inconvenience with no significant corresponding 
benefits”.39 
The High Court, however, dismissed these complaints and reinforced its judgment in 
Williams No 1. 
The Commonwealth argued again that its power to spend was not constrained by the 
federal distribution of powers in the Constitution. If it was, however, it argued that it still 
had an executive power to spend on all matters that are reasonably capable of being 
seen as of national benefit or concern, being those that “befit the national government 
of the Federation”.40 It then argued that chaplaincy is “reasonably capable of being 
seen as a matter of national benefit or concern” and that expenditure on the program 
was therefore valid. 
The Court responded by noting that on this reasoning, practically anything would fall 
within the Commonwealth’s spending powers.41 It concluded that the Commonwealth’s 
argument was based upon the false premise that “the executive power of the 
Commonwealth should be assumed to be no less than the executive power of the 
British Executive”.42 The Court stressed that Australia is a federation, not a unitary 
state, and that the Commonwealth’s powers are therefore limited. It concluded:
“ This assumption, which underpinned the arguments advanced by the Commonwealth 
parties about executive power, denies the ‘basal consideration’ that the Constitution effects 
a distribution of powers and functions between the Commonwealth and the states. The 
polity which, as the Commonwealth parties rightly submitted, must ‘possess all the powers 
that it needs in order to function as a polity’ is the central polity of a federation in which 
independent governments exist in the one area and exercise powers in different fields of 
action carefully defined by law. It is not a polity organised and operating under a unitary 
system or under a flexible constitution where the Parliament is supreme. The assumption 
underpinning the Commonwealth parties’ submissions about executive power is not right 
and should be rejected.”43
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This has hopefully once and for all eliminated the Commonwealth’s premise that as a 
‘national’ government it can spend on anything it deems in the national interest or for 
national benefit.
Despite the Commonwealth’s provocation, the High Court was ultimately quite 
restrained in its judgment in Williams No 2. It did not strike down the whole of the 
Commonwealth’s scheme to validate and authorise the hundreds of Commonwealth 
spending programs. Instead, it chose to read the relevant provisions so that they only 
operated in relation to those spending programs that fall under a Commonwealth leg-
islative power.44 The law is therefore likely to be effective in supporting some of the 
listed programs, being those that clearly fall within a head of Commonwealth legislative 
power, such as external affairs, defence or immigration. However, this leaves uncertain 
the validity of Commonwealth spending upon a large range of other programs that do 
not appear to fall under its legislative power. 
Professor George Williams observed that this includes programs concerning matters 
such as “drought assistance, local government, community legal centres, energy effi-
ciency, community safety, affordable housing, sport and the arts” as well as education 
programs such as those concerning “early childhood education, school support and 
the Australian baccalaureate”.45 
Implications for cooperative federalism
In the Pape and Williams cases, the High Court made it clear that the Commonwealth 
is a polity of limited powers within a federation made up of independent govern-
ments. The Commonwealth does not have the power to spend on matters outside 
the powers allocated to it by the Constitution, unless it does so by grants to the states 
under section 96 of the Constitution. It also made clear that these grants must not be 
coercive and the states must have the option to reject them. What, therefore, are the 
consequences of Williams No 2?
As the High Court did not strike down the provisions of the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act that purport to authorise Commonwealth expenditure, these provi-
sions may continue to operate in relation to those spending programs that fall within 
the Commonwealth’s powers.46 For other spending programs that rest on a more 
dubious basis, the Commonwealth might rely on the fact that it is very rare for anyone 
to challenge the validity of its spending programs and it might take the view that it 
should continue with spending as usual until brought to book by more litigation. This 
would be a narrow short-term approach, but consistent with previous Commonwealth 
practice.
A more sensible approach by the Commonwealth, however, would be to reassess its 
expenditure programs. Which ones fall within its powers? Which ones fall within national 
priorities and ought to be the subject of cooperation between the Commonwealth and 
the states? Which ones are really matters for the states to deal with? What economic 
advantages can be achieved by a single level of government dealing with an issue 
rather than the duplication of policy, administrative and accountability roles? What, 
in short, is best for the long-term interests of the people of Australia, rather than the 
short-term interests of political parties in government?
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White Paper on the Reform of the Federation
The reconsideration of these expenditure programs should occur within the wider 
context of the reform of the federal system, and Commonwealth and state financial 
relations. The terms of reference for the Commonwealth’s proposed White Paper on 
the Reform of the Federation raise some hope that these issues will be addressed 
comprehensively. If it can be achieved, the next great productivity reform for Australia 
will be the reform of the federal system to remove inefficiencies arising from duplica-
tion, excessive administrative burdens, over-centralism and lack of competition. 
The Prime Minister, in announcing the terms of reference of the white paper, recognised 
that a major part of the problem with the federal system is that the Commonwealth 
has become increasingly involved “in matters which have traditionally been the 
responsibility of the states and territories” and that states and territories have become 
increasingly reliant on revenue collection by the Commonwealth.47 
The white paper is to consider, within the constitutional framework:
•	 The practicalities of limiting Commonwealth policies and funding to core national 
interest matters, as typified by the matters in section 51 of the Constitution;
•	 Reducing or, if appropriate, eliminating overlap between local, state and 
Commonwealth responsibility or involvement in the delivery and funding of public 
programs;
•	 Achieving agreement between state and Commonwealth governments about their 
distinct and mutually exclusive responsibilities and subsequent funding sources for 
associated programs; and
•	 Achieving equity and sustainability in the funding of any programs deemed the 
responsibility of more than one level of government.48 
While laudable aims, reforms of these kind have been promised many times before. 
Almost every Prime Minister has some kind of ‘new federalism’ policy that gives rise to 
much sound and fury but ultimately signifies nothing. 
Kevin Rudd swept to power with great plans to end the blame game and reform the 
federal system. Significant changes were made to simplify and consolidate grants, 
only to be undone almost immediately by the creation of ‘national partnerships’, which 
reinvented the previous burdens, duplication and encumbrances. Hence it is difficult 
not to be cynical about new promises of federalism reform.
However, nothing can be achieved without trying. The key difference will be whether 
there is sufficient willingness to tackle the issue of federal financial relations. Returning 
responsibilities to the states is a hollow reform if relevant funding (or means of funding) 
does not accompany the responsibilities. As the High Court stressed in Williams 
No 1, it is ‘public money’ that is in question, not the Commonwealth’s money. An 
assessment needs to be made of the general cost of different responsibilities, such as 
health and education, as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), and access 
to the same proportion of overall revenue must be allocated to the level of government 
that holds the responsibility. Whether this should be done by reallocating sources of 
tax revenue to different levels of government (which enhances responsibility for the 
balance between revenue raising and expenditure) or whether it is achieved by tax 
sharing (because it is often more economically efficient for a tax to be imposed and 
administered centrally) is a matter for further discussion. 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
80
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
81
S E C T I O N  2 . 2
For the federal system to work efficiently, it is imperative that the level of government 
responsible for fulfilling a function has access to the revenue needed to perform that 
function adequately without needing to rely upon the goodwill of another level of gov-
ernment. The framers sought to achieve this outcome by limiting the Commonwealth’s 
spending to its responsibilities and allocating the surplus to the states. This system 
failed within 10 years of federation. One can only hope that the outcome of the White 
Paper on the Reform of the Federation is a more effective system that has a longer 
and more productive life.
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The historical origins of Australia, first as colonies, then as self-governing states, and 
finally as a Federation, have engendered the development of a cooperative federalism 
that governs Australia today. This concept of cooperative federalism, where national, 
state and local governments interact cooperatively and collectively to solve common 
issues and concerns, defines the regulatory setting in Australia. 
Both shaped by and constrained by federalism, Australia’s regulatory framework illus-
trates how regulation in the 21st Century is the interaction of state and federal levels 
of government regulating the myriad of activities that occur in Australia today. Some 
activities, such an onshore mining, are the regulatory purview of the states, falling 
squarely within the plenary powers. Other areas, such as immigration and defence fall 
within Commonwealth regulatory competence. Still others, such as offshore petroleum 
activities, exhibit regulatory complexities, since both the states and Commonwealth 
have regulatory jurisdiction over some portion of the activities. 
This chapter provides an overview of the regulatory setting within which 21st Century 
Australia operates. To examine the regulatory setting within the Australian Federation, 
the chapter firstly examines what regulation means. In doing so, it identifies the many 
forms of regulation, before settling on the idea of legal regulation. To consider legal 
regulation in 21st Century Australia, this chapter also provides an overview of the dis-
tribution of regulatory power to the Commonwealth and states as conferred by the 
Australian Constitution and delineated in subsequent judicial decisions. 
The chapter then examines the regulatory setting of Australia’s Federation today, in 
particular, the forms of regulation available for cooperative federalism to continue, 
such as: 
•	 The use of the referral power under section 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution; 
•	 Co-regulation; 
•	 Mirror legislation; and 
•	 Harmonisation of legal frameworks.
What does ‘regulation’ mean?
The concept of regulation has existed for many millennia. In its broadest sense, regula-
tion can be described as a rule designed to control or govern conduct. The concept of 
regulation refers to “the broad range of legally enforceable instruments which impose 
mandatory requirements upon business and the community, as well as those gov-
ernment voluntary codes and advisory instruments for which there is a reasonable 
expectation of widespread compliance”.1 Governments use regulations as instruments 
to achieve economic, social and environmental objectives.2 
Such regulation has existed since early civilisations, including Egyptian, Roman, Greek 
and Indian civilisations. Indeed, the fundamental basis of civil law, the Justinian Code 
(also known as Corpus Juris), arose from a collection of fundamental works in juris-
prudence issued from 529 to 534 by order of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian.3
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Many forms of regulation occur. Freiburg identifies at least six forms, including:
1. Economic regulation; 
2. Transactional regulation; 
3. Authorisation as regulation; 
4. Structural regulation; 
5. Informational regulation; and 
6. Legal regulation.4 
In the context of regulation within the Federation, this chapter will focus on legal 
regulation as a tool that governments use to govern the conduct of those within the 
Federation. 
The legislative framework established by a state can include either rule-based (pre-
scriptive) or objective-based legislation.5 
Rule-based regulatory frameworks rely on legislatively entrenched rules to regulate 
activities. These systems tend to require new rules every time a new regulatory situ-
ation arises.6 In addition, rule-based regulation can lead to regulatory inconsistencies 
and rigidity, and is prone to creative compliance to adjust to new situations.7 
Objective-based regulation moves away from detailed, prescriptive rules, instead 
relying on broadly stated principles or objectives to set the standards by which 
companies conduct their operations, and the basis for decision-making by public 
authorities. Under this type of regulation, there is a reference to generalities that 
express fundamental obligations that the participants should observe.8 It is often 
known as objective-based regulation since it seeks to implement the policy objectives 
using broad principles rather than specific rules.
Regulatory setting in the Australian Federation
Since federation, the regulation of Australian states has been redistributed between 
federal and state governments. The Australian Constitution enumerates the regulatory 
powers granted to the Commonwealth Government (head of power). Generally, these 
powers are enumerated under section 51 of the Australian Constitution. Examples of 
these powers include:
•	 Trade and commerce; 
•	 Corporations; 
•	 External affairs; 
•	 Taxation; 
•	 Defence; and 
•	 The incidental power under section 51(xxxix), which allows the Commonwealth to 
act on matters incidental to an enumerated head of power. 
The extent of the Commonwealth’s enumerated power has been defined and shaped 
by over 100 years of judicial interpretation by the High Court. Several notable cases, 
including The Engineers Case,9 The Boilermakers Case10 and the Tasmanian Dams 
Case,11 have considered the powers of the Commonwealth and the states. Over 
the last 110 years, decisions of the High Court have delineated the boundaries of 
Commonwealth powers, and under the Constitution, considerably expanded the 
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Commonwealth’s powers. The ‘incidental power’ under section 51(xxxix) of the 
Constitution, in conjunction with judicial decisions, has increasingly concentrated 
regulatory control in the hands of the Commonwealth. A recent example of such regu-
latory control is demonstrated in the shift of the control of employment and industrial 
relations to the Commonwealth, particularly after the decision in The Work Choices 
Case.12 
Where there is no enumerated power for regulation by the Commonwealth, the 
regulation will fall to the states under plenary powers granted by the various state 
constitutions.13 Such plenary powers are often referred to as “… to make laws for 
the peace, welfare and good government of the state”. For example, section 2 of 
the Queensland Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) authorises the Queensland Parliament to 
make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of Queensland. Such plenary 
powers of the states are subject to section 109 of the Australian Constitution, in which 
if a law of a state is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth 
law shall prevail, and the state law, to the extent of the inconsistency, shall be invalid. 
The states also have the capacity to refer matters to the Commonwealth Parliament 
under section 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution (the referral power). 
The Council of Australian Governments
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) was established in 1992 to coordinate 
activities between federal and state governments, and between state governments, 
to enhance cooperation within the Federation. As a peak intergovernmental forum in 
Australia, the COAG is committed to making federalism work, with an emphasis on 
“cooperative working relationships rather than buck-passing and blame”.14 
The COAG’s core agenda of making federalism work centres on regulatory reform. To 
achieve such reform, all members of the COAG agreed that regulation in their jurisdic-
tions should be consistent with the following principles: 
1. Prior to regulatory reform or change, a case for action is established;
2.  A range of regulatory types is considered for the regulation of the activity, including 
self-regulation, co-regulation and non-regulation, and their net benefits and costs 
assessed;
3.  The regulator adopts the regulatory option that generates the greatest benefit for 
the community;
4.  Regulation and legislation should not restrict competition unless it benefits the com-
munity as a whole and the objectives of the regulation can only be achieved through 
restriction of competition; 
5.  Effective guidance should be provided to relevant regulators and regulated parties 
to ensure the policy intent and compliance requirements of the regulation are clear;
6.  The regulation should remain relevant and effective over time; 
7.  The regulator consults effectively with key stakeholders during all stages of the 
regulatory cycle; and 
8.  Government action should be effective and proportional to the issue addressed and 
the area of regulation.15 
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However, often regulatory frameworks, and their concomitant policy regimes, emerge 
incrementally over long periods of time to solve largely simple problems,16 resulting in 
regulatory frameworks and policies that may be incoherent, inconsistent and impre-
cise, causing regulatory burden.17
To implement the COAG’s principles, it is also essential that existing regulatory frame-
works impose the minimum burden necessary to achieve the desired regulatory and 
policy objective. 
The regulatory burden created by the Federation
Unnecessary regulation (often known as regulatory burden) has been identified as a 
critical issue in regulation for the 21st Century Federation. 
In 2005-06, a Productivity Commission Taskforce undertook a study on reducing 
regulatory burden on business. The resulting report, Rethinking Regulation,18 identified 
that the volume of regulation in Australia has risen dramatically since 1990, with more 
regulation passed by the Australian Parliament from 1990-2005 than in the preceding 
90 years of federation.19 This has not only increased the complexity of regulation, but 
also produced regulation of variable quality. Problems with regulation identified by the 
taskforce included unclear and questionable objectives, excessive reporting require-
ments, overlap, duplication and inconsistency, and poorly expressed confusing and 
inconsistent use of terms.20 
The Productivity Commission undertook a study into regulatory burden in the upstream 
petroleum sector in 2008-09.21 The findings of this study correlated with the findings 
of Rethinking Regulation. It identified multiple sources of regulatory burden arising from 
the complexity of the regulation of offshore resources by state and federal govern-
ments. Sources of regulatory burden include: 
•	 Unclear, questionable or conflicting objectives;
•	 Overly complex regulation;
•	 Excessively prescriptive regulation;
•	 Duplication of regulation;
•	 Inadequate resourcing of regulators (including inexperience or lack of expertise);
•	 Overzealous regulation;
•	 Regulatory bias;
•	 Unwieldy approval and licencing processes; and 
•	 Lack of transparency in regulatory processes.22 
The nature of Australia’s Federation has the potential to exacerbate both the growth 
in regulation and the burden that regulation creates. Having unclear role definition 
between spheres of government can cause regulatory overlap, worsening many of the 
problems that the Productivity Commission identified. 
An example of the effect of Australia’s federalist regulatory setting is found in the 
Queensland aquaculture industry. As incomes have increased in Asia, with concomitant 
declining fishery catches in the region, there is an opportunity for Australia to develop 
its aquaculture industry. However, a recent review of aquaculture in Queensland found 
that no new major investments are being undertaken. Many in the Queensland aqua-
culture industry cite regulatory risk as a significant barrier to new investment. This risk 
arises because of the complex and lengthy approvals process, which has no certainty 
of outcome.23
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The industry exists, like many others (for example, aggregates extraction), in a legisla-
tive ‘grey’ area. Queensland does not have dedicated aquaculture legislation. Rather, 
aquaculture is regulated through a combination of planning, fisheries, environment 
and food safety regulation, with some of these areas regulated at both state and 
Commonwealth levels. Various licences, permits and development approvals from 
both state and Commonwealth governments may be required for aquaculture pro-
duction, depending on the location, species and production systems. The complexity 
involved has been cited as killing the industry before it has a chance to emerge.
As the Queensland Competition Authority noted in its report of the Queensland 
aquaculture industry, the regulatory risks to the aquaculture industry are uneven. If 
the development potential is large but unrealised because of regulatory barriers, the 
resulting economic loss is significant. However, if there is little development potential, 
the downside of regulatory reform is quite small. There will simply be little or no growth 
in aquaculture production. In this situation, with a potentially large loss from lack of 
regulatory reform, but minimal loss from regulatory reform followed by market-driven 
lack of development, it is preferable to undertake regulatory reform.24
Tools to reduce regulatory burden in Australia’s  
21st Century Federation
A number of regulatory tools can be, and are, used within the Federation to address 
regulatory burden and align with the COAG’s aim of implementing regulatory prin-
ciples. The tools include:
•	 Referral powers;
•	 Mirror legislation; and
•	 Legal harmonisation.
Referral powers
Section 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution allows the states to refer the plenary 
power it holds for a particular activity to the Commonwealth. This ‘referral’ may also be 
done by one state on an individual basis. 
An example of such referral of power by a single state was the referral of certain 
industrial relations matters by the Victorian Government to the Commonwealth under 
the Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996 (Vic). By referring industrial 
relations laws to the Commonwealth, Victoria enabled the Commonwealth Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth) to apply to its industrial relations. 
Referral may also be undertaken by all states in unison to establish Commonwealth 
regulatory control over an activity. Such collective conferral of power occurred in 
2001 at the coaxing of the Commonwealth Government, and was enacted in the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). It would appear that the Commonwealth holds a plenary 
power for making laws with respect to corporations under section 51(xx) of the 
Australian Constitution. However, in the 1990 Incorporations Case,25 New South Wales 
(NSW) questioned the constitutional validity of the Commonwealth to make laws with 
respect to corporations under the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth). The High Court held 
that while section 51(xx) empowers the Commonwealth to legislate with respect to 
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth, it did not have the power 
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to regulate the formation of a corporation, and could only regulate a corporation once 
it had been formed. Since the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) regulated the formation 
of corporations as well as those already formed, the parts of the Act regulating the 
formation of corporations was invalid. 
The Commonwealth eventually obtained the power to regulate all aspects of corpora-
tions, including their formation, by persuading the states to refer their powers over 
incorporation processes to the Commonwealth. Such referred powers are imbued in 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
Similarly, the states transferred regulatory responsibility of credit to the Commonwealth, 
where regulatory responsibility for credit lies with the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 (Cth). This referral was achieved on the heels of the Global 
Financial Crisis, with the states identifying the logic in a single regulatory framework for 
credit in Australia in an era of increasing electronic credit activities that defy national 
borders. 
Mirror legislation 
Mirror legislation is identical legislation enacted in each state and territory to create 
nation-wide consistency. This was effectively employed as a regulatory tool within the 
Federation in the early 1980s to address the complex issue of the regulation of off-
shore petroleum activities. 
When petroleum was first discovered in the early 1960s, the Commonwealth 
Government grappled with how the regulatory framework should be constituted given 
there were no enumerated powers for the Commonwealth with respect to natural 
resources under the Australian Constitution. The solution was the 1967 Petroleum 
Agreement. The legal status of the Agreement was articulated in clause 26, with the 
participating governments acknowledging that, “… this Agreement is not intended to 
create legal relationships justiciable in a Court of Law but declare that the Agreement 
shall be construed and given effect to by the parties in all respects according to the 
true meaning and spirit thereof”.26 
The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) was implemented to give effect to 
the Petroleum Agreement, thereby securing offshore petroleum development without 
having to resolve the issue of jurisdiction over marine natural resources. This regulatory 
détente was shaken by the Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth), in which the 
Commonwealth claimed jurisdiction over all of Australia’s territorial sea.27 The states 
challenged this assertion, claiming that the first three nautical miles of the territorial sea 
were vested with the states for historical reasons.28 
NSW challenged the constitutional validity of the Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
(Cth) in the High Court in the Sea and Submerged Lands Case 1975.29 The High Court 
held that under section 51(xxix) of the Constitution, the external affairs power extends 
to anything that in its nature is external to Australia, including marine boundaries. This 
meant that the states held no jurisdiction over waters below low water mark. 
However, in the interests of cooperative federalism, the states and Commonwealth 
governments negotiated a settlement of marine boundaries through the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement (OCS) in 1979. The OCS divided the regulation of Australia’s 
offshore petroleum activities between the states and the Commonwealth Government, 
with the states regulating the first three nautical miles and the Commonwealth regulat-
ing seaward from three nautical miles. 
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To effectively co-regulate petroleum activities, the states enacted legislation that ‘mir-
rored’ the Commonwealth’s Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act. However, in 2008, the 
new Commonwealth Act, the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2008 (Cth), came into force. No states except Victoria have mirrored the legislation. 
As such, regulatory burdens and inconsistencies have been identified, as articulated 
in the 2009 Productivity Commission Report, Review of the Regulatory Burden on the 
Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector. 
The case of the Petroleum (Submerged Land) Acts demonstrates how mirror legisla-
tion can be ineffective, and how it can even contribute to regulatory burden when 
amendments are not consistently made over all jurisdictions. 
Legal harmonisation 
A tool for regulators that is likely to be increasingly used in the 21st Century Federation 
is that of legal harmonisation. Rather than requiring exact ‘mirroring’ of legislation, 
legal harmonisation requires that the principles of the Act and the policy objectives 
be imbued in the legislation, leaving the jurisdiction to implement the principles in a 
legislative drafting manner that it sees fit. This harmonisation of laws can be seen in 
the implementation of EU directives in the European Union. The EU provides Australia 
with a working example of states (in this instance, nation states) that are directed to 
implement principles from EU directives, and then implement the principles laid out in 
the directive in a manner that the nation state sees fit. 
An excellent example of this is Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorizations 
for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (1994) (the 
Hydrocarbon Directive). Each EU member state is directed to implement the provisions 
of the directive, but is able to implement within existing hydrocarbon laws. Directive 
94/22/EC was implemented in diverse legislation throughout the EU, including the 
Minerals Act in Poland, the Petroleum Act in the United Kingdom, and the Petroleum 
Activities Act in Norway. No two legislative instruments read alike, yet all implement the 
objectives and principles required under the Hydrocarbon Directive. 
In Australia, legal harmonisation has been effectively implemented in offshore petro-
leum safety. After the Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea, the regulation of offshore 
petroleum platform was reformed, with the ushering in of the use of the Safety Case 
Regime (SCR) as a principle-based form of safety regulation.30 By 2000, companies 
and governments alike saw the need for coordinated, national safety regulation. To 
achieve this objective, the states and the Commonwealth harmonised their legislation 
to enact the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA). While not mirror 
legislation, the harmonised framework along with Memorandum of Agreements, is 
extremely effective in enacting the objective of Commonwealth-based safety regula-
tion in offshore petroleum safety. 
The COAG has recently attempted to harmonise legal frameworks between states 
with respect to coal seam gas activities. In its Land Access Work Stream, the COAG 
Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER) (now COAG Energy Council) 
sought to address the regulatory issues affecting investment in resource exploration 
and development in natural gas from coal seams, especially land access, community 
and infrastructure. To address these issues, the COAG Energy Council embarked upon 
the Harmonisation of CSG Regulation project. The project operated from December 
2011 to May 2013, with the SCER developing and endorsing a harmonised framework 
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for CSG. The National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Natural Gas from Coal 
Seams31 (the harmonisation framework) puts in place a suite of leading regulatory prin-
ciples relating to coal seam gas extraction and regulators in the management of coal 
seam gas. It also ensures that regulatory regimes are robust, consistent and transpar-
ent across all Australian jurisdictions.32 
Although the Commonwealth does not have the necessary enumerated power to reg-
ulate coal seam gas extraction in the states, through the COAG Energy Council, the 
Commonwealth has sought to harmonise the laws relating to coal seam gas in state 
jurisdictions. Although non-binding, the harmonisation framework has been developed 
to provide guidance for the states to develop the regulatory tools required for coal 
seam gas extraction and to ensure this development is managed sustainably.33 
In the Australian Federation, where relationships between the states and the 
Commonwealth have at times been contentious, the non-binding nature of the har-
monisation framework means that the Commonwealth is not trying to wrest regulatory 
control from the states. Instead, the states are able to use the framework to develop a 
regulatory framework that implements the COAG’s principles of good regulation for an 
activity in which some states have less competency than others. 
Non-binding legal harmonisation of principles associated with the regulation of activi-
ties that occur in multiples states may become an increasingly useful tool to implement 
the principles of good regulation that the COAG developed, reduce regulation, and to 
continue the spirit of cooperative federalism.
Where will it all end?
This chapter has identified the regulatory tools that will be increasingly implemented in 
the new millennium to effectively regulate in the Australian Federation. Yet there are still 
so many areas that require attention. In the area of property, one of the fundamental 
economic drivers in Australia, there have been some major reforms. It took over 30 
years, but finally Australia has a national personal properties security regulatory frame-
work under the Personal Properties Securities Act 2009 (Cth). Similarly, a National 
Electronic Conveyancing System was implemented at the initiative of the COAG to 
provide a single electronic conveyancing system for use throughout Australia. Yet 
there still remain eight separate land title jurisdictions. While there have been some 
attempts to create a national Torrens title system, there is yet to be a single system of 
Torrens title. Perhaps one answer is the harmonisation of Torrens title legislation in the 
different jurisdictions. Another answer may be that all states mirror their Torrens title 
legislation similar to the mirroring of Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts in each of the 
states. Another possibility is the conferral of powers relating to the regulation of land 
title to the Commonwealth. 
Whichever method is used, there exists the capacity to create a single land title jurisdic-
tion to reduce regulatory burden and principles of regulation set down by the COAG. 
However there is one important and necessary component missing – cooperation. 
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Conclusion
The political will for regulatory cooperation is essential for regulation in Australia’s 21st 
Century Federation. Without cooperation, the tools for efficient and effective regulation 
in Australia will exist, but they will not be used to continue the tradition of cooperative 
Federalism. 
As this chapter has illustrated, so many times states have challenged the 
Commonwealth’s power to legislate with respect to certain matters. In some areas, 
such as offshore petroleum regulation, such a state/Commonwealth divide has created 
a complex regulatory framework that has been the subject of numerous reports and 
responsible for the Montara well blowout and oil spill. Without cooperation between 
various levels of government, there will only be greater legal complexity and increased 
regulatory burden. 
There are tools to address this. While mirror legislation is a tool that is available, the 
experience of offshore petroleum demonstrates that in a complex regulatory frame-
work, this can be difficult to maintain and may indeed lead to poor regulation. The 
referral power is available to states, although this tool is little used, as many states 
don’t want to lose control over the regulation of areas, particularly where there may 
be economic benefits of retaining regulation, for example, onshore mineral resources. 
Alternatively, legal harmonisation is an efficient and effective method of reducing regu-
latory burden. It enables the states to implement principles of regulating a particular 
area, for instance coal seam gas extraction, without having to refer their powers or 
implement mirror legislation that requires changing when one jurisdiction makes a 
change. Rather, legal harmonisation allows the principles of regulating that area of 
law to be imbued, leaving the details to the individual states, in a manner similar to EU 
directives. 
Without implementing some changes, it is likely that the level of regulatory burden will 
continue to increase in the 21st Century. Without the political will to implement change, 
by the middle of the century, the regulatory setting in the Australian Federation may 
well be drowning in a sea of federalism. 
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In April 2014, the Commonwealth announced its decision to abolish the COAG Reform 
Council (CRC) and transfer or scale back the CRC’s responsibilities for monitoring 
the service delivery performance of Australia’s state and territory governments. This 
closed a brief but promising chapter in Australian federalism and ended an experi-
ment that had put Australia at the forefront of new developments in global federalism. 
The decision to terminate the CRC reflected, however, the challenging nature of such 
experiments. They require sustained commitment from all those involved and may be 
very slow in producing demonstrable benefits. In the absence of a return to a more 
classical division of powers and responsibilities in Australian federalism, though, there 
is little alternative to the kind of transparency the CRC provided.
Background
When the Rudd Government came to office in November 2007, it did so with a 
promise to ‘end the blame game’ in Australian federalism. In particular, Rudd had 
promised to address the problems created by the very high degree of Commonwealth 
intervention in areas constitutionally the responsibility of the states. That intervention 
was overwhelmingly through specific purpose payments (SPPs), or ‘tied grants’. 
These numbered close to a hundred, contributed a quarter of total state revenue and 
affected an extensive range of service delivery areas. Tied grants were widely seen as 
inefficient and sometimes ineffective, imposing a burden on the recipient jurisdictions 
and thoroughly obscuring accountability. They were – and are – made possible by the 
extremely high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in Australian federalism.1 
The Rudd Government promptly set to negotiating major reforms to these practices 
with the states as part of a turn to a much more genuinely ‘cooperative federalism’.2 
By November 2008, the states had signed up to the Intergovernmental Agreement 
on Federal Financial Relations, which outlined sweeping reforms to the fiscal transfers 
system.3 Those reforms were directed at fundamentally changing the grants system 
from one based on unilaterally imposed input controls to one based on consensu-
ally established outcomes targets. In exchange for the ‘broad-banding’ of sundry tied 
grants into a handful of block grants, the states agreed to a new accountability regime, 
one based on performance reporting and assessment.
The body charged with responsibility for that assessment already existed, at least in 
name. The CRC had been established in the later years of the Howard Government, 
but now it had a real purpose. Its job would be to evaluate the performance data 
and report to COAG on how well the various jurisdictions were doing in respect of 
the agreed-upon outcomes objectives. The primary source of those data already 
existed. This was the annual Report on Government Services (ROGS) produced by 
the Productivity Commission under supervision by an intergovernmental steering com-
mittee.4 By this point, ROGS was into its 15th year, having been created during the 
intense reform period of the mid-1990s; however, its impact had never been great. 
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Reinvigorating federalism
Although it has been a leader, Australia is certainly not alone in moving towards inter-
governmental performance assessment or ‘benchmarking’. In a variety of ways, and to 
varying degrees, various federal or federal-type systems have turned to measurement 
as a way to navigate out of the rut they seem to be in. Performance measurement 
seems to offer ways to increase efficiency and accountability, in the process perhaps 
allowing federal systems to deliver on some of their putative advantages. The option of 
returning to some sort of golden age, when clear lines divided the powers and respon-
sibilities of the two levels of government, can seem attractive.5 But it is utopian — not 
only because of the great difficulty of constitutional change, but also because policy 
fields now rarely lend themselves to clear division. The status quo has elements of the 
worst of both worlds. Performance assessment regimes accept the reality of overlap-
ping responsibilities but seek to rationalise the relationships involved. 
Federalism is often said to provide important public policy benefits, notably competitive 
pressures and a multiplication of opportunities for policy experimentation and learning. 
Ideally, jurisdictions judge their performance against others and engage in a process of 
policy learning leading to the adoption of ‘best practice’. But the benefits of so-called 
‘laboratory federalism’ are chronically undersupplied.6 They require opportunity and 
incentive structures that are rarely present to an optimal degree. Among other things, 
jurisdictions must have a wide range of autonomy as well as effective mechanisms for 
policy learning; citizens, meanwhile, need a reliable and accessible way to judge how 
well their particular government is performing. Jurisdictions may need both prompting 
and assistance to encourage the dynamics of competition and learning. And for this, 
central governments may “need to assume both a learning role and a leadership role”.7 
According to the private sector model from which the idea of benchmarking derives, 
individual jurisdictions (firms) are proactive in comparing with others and learning how 
to do things better.8 Private sector businesses, however, have a direct and powerful 
incentive to engage in such practices: the profit motive. By their nature, public sector 
entities generally have no such incentive. Thus, in the public sector, benchmarking 
almost inevitably includes more of a ‘top-down’ element, with higher authorities 
imposing the requirement for performance assessment on subordinate units. In unitary 
or centrally dominated systems, this can take a decidedly coercive form. Such coer-
civeness sits poorly with the idea of federalism. However, the fact that the constituent 
units of a federal system are unlikely to subject themselves to comparative perfor-
mance assessment spontaneously means that some central impetus will be essential. 
In a federal system, that central government role must strike a balance that stimulates 
action while ensuring willing cooperation. Central governments at the very least can 
play a powerful facilitative role in promoting and supporting benchmarking between 
their constituent units.
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Caution required
In theory, such a regime should help federalism shake off some of its torpor. But just 
as federalism in practice rarely lives up to the expectations of federalism in theory, 
benchmarking in practice faces considerable challenges. This is the case even for 
benchmarking carried out within a given jurisdiction, let alone between jurisdictions in 
a federal system. 
The challenges are primarily those associated with the translation of a private sector 
device to a public sector environment. The nature of business is simple: In particular, 
the overriding goal is profitability in the sale of outputs. Those functions are readily 
measurable. By contrast, government is not primarily about outputs, it is about out-
comes. “Output is never an end in itself for the public sector”.9 It is not about how 
many classroom hours are delivered, operations carried out, or even kilometres of 
road laid. It is about things such as how the next generation is trained and socialised, 
the general health of the population, and the efficiency and suitability of the transport 
system. 
These outcomes are often difficult both to measure and to influence. In seeking to 
measure governmental performance, inevitably one often has to settle for approxi-
mate or proxy indicators — measures that are, or can be, made available that stand 
in for the real objective. In turn, the reliance on such measures means the creation 
of perverse incentives. Driven by these incentives, behaviour is modified to match 
the measures, not the final objective (so-called ‘teaching to the test’). Even worse, 
‘gaming’ occurs — particularly in ‘high stakes’ settings — as entities seek to generate 
performance data that tell the desired story rather than the real story. The difficulties 
involved in generating reliable data, directly comparable across jurisdictions, means 
that the development of effective benchmarking regimes is a highly iterative process 
that may take a substantial period of time that requires sensitive design.10 Like 
many experiments in public policy, there is a substantial risk of “overpromising and 
underperforming”.11 
The other key challenge of benchmarking in federal systems is to complete the chain 
of influence. Even the best performance-measurement system only provides informa-
tion; somehow that information must feed into and influence the way jurisdictions do 
their jobs. Again, business firms are highly motivated to listen to and act on such infor-
mation while public sector entities have much less intrinsic motivation – thus the need 
for an overarching regime with some kind of sanctioning effect. Hence the reluctance 
of public sector entities to engage in benchmarking. 
Two forms of sanctioning prevail, and neither is particularly popular with those being 
assessed: financial rewards and penalties, and ‘naming and shaming’. 
The former lodges power with the central authority, the latter with the public. Regimes 
that lean towards naming and shaming tend to publicise results in highly aggregated 
‘league table’ form to make simple comparative evaluation easy. When applied ener-
getically, neither is conducive either to honest reporting or to cooperative development 
of indicators and learning models.
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A recent development in federal systems
In the classical model of federalism there is little room for performance management 
regimes. The constituent units are ‘sovereign’ within their own areas of jurisdiction and 
directly accountable to their own constituents. Modern realities – particularly the tre-
mendous amount of centralisation that has occurred – mean that the classical model 
is often little more than notional.12 Intergovernmental benchmarking has emerged as 
one way of dealing with the complexities resulting from extensive de facto concurrency 
in federal systems. Just as federal systems differ greatly, though, so do these experi-
ments in benchmarking. 
At one extreme lie top-down programs such as the Congress’s No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB) in the United States. NCLB used Congress’s substantial power through 
tied grants to force the states to implement a performance reporting and management 
system in their education systems. It provoked fierce resistance from a number of 
states, had significant implementation difficulties and produced much-debated out-
comes. More decentralised federations such as Canada and Switzerland have had 
very modest experiments with intergovernmental benchmarking. But further out at the 
decentralised extreme, the most celebrated – or, at least, certainly the most discussed 
– example of intergovernmental benchmarking is the European Union’s (EU) ‘Open
Method of Coordination’ (OMC). 
By contrast with the American example, the EU introduced its benchmarking 
regime precisely because it had no authority or leverage in the extensive range of 
policy domains to which the OMC was applied. It opted for a ‘soft law’ approach in 
which it had no ‘hard law’ capacity. Accordingly, the OMC is a highly collaborative 
process, which involves performance measurement but not sanctions and includes 
a qualitative dimension, ‘peer review’, intended to facilitate learning, understanding 
and dissernination of best practice. Precisely because the EU is too decentralised to 
be yet a fully fledged federation and have an overweening central government, its use 
of benchmarking has taken a form that could be regarded as best practice federalism 
and innovative ‘experimentalist governance’.15 The main criticisms concern the limited 
nature of its results to date.16 
The Australian experience
The Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations addressed two of the 
main limitations on the states acting as learning organisations: giving jurisdictions more 
autonomy in how they exercised their functions, while establishing a regime exposing 
them to greater scrutiny in how well they exercised those functions. The autonomy 
came from the consolidation of a large number of tied grants into a small number 
of block grants as well as the Treasury-to-Treasury (rather than line agency) nature 
of the transaction. The scrutiny function likewise looked palatable to the states. The 
CRC was organised as a ‘joint venture’ body rather than a Commonwealth agency 
and it answered not to the Commonwealth but to COAG.17 Furthermore, since the 
main block grants were no longer conditional, no funding was at risk from reported 
underperformance.18 
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From a ‘federalist’ or state perspective, however, the reform of the grants system 
was compromised in two regards.19 One was a considerable pressure from within the 
Commonwealth Parliament and Government for lines of accountability to flow back 
through the Commonwealth, since that’s where the funds originated.20 The other was 
that while the new SPPs cleaned the slate as far as the Commonwealth’s past mis-
deeds were concerned; they did not preclude fresh ones.21 Indeed, the Agreement 
explicitly made provision for so-called National Partnership Payments (NPPs) — the 
old tied grants in a new guise. NPPs were conditional grants with funding depen-
dent upon performance. The CRC was responsible for assessing whether states had 
performed as required. NPPs proliferated rapidly and it very much looked like the 
Commonwealth was “reverting to type”.22 
The main problem with the CRC and the performance assessment regime was not 
that it betrayed the federal spirit, as the NPPs did, but rather that it failed to make 
a meaningful impact. This was acknowledged by the CRC itself. A major reason for 
this was the intrinsically challenging nature of the task, as previously mentioned. In 
the words of the CRC Chairman, “accountability for outcomes is not for the faint-
hearted!”23 The highly iterative nature of such exercises is clear from, if nothing else, 
the amount of time and effort the CRC required simply to establish baseline indicators. 
The other problem was – as sceptics would have quickly pointed out – in the absence 
of sanctions, what is going to compel compliance or responsiveness even once mean-
ingful findings emerge? As the Council Chairman put it, “there is not a lot of evidence 
that governments are improving their performance in response to the findings”.24 
Conclusion
The CRC and the performance evaluation regime over which it presided was an 
acknowledgement that intergovernmental relations in Australia are inextricably 
entangled. This creates difficulties for a system that was originally envisaged as being 
based on the almost entirely separate and autonomous operation of the two levels of 
government. The CRC also represented an instance of the way that intergovernmental 
relations in Australia have been growing more formalised over the past 25 years.25 At 
the same time, though, the summary abolition of the CRC demonstrated how tenuous 
that process of formalisation has been and how a substantial commitment to genu-
inely collaborative relations between the two levels of government does not change 
the underlying realities of Commonwealth dominance. There have been various calls 
for real institutionalisation of Commonwealth and state relations over the years and the 
CRC experience represents another illustration of the degree to which such develop-
ments would be welcome.26 
A performance comparison and learning, or ‘benchmarking’, regime is not a panacea 
for what ails Australian federalism; however, there is no panacea. The situation in 
Australian federalism is a version of that envisaged in the economic ‘theory of the 
second best’. A classical dualistic division of powers may be the ‘best’ arrangement, 
but attempts to approximate that ideal are likely to result in outcomes that are far from 
the best; a second best alternative of a coordinated outcomes-focused performance 
regime could be the best real-world alternative. Benefits will be incremental and will 
require iterative and collaborative development and improvement; however, despite 
the demise of the CRC, something along those lines is the way to proceed. 
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When the American founders came to write the constitution for their new nation, 
they closely examined the successes and failures of democracies, both ancient and 
modern. They came to the conclusion that it was essential not to create any concen-
tration of power within the system of government. So they sliced authority within the 
system in two ways: 
1.  Horizontally through the separation of powers between legislature, executive and
judiciary; and
2.  Vertically by means of a division of powers between national and state governments.
The approach to federalism was based on the assumption that there could be a neat 
assignment of separate revenue raising and expenditure functions to each of the two 
levels of government, making each level almost watertight and largely self-sufficient. 
Thus ‘Layer Cake’ federalism was born.
In doing this, the American founders were reflecting the dictum of Kenneth Wheare, 
the designer of many federations for former British colonies. His definition of federalism 
contains the words: “By the federal principle, I mean the method of dividing powers so 
that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and 
independent”.1 
The word federalism is derived from the ancient word ‘foedus’, meaning a ‘covenant’ 
or ‘compact’ between sovereign states to create a nation with a division of powers 
between centre and region. The advantages of a federal system over a unitary one 
are considered to include diversity, responsiveness, encouragement of innovation and 
experimentation, and competition. A federal system also helps preserve national unity 
in culturally diverse societies.
The assignment of powers in federal constitutions is often also influenced by the 
societal context. For example, in multicultural and multilingual nations, the states 
retain powers relating to cultural aspects such as education, arts, broadcasting and 
communications, and occasionally the retention of different legal systems as well as 
concurrent powers over immigration. In developing countries like India, where land 
is a fundamental resource, states retain most powers relating to land use. Most 
federations list powers for one level and give residual powers to the others. Canada 
attempted to provide long lists for both national and provincial levels, and thus created 
a legal quagmire.
Layer cake federalism in Australia
Australia’s Founders were in pursuit of unity in diversity, and they largely followed the 
American recipe for their layer cake federalism, including the approach that the powers 
of the new Commonwealth Government would be listed and all residual powers would 
go to the states. There were just a few concurrent powers, a provision for some tax 
sharing, and it was assumed that Britain would handle most of Australia’s external 
affairs powers.2 
The first explicit emergence of criteria for allocation of powers arose at the key meeting 
of Premiers in Sydney in 1891. In a strategic move (which holds important lessons 
for today’s public policy designers), Henry Parkes put forward a set of principles for 
discussion, realising that if agreement could be achieved on principles, the design of 
the Constitution and creation of the nation could begin. 
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Throughout the 1890s, some criteria were cited by the Founders as the successive 
drafts of the Constitution evolved. They were essentially that the Federal Parliament 
would have responsibility for areas that affected the whole nation, such as trade, immi-
gration, postal and telegraphic services, marriage and divorce. The colonies, soon to 
become states, would also have to hand over their customs and excise taxing powers 
to the Federal Parliament, because a federation is a customs union with one external 
border. But a large share of these duties would be returned to the states as grants 
in recognition that the narrowness of their tax base would be inadequate for them to 
provide the functions they would assume. This was, of course, well before the arrival 
of income tax. 
Sir John Quick, writing in 1919, recalled:
“ In deciding upon the distribution of powers the Australian Federal Convention was guided 
not only by the model of the United states Constitution but by special considerations. 
It was thought that there should be reserved to the states all powers affecting private rights, 
municipal functions, local interests, resources that they should control; the administrating 
of justice and local governing communities, and have a free opportunity for internal 
development and local option, and choice in internal affairs. To the Commonwealth were 
ceded such powers as of a truly national character, whether relating to commerce, industry, 
finance, economies, defence or external affairs. It would have been a great calamity had 
the Convention drawn up an instrument of government to last as the citadel of national 
life for all time merely in haphazard manner, without reference fundamental and guiding 
principles.”3
The colonies were somewhat apprehensive about surrendering powers to the new 
Commonwealth Government, but were finally assured that they would still have the 
upper hand because they had designed the Senate as a states’ house and it would 
have substantial leverage. And anyway, as Alfred Deakin said, “you cannot have an 
omelette without breaking eggs”.4 
Kitchen rules
It is well known that since 1901, the powers of the Commonwealth Government have 
grown exponentially in the Australian Federation. There are several causal factors for 
this, including:
• The emergence of a national economy rather than the six separate ones that existed
at federation.
• The sheer growth of the public sector itself and the increasing complexity of the
public sector with many functions interrelated.
• Globalisation and the centripetal forces that flowed into the Federation with powers
accruing to the Commonwealth Government, especially external affairs and inter-
national treaties.
• Escalating vertical finance imbalance particularly through the takeover of income tax
from the states during World War II and thereafter, which resulted in the Australian
Federation having the greatest vertical fiscal imbalance of any federation in the
democratic world.
• High Court interpretations that have, on balance, greatly increased the powers of
the Commonwealth Government for various reasons, and allowed intrusion into a
number of areas that had been the preserve of the states under the Constitution,
including new arenas like the environment, which is still not mentioned in the
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Australian Constitution. The High Court, of course, bases its decisions on legal inter-
pretation. But it is of considerable relevance to this discussion of criteria that it has 
allowed some sections of the Australian Constitution to override others, for example, 
external affairs, and finance and company powers, to override other powers that 
were originally ceded to the states in the original Constitution. This is rare in the 
experience of federations; it certainly would almost never occur in relation to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
• Some interchange of powers.
• The need for Commonwealth Government to intervene during national crises such
as wars and depressions.
• Several referendums in which the Commonwealth Government gained new powers
and revealed public reaction to new criteria for the allocation of powers in the
Federation. There are three interesting cases:
–  The 1927 amendment giving the Commonwealth Government powers to control
public borrowing was a response to reckless behaviour of the New South Wales
(NSW) Government and the desire to stimulate economic growth;
–  The 1946 referendum giving power to the Commonwealth Government in
welfare was a public response to the need to address challenges in post-war
reconstruction; and
–  The 1978 referendum on indigenous affairs (the largest “yes” vote in Australian
history at 90 per cent) was interpreted as public recognition that the states acting
alone had not adequately addressed this arena.
All of these trends towards national government dominance also resulted in a complex 
layer of Executive Federalism cascading down from the Premiers Conferences, which 
are nowhere mentioned in the Australian Constitution, and which eventually morphed 
into the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), on through some 43 Ministerial 
Councils and around 350 intergovernmental agreements. Executive Federalism ‘got 
things done’ but at the very high price of a lack of accountability because of the sub-
stantial consequent swirling of levels of government in many areas of the public sector. 
The wealthy chefs in Canberra were now doing all the baking and the layer cake 
became a ‘marble cake’. Overlap and duplication in the Australian Federation grew 
apace.
Recipes for marble cakes
There were at least four major attempts in the 20th Century to address the issue of 
overlap and duplication, and to develop criteria to establish roles for each level of 
government: 
1. The Kestnbaum Commission in the USA;5
2. The Rowell-Sirois Commission in Canada;6
3. The Australian Council on Intergovernmental Relations;7 and
4.  The rewrite of the German Constitution, the Basic Law, from 1949, which recog-
nised the reality of changes in federal systems and endeavoured to assign roles and
responsibilities to levels rather than just discrete functions.
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Looking across all these attempts, a number of criteria become clear. They usually 
start from the premise that states are sovereign partners in a federation. So they are 
mainly to do with the circumstances when a national government should become 
involved in a public sector function that is designated as a state function in the consti-
tution of a federal system. 
It is noted that in many cases, these goals could be achieved by the states alone, 
acting in concert, through an interchange of powers, mutual recognition of legisla-
tion, or through concurrent or mirror legislation. These days technology also provides 
much scope for states to share resources and innovations with one another. However, 
as the American John Adams pointed out, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get so 
many clocks to strike at once. Also, the role of arbitrator will often be assigned to the 
national government when the state and territory jurisdictions cannot agree among 
themselves.
A national government presence may be required to achieve:
• Aspiration, patriotism or exhortation on a national goal or issue;
• Uniformity, particularly of national standards;
• Universality of coverage and access;
• Guaranteeing mobility and portability across the nation, which includes regulation of
mobile resources and citizens;
• Providing equality of opportunity and accessibility including spatial equity;
• Filling identified gaps in service delivery (usually until the states pick up the initiative
– this may require a sunset clause on national government intervention);
• Achieving economies of scale;
• Coping with spill overs between jurisdictions;
• Addressing asymmetry where small jurisdictions may not have resources to provide
services comparable with that of others;
• Encouraging and funding research and innovation to benefit the whole nation;
• Meeting international obligations and achieving international competitiveness; and
• Guaranteeing national security.
In addition, a role emerges for a national government when ‘overrides’ become nec-
essary in a federation, typically because of a crisis or emergency, for example, gun 
control, hyperinflation or severe economic recession, natural disasters and terrorism. 
Justification for greater national government involvement also arises as a result of 
‘linkages’, which see national government powers connected to those of states, for 
example, housing, welfare, immigration, education, health, crime and enforcement.
Of course, the involvement of the national government will also inevitably be related to 
its superior financial resources through larger taxation powers and access to borrow-
ings. Then vital state and local government functions such as provision of infrastructure 
will depend on national government intervention of some kind.
A number of criteria have also been posited for state and local government functions, 
including:
• Local knowledge;
• Closeness to clients;
• Community engagement and mobilisation of resources;
• Responsiveness and flexibility;
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• Speed of delivery and nimbleness; and
• Where experimentation or innovation is warranted, which might then provide lessons 
for other jurisdictions.
Enter new federalism
There have been five major periods of ‘new federalism’ in Australian history, all of 
which have involved a reconsideration of the powers of the levels of government.
Post-depression
Post-depression there was intense cooperation between national, state and local 
governments, and executive federalism was born with a range of ministerial and 
administrative councils established. The criteria were simple and were all aimed at cre-
ating employment and facilitating borrowing for infrastructure. In essence, they were 
crisis-style override criteria. 
World War II resulted in intense cooperation between the national and state and 
territory governments, with the national government taking over many functions 
including income tax, and coordinating many others including transport, provisions 
and rationing.
Whitlam Government
The Whitlam Government introduced new program areas for the Commonwealth 
Government, with a strong centralising initiative. The main emphasis was addressing 
what was seen as areas of neglect such as urban and regional development, envi-
ronment and heritage, welfare and education. These areas were not strictly speaking 
national government powers, and indeed many of these functions were achieved by 
bypassing the Constitution. In effect, many of the programs sought to override the 
states on the grounds of national or even international interest.
Fraser Government
The Fraser Government’s new federalism was aimed at rolling back national govern-
ment intervention largely based on notions of states’ rights and reducing government 
intervention. The criteria mainly centred on reducing overlap and duplication, and ideo-
logical notions such as de-concentration of power. Significantly, there was an attempt 
at tax sharing with states and territories, and local governments, through having an 
allocated share of the income tax base and giving the states and territories the capac-
ity to add or reduce their tax level. This never eventuated because of bogus claims of 
double taxation. The Fraser Government had also formally brought local government 
into the tent of intergovernmental discussion for the first time. 
Hawke Government and the 1990s
The most interesting period in relation to criteria was the Hawke Government’s new 
federalism. Having achieved a number of significant macroeconomic reforms, the 
Government turned to microeconomic reform and found that the states and territo-
ries controlled most of the levers in this domain. So, efforts were aimed at achieving 
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collaboration between national, state and territory, and local governments to address 
this national aim. A new model was born in that, instead of following past approaches 
to revise the allocation of whole functions of government, there was an acceptance 
that many functions would continue to be shared. The real challenge was to identify 
roles and responsibilities within the shared function. In doing this, the government 
was, in essence, following the German model. From now on ‘national’ would no longer 
automatically mean ‘national government’; it would mean ‘partnership’.
Most importantly, there were four principles underpinning this new federalism:
1. The nation principle, which recognised that Australia was one nation;
2.  The subsidiarity principle, which recognised that a government function should be
delivered by the government closest to the client;
3.  The structural efficiency principle, which means that the structures of a federation
should operate as efficiently as possible; and
4.  The accountability principle, which identifies that the operation of the whole federal
principle should be accountable to the people.8
Another significant modality that would be employed was mutual recognition by each 
state and territory of some of the other jurisdictions’ laws.
And so the significant reforms of the 1990s began, including National Competition 
Policy, a national electricity grid, nationally consistent food labelling and national rail 
freight coordination.
Having addressed responsibility sharing on the expenditure side, Hawke considered 
an attempt at tax sharing, but this fell afoul of the Keating challenge to Hawke for the 
Prime Ministership; since Keating, trained at the knee of Jack Lang, was a centralist 
and not a federalist. 
The Howard Government turned Australian politics on its head when it became cen-
tralist in policymaking. Part of this trend can be accounted for by the fact that almost 
all of the states and territories were then Labor governed. Whatever the cause, it 
meant that all the major Australian political parties were now centralist for the first time 
in the nation’s history.
Rudd Government
Enter the Rudd Government’s new federalism, which was characterised by a promise 
to reduce the overlap and duplication in the Federation. This was primarily by reduc-
ing over 100 individual specific purpose programs to six major block grants, all of 
which would operate by way of partnership agreements setting out desired outcomes 
and defining roles and responsibilities. However, all these agreements were eventually 
subject to a national government financial control or veto. There was also the threat 
of a national government takeover of some powers such as hospitals lurking in the 
background. The COAG Reform Council would oversee performance of the system 
and it had been very critical of the performance of these arrangements until it was 
recently abolished.9 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
108
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
109
S E C T I O N  3 . 1
The false dichotomy
In contemporary Australia, whenever public policy for the Federation is discussed, 
a false dichotomy is often instantly propagated: The Commonwealth Government is 
about policy and the states are about service delivery.
This is fundamentally false because in a true federation, the states are sovereign and 
therefore must be policy partners in any intergovernmental negotiations and not merely 
service deliverers. A partnership is not a partnership unless the partners are equal. This 
is overlooked so often because of the chronic vertical fiscal imbalance in the Australian 
Federation in which the Commonwealth Government, by default, raises over 70 per 
cent of all public revenue, and therefore comes to see itself as the policymaker.
It is also false because public policy is a spectrum and must include policy design right 
through to implementation. And, at any event, in any system the service provider is 
usually in the best position to shape the policy design. 
The other ‘elephant in the room’ is always the view propagated, particularly by the 
business sector as a key component of its views about overlap and duplication, that 
the states should be abolished and Australia should become a unitary system. Of 
course the Labor Party has also long held, as part of its platform, that the states and 
the Senate should be abolished. All of this tends to diminish the importance of the 
states in the eyes of the community, and offers a simplistic solution to the challenge 
of developing criteria for the allocation of roles and responsibilities in the Federation.
Governance: The icing on the cake
In Australia, any attempt to identify the ingredients that caused the swirls in the marble 
cake will fall foul of the thick layer of icing covering the governance arrangements. 
We have experimented with a vast array of governance designs for intergovern-
mental bodies such as the Murray-Darling Authority, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority, Snowy Mountains Authority and Australian National Training Authority. Most 
have been statutory authorities established under Commonwealth legislation. Some 
have required mirror legislation in all participating jurisdictions. Some have been in a 
company format while others have rested just on an agreement or memorandum of 
understanding.10 None have been free of potential political interference, and all have 
been very low on public accountability. The Minutes of Ministerial Councils are not 
made public and neither are those of the intergovernmental management bodies in 
most cases. Intergovernmental relations is exempt from Freedom of Information laws.
From a long period of experience, it would seem that a company format for inter-
governmental management bodies is the best model for the future. It would achieve 
buy-in from all jurisdictions, prevent expert board members from acting as representa-
tives and make their prime loyalty to the mandate of the body, and create transparency 
and arms-length decision making from politicians. Most importantly, it would reveal the 
criteria used to allocate roles and responsibilities in the functional area. With minutes 
made public and containing full reasons for all decisions, the public and Parliament 
and its accountability watchdogs would be able to sheet home responsibility for per-
formance and impact on citizens.
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The case of education 
In virtually all federations, school education is a state government power, being one of 
the most powerful symbols of state government sovereignty and difference. 
Higher education is something of a special case and is often a shared power between 
national and state governments. The justification for involvement of the national gov-
ernment in higher education revolves around several factors:
• Research: Universities have research as a prime focus, and research, as a public
good, benefits the whole nation. It is also costly and is often beyond the means of
many state and territory governments.
• Spill overs and mobility: There is considerable interstate migration of students for
their university education. Similar arguments apply in respect of equal opportunity to
enter higher education nationwide.
• International relations, including honouring of treaties, monitoring and regulation of
standards for international students, and coping with visas and related aspects.
School education is usually a jealously guarded power of state governments, related 
to local, cultural and sheer sovereignty claims by regions. Consequently, any debate 
about criteria revolves around the justification for national government intrusion into 
this space. The following points have been the main criteria in Australia and elsewhere:
• Process roles, including leader, coordinator, facilitator, catalyst, enabler, aspirational
encourager and champion of patriotism and social cohesion, and promoter of
innovation;
• Funder, especially where, as in Australia, the national government possesses much
superior revenue sources;
• International roles, including research benchmarking; monitoring competitiveness;
and diplomatic and functional relations with international education bodies such as
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNESCO,
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the European Union (EU); as well
as bilateral relations with many countries and regulation of national standards and
accreditation of international providers;
• Coping with linkages of education with other functions such as immigration, welfare,
health, social policy and higher education including teacher education;
• Identifying gaps, for example, it is doubtful if the ‘Closing the Gap’ program to
address indigenous disadvantage would have occurred without a national gov-
ernment presence and stimulus (however another principle could be that all such
initiatives should have a sunset clause so that a review can take place every five
years to evaluate whether a national government presence is still warranted);
• National standards for teaching, curriculum, and reporting and accountability; and
• Facilitating mobility of students and teachers across the nation, through uniformity,
portability, accessibility and universality of entitlement.
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The challenge in relation to school education can be seen starkly by considering the 
world’s top performing countries in international tests as identified by the OECD. Top 
performing countries take a holistic approach to education comprising the following 
elements:
• A focus on the wellbeing of students and their individual progress;
• A sound curriculum based on a clear set of values, principles and educational aims;
• High-quality teachers who are motivated and appreciated;
• Leadership from school principals;
• Resourcing;
• Parental and community support, accountability, reporting and quality assurance
linked to systemic school improvement; and
• The conceptualisation capacity of the students.
Looking at these components, it is clear that Australia faces a significant challenge 
in taking such a holistic national approach, largely because of the way responsibility 
for each component is allocated to different levels of government. Also, both levels of 
government are involved in the very confusing funding of schools for both government 
and non-government sectors. States and territories are mainly responsible for teach-
ers but the Commonwealth Government can influence teacher pre-service through its 
responsibility for university funding, and so on. Therefore, it requires a major effort to 
achieve consensus on each element for this ideal of a holistic approach, which simply 
does not exist in Australia.
The diversity in schooling across Australia is quite staggering in very many respects. 
This includes length of school day and year, streaming, internal and external assess-
ment, and phasing of progression of students. A few states and territories have 
syllabuses but most don’t. It is even doubtful whether school attendance is actually 
compulsory in all states and territories. The borderline between school, vocational 
education, and university is also now blurred. Some TAFE colleges and private provid-
ers offer university courses; 25 Australian universities and many vocational education 
providers now offer so-called ‘bridging’ courses for tertiary entrance, which are mostly 
remedial courses in literacy and numeracy. The reasons for all these differences are 
often lost in antiquity or not apparent.
School curriculum: The ‘what’ and the ‘how’
School curriculum is a particularly interesting case since Australia is now the only 
federation in the world with a reasonably comprehensive national school curriculum. 
Germany and America have national standards, and America also has some rudi-
mentary content under the Obama Government’s program, although not all states 
participate. 
In many countries, the drive for a national curriculum has come from the increas-
ing significance and impact of international tests such as Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMMS) and Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), which have 
created de facto international league tables for countries in educational performance. 
Australia has lagged badly in several aspects of these tests and people look to the 
Commonwealth Government to coordinate action to address this concern.
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Prior to the national curriculum in Australia, there was a significant variety of 
approaches in the states and territories; some did not have formal curriculums. NSW 
and Victoria had fairly robust systems and so were more reluctant starters.
Benefits of having a national school curriculum include:
• Introducing an actual curriculum in many states and territories where previously
there was none;
• Coordinating efforts to address shortcomings revealed in international tests;
• Lifting aspirations for all levels of achievement;
• Introducing national standards and benchmarks;
• Facilitating mobility of students and teachers;
• Uniforming rigour that may have been previously uneven across the nation;
• Enabling greater access to teaching resources;
• Benefiting smaller jurisdictions that are without the scale to design and update cur-
riculum; and
• Creating nationwide equity and entitlement.
Sovereignty over delivery: What versus how
Despite the welcome that states and territories have extended to national government 
involvement in some aspects of national curriculum, there is fierce territorial control 
exerted by the states and territories over the delivery of the curriculum for primary and 
lower secondary levels. Also, possession is still 10 points of the law when any aspect 
of upper secondary schooling is considered. Here the states and territories jealousy 
guard all their rights in this domain, including protecting the fiefdoms of their number-
crunching assessment authorities responsible for exit-level Year 12 testing leading to 
tertiary entrance.
The simplistic criterion advanced by the states and territories in relation to school cur-
riculum is that the Commonwealth Government is about the ‘what’ but the states are 
about the ‘how’. As an extreme example, at present, the national curriculum authority, 
Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), is forbidden by 
the states from directly contacting schools.
The states and territories also control the certification of schools and, despite evidence 
that this is often a very flawed process in some jurisdictions, the Commonwealth 
Government is not welcome in this domain either. All this leads to considerable doubts 
about whether the national curriculum is actually being implemented as intended 
across the nation. Indeed, many jurisdictions are adapting and adopting as they see fit 
and do not have rigorous quality assurance processes in place. 
A national curriculum that is not being implemented is not a true national curriculum. 
It is also a national disgrace that parents are allowed so easily to opt out their children 
from the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) testing, 
since a national curriculum without assessment of all students is not a true curriculum 
and cannot monitor progress of all students, establish equity of entitlement across the 
nation, or assist teachers with diagnostic instruments. The laxity of some jurisdictions 
on this aspect is cause for considerable concern. The Commonwealth Government 
seems content to hand over millions of dollars to jurisdictions and sectors on condi-
tion of implementing the national curriculum without any checks as to whether these 
commitments are honoured. Some states and territories are just as slack in monitoring 
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schools during their certification process to be sure the national curriculum is being 
implemented.
There is also a strange and curious picture regarding the governance of the national 
curriculum process. A Ministerial Council issues instruction to ACARA, and the Board 
members of ACARA are appointed on the recommendation of the national and state 
ministers. The states and territories in reality have the majority of votes on both the 
Ministerial Council and the Board of ACARA, and they provide half of the funding for 
ACARA. However, they still see ACARA as a national government body. This makes 
little sense and can only be because the formal statutory location of ACARA is under 
national government legislation. This returns us to the governance question in inter-
governmental relations discussed earlier.
Lessons
Looking back over the many attempts to identify criteria for assigning roles and 
responsibilities in the Australian Federation, two points stand out:
1.  A pure layer cake is no longer possible – it is not feasible to reassign complete func-
tions of government to particular levels; and
2.  Marble cakes are the menu of the day, so it becomes a matter of assigning roles
and responsibilities within shared functions of government. This applies to both
revenue and expenditure.
It is a false premise to assume that the Commonwealth Government will always have 
the key policymaking role, and the subnational levels the delivery role. In a federation, 
the states and territories are policy partners, not just service deliverers.
Any attempt to clarify the roles must begin with revenue sharing. Until the partners are 
on an equal financial footing, there is no point trying to assign expenditure roles. In 
Australia, this means that the states and territories and local governments are going to 
have to be given or take back added taxation powers, preferably income tax sharing 
as was intended by the Founders of the Constitution.
Many criteria exist to facilitate the unravelling of the overlap and duplication. They 
need to be applied from a basic assumption that justification is required for the 
Commonwealth Government to become involved. It must be recognised that many of 
these criteria, which have been outlined, are not mutually exclusive and some trade-
off, ranking, or compromise will be required among them. It is also worth considering 
that any assigned role for the Commonwealth Government should have a sunset 
clause attached, for review after five years, to see whether the national government 
role is still required.
Where it is determined there should be joint responsibility for a function, the actual 
role of each level must be identified to ensure direct accountability to citizens. 
Accountability should also be more vigorously taken up by regimes such as auditors 
and ombudsman at both national and state level, as well as to parliaments, which 
should oversee all such intergovernmental activity. A special Senate committee on 
intergovernmental relations should be established to perform this function constantly.
Governance arrangements for intergovernmental bodies need to be designed to 
achieve buy-in from all levels of government but also maximum accountability and 
independence, so that they can function on expert evidence and not merely political or 
policy considerations. The criteria they apply in decision making must be transparent 
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and their minutes should be made public with reasons for all decisions clearly stated. 
A corporate model would be best to achieve all these objectives. Any directions from 
ministerial councils must also be fully and publicly documented. Above all, they need 
to be made far more accountable to the public for their decision making. 
Almost all adult Australians carry two cards in their pocket or purse – a Medicare card 
and a drivers’ licence – and they probably never bother to ponder why one is issued 
by the Commonwealth Government and the other by the state or territory government. 
We also know from past surveys and press reports that, when things go well, most 
Australians probably do not really care which level of government delivers a service as 
long as it is delivered efficiently and responsibly. But when things go wrong they need 
to know who is accountable and they do not appreciate buck-passing.
Perhaps the single measure that would best shake up this whole area would be a 
requirement that the plaque on every school hall and hospital should contain the 
names of the national, state or territory minister. Then people would know who 
designed the recipe and baked the marble cake, and pass informed judgement as to 
whether it is to their taste.
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Our local government sector is small by world standards, accounting for only around 
six per cent of general government outlays and three to four per cent of total taxes col-
lected in Australia.1 Local government expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) is only 2.3 per cent in Australia compared with eight to 15 per cent in 
other developed countries (refer to Figure 1).2 
Yet paradoxically, Australia’s local councils are big by world standards. In 2011, the 
average residency size of local government units in Australia was more than 40,000 
residents; in the United States (US), 7981; and in the European Union (EU), 5693 (refer 
to Figure 2). 
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FIGURE 2 
AVErAGE SIZE OF LOCAL GOVErNMENT BODIES BY POPuLATION (2011)
Source: Dexia Bank
FIGURE 1 
LOCAL GOVErNMENT EXPENDITurE AS A PErCENTAGE OF GDP (2006)
Source: Dexia Bank
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The merger myth
One of the main arguments advanced for merging councils is that increased size 
would increase cost efficiency. As MA Jones states, “It was once thought that small 
local governments allowed more community control but were more costly than larger 
units”.3 
Yet, researchers both here and abroad have found that larger councils do not exhibit 
lower unit costs of servicing than smaller ones.4 
It has been found that some council functions are done best on a large scale while 
other tasks are performed better on a small scale. “Smaller units are the most demo-
cratic and participative, and also the most efficient.”5 
In fact, the 2006 New South Wales (NSW) Local Government Inquiry6 “found no con-
clusive evidence that mergers would reduce unit costs. For smaller rural councils a 
lack of population density rather than size appeared to be the main cause of higher 
operating costs per resident”. 
“Increasing population yields a lower level of gross expenditure per capita, however, 
once this reaches a point between 31,500 and 100,000, increasing population size 
results in higher levels of gross expenditure per capita.”7 
“Concentrated structures were associated with higher spending than more fragmented 
local government and that there may be diseconomy of scale factors operating that 
outweigh the technical benefits of larger units.”8 
As a case in point, Sydney metropolitan councils show no significant economies of 
scale, that is, average council cost per resident has little bearing to council size.
FIGURE 3 
COuNCIL PEr CAPITA EXPENSE VS POPuLATION SIZE (2010-11)
Source: DLG, Comparative Information on NSW Council, 2010–11
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Furthermore, larger councils in NSW generally charge higher rates than smaller to 
medium-size councils charge. 
The ‘big is better’ argument is not always apt for a public bureaucracy where being 
nimble, flexible and cost conscious can be difficult given the bigger the span of control.
For instance, in 1965, Australia Post moved all Sydney’s mail sorting to one building, 
the Redfern Mail Exchange. Instead of achieving economies of scale, the result was a 
demoralised workforce, union dargs and lower productivity.9 Australia Post was forced 
to restore decentralised mail sorting and to focus on the real problem – getting the 
workflow processes right. 
The reality of council operations is that some services enjoy economies of scale 
while others suffer diseconomies from aggregation. A one-size-fits-all approach is 
both crude and dangerous. As Brian Dollery notes, “the results of amalgamations (in 
Australia) has not met expectations … structural change through compulsory council 
consolidation have not been effective in achieving their intended aims of meaningful 
cost savings and increased operational efficiency.”
Mergers are unlikely to yield efficiency gains where legislation (such as that in NSW) 
prohibits:
• Merged councils from having forced redundancies for three years;
• Changing employees’ terms and conditions;
• Relocating staff outside the boundaries of the former council area if they claim hard-
ship; and
• Reducing pre-existing employment levels in rural areas.
Where small scale is a handicap, it can be overcome (especially in metropolitan areas) 
by creating ‘virtual’ councils that use a shared services centre or outsource their func-
tions, for example, rate collections and capital works, to specialist providers. 
FIGURE 4 
COuNCIL AVErAGE rATES VS POPuLATION SIZE (2010–11)
Source: DLG, Comparative Information on NSW Council, 2010–11
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FIGURE 5 
SHOuLD Our COuNCILS BE BIGGEr?
Local council processes
Process Example Scale efficiency
Routine processing Rate notices, paying invoices 3
Case-by-case determinations LEPs, new traffic signs 7
Capital works and maintenance Footpaths, lawn mowing 3
Corporate services Policies, codes, community consultation 3 and 7
Source: Review Today <reviewtoday.com.au>
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For instance, today more than a quarter of California’s cities (about 130) are contract 
cities based on the ‘Lakewood model’:
“ Lakewood of the early 1950s was David fighting the Goliath of Long Beach, a city intent 
on gobbling up its unincorporated neighbour parcel by parcel. The legal turf battles were 
exhausting Lakewood’s defenders, most of whom were transplants drawn to the promise 
of this sleepy village-turned-post-war boomtown. Then along came John Sanford Todd, 
a struggling attorney and proud Lakewood resident, who dreamed up a way to preserve 
his community’s independence without it going broke: It would become a new kind of city, 
one that contracted out for police protection, trash collection, firefighting – just about every 
service a city provides.
“ That practice is commonplace in the USA today, but it was a revelation a half century ago. 
Todd’s vision, dubbed ‘the Lakewood Plan,’ became a model of local government that 
informed incorporation drives throughout Southern California and beyond. Suburbia took 
shape in a rash of ‘contract cities,’ including the neighbouring Dairy Valley (now Cerritos), 
La Puente, Bellflower, Duarte, Irwindale, Norwalk and Santa Fe Springs, which sprang up in 
such rapid succession that some observers began proclaiming the end of big cities.”10 
Post-industrial efficiency requires speed not scale
The argument in favour of larger councils is based on the theory of economies of scale 
first proposed by Ronald Coase in 1937 to explain the efficiency of large corporations 
using assembly lines. “Large organisations, such as companies, make sense when the 
‘transaction cost’ associated with buying things on the market exceed the fixed costs 
of establishing and maintaining a bureaucracy.”11 
FIGURE 6 
EFFICIENCY AND SIZE – THEOrY
Average cost 
per unit of output
Volume of output
Economies and diseconomies of scale
Lowest average cost of production
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However, Coase also recognised that there were limits to scale efficiencies, beyond 
which, unit costs rose with each extra output. Initially, cost efficiencies were obtained 
from division of labour and specialisation of tasks, increased scope for shared ser-
vices and increased dimensional capacity. Beyond a certain point, unit costs rose 
from control span limits, coordination complexity, and communication and information 
network requirements. 
But a lot has happened to organisations since Henry Ford pioneered mechanising 
production on a large scale using assembly lines. A 2001 Special Supplement in The 
Economist declared, “Modern technology is shifting the balance of advantage away 
from firms and towards markets. The current goal is to focus on the few things at 
which they undoubtedly excel and to hand over everything else to equally focused 
specialists”.12 This is something that Lakewood County and its successors found. 
Aggregating activities together in a large organisation does not necessarily ensure 
economies of scale let alone service effectiveness. Take for instance anti-dumping 
laws designed to protect local producers from subsidised imports sold below 
cost. They are administered by a branch within the Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service. In 2012, an inquiry (chaired by former Victorian Premier, the Hon. 
John Brumby) was established into whether the function should be performed by a 
separate standalone anti-dumping agency following evidence that the existing com-
plaints process is too slow and cumbersome.13 
What matters in both business and government now is not size, but speed. Speed is 
obtained through greater flexibility using a Shamrock-style structure as advocated by 
Charles Handy14, not a giant bureaucracy as preached by Coase. Shamrock organisa-
tions concentrate on their core role and outsource everything else. Their organisational 
structure consists of three parts:
1.  Core staff, for example, senior management and others who do what can’t be easily 
outsourced;
2.  Contractors, for example, individuals who once worked for the organisation but 
now supply generic services to it; and
3.  Consultants, who are professional and hi-tech workers who provide customised 
services to the organisation.
Redesigning councils to become virtual 
Virtual councils address both the popular demand for small discrete municipalities that 
are close enough to residents to address their special needs, and the administrative 
advantage of doing some things on a large scale to achieve cost efficiencies, stan-
dardised outputs and the option to switch supplier if service delivery is not satisfactory. 
That’s the nub of the challenge facing local governance. 
Lakewood-style councils use a shamrock organisation structure to achieve such an 
outcome. They employ a small full-time professional staff who outsource generic tasks 
and use part-time contractors for specialist work. Australia’s local governments should 
be encouraged by state governments to adopt such a model. It could be trialled in 
one region with the state offering its local councils infrastructure rehabilitation grants in 
return for their active cooperation. 
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FIGURE 7 
A rEGIONAL LOCAL GOVErNANCE STruCTurE
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Board of council GMs/Regional shared services centre 
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The first step would be to merge administrative functions of neighbouring councils 
that would benefit from economies of scale and scope (as established by an expert 
inquiry) into a linked shared services centre (SSC) that would be run as a commercial 
cooperative by member councils. 
A public company or cooperative structure is best suited for operating a SSC because 
it is more operationally flexible and economically competitive than a county council 
structure. 
Commercial contestability is important, not only for retaining council membership, but 
also for expanding sales to other clients in the public and private sectors. 
However, a county council model is better suited for regional planning functions for 
which regulatory powers are required. The county council model, by giving an existing 
regional organisation of councils (ROC) a statutory basis, would also give it greater 
authority when making submissions to state and federal government agencies. The 
regional county council would consist of mayors of member councils (refer to Figure 
7). 
The SSC, as a public company, would have its own CEO and be governed by a board 
of directors consisting of general managers of its member councils. The SSC, besides 
serving member councils, would also serve a regional council of mayors presiding over 
a regional county council (that could take on regional planning and advocacy func-
tions). As a cooperative, the SSC would pay an annual dividend to each member 
council commensurate with the value of services sold to it (refer to Figure 7).
Each council would retain a general manager with a small support staff to provide 
it with secretariat services including strategic planning and policy advice, to place 
manage the municipality and ensure the services centre fulfilled its contractual obliga-
tions. Each council, with the assistance of its general manager, would negotiate a 
services contract with the CEO of the SSC. 
Each council would appoint an independent local planning panel (LPP) to decide all 
local development applications in accordance with council planning and development 
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policies. All councils within a region would continue to have a say in appointing a joint 
regional planning panel (JRPP) that decides development applications of a regional 
nature (refer to Figure 8). The SSC would have an ongoing mandate to provide pro-
fessional staff to assist the local and regional planning panels with fees charged for 
providing such planning expertise set by the states’ independent pricing authority, 
such as the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal in NSW. 
After say five years, each council would be given the discretion to buy services from 
any provider, public, not-for-profit or private (refer to Figure 9). Shifting business to 
alternative providers would mean forfeiting cooperative dividends. Nevertheless, such 
a sunset clause would put the SSC on notice that unless it performed efficiently and 
effectively it could expect to lose custom once its five-year exclusive contract expired. 
FIGURE 8 
LOCAL COuNCIL SETS LOCAL PLANNING POLICIES AND APPOINTS MEMBErS TO LOCAL AND 
rEGIONAL PLANNING PANELS
Source: Percy Allan & Associates
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FIGURE 9 
AFTEr FIVE YEArS, LOCAL COuNCIL IS FrEE TO NEGOTIATE SErVICE CONTrACTS WITH 
ALTErNATIVE SErVICE PrOVIDErS
Source: Percy Allan & Associates
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If a community wanted a smaller council for better place management of its services 
and infrastructure, such a contract model would allow municipal councils to splinter 
along precinct lines without sacrificing economies of scale and scope. 
Indeed, a community contract council would bear some resemblance to a strata and 
community title owners’ corporation that used a body corporate service secretariat to 
plan and engage its services from external providers, such as a shared services centre 
(jointly owned with other body corporates) and/or a variety of other specialist services 
providers serving multiple clients. 
The main difference with the body corporate analogy would be that: 
•	 The council chamber would remain a political body required to service the social, 
environmental and economic needs of the wider community rather than just focus 
on property management; 
•	 The council’s secretariat would remain a public service organisation accountable to 
elected councillors; and 
•	 The SSC would be a commercial cooperative using activity-based costing to price 
its services and (except for planning panels) subject to market contestability after 
five years. 
Critical to establishing community contract councils is the concept of an SSC. 
Following are examples of such centres used in not-for-profit organisations, private 
enterprise and state government: 
Credit union movement
Independent shop fronts offer sophisticated financial services because they are linked 
to an SSC that acts as their bank, raise their finance, process their mortgages, service 
their ATMs, and so on. For example, CO-OP Financial Services, the largest credit union 
owned interbank network in the US, provides an ATM network and shared branching 
services to credit unions. In Australia, Cuscal Limited does the same.
American union movement 
Small local unions with only a few hundred members offer full services because behind 
each is an SSC that provides them with membership processing, collection of dues, 
specialist legal advice for employee contract negotiations, newsletter production, dis-
count deals, and so on.
Large corporations 
Conglomerates such as General Electrics often pool their support services (for 
example, recruitment and training, payroll and leave processing, bulk purchasing, 
environmental and legal advice, and financial transaction processing) to free up their 
autonomous business units to concentrate on their core operations.
Business rivals 
Vipro, jointly owned by the Commonwealth Bank, National Australia Bank and 
Westpac, was formed in 2005 to jointly process cheques on behalf of its owners. 
The consortium outsourced its operations to financial information services company 
Fiserv Inc., in a $600-million, 12-year deal. It claims this shared service arrangement 
reduced costs, improved fraud prevention and saved capital investment associated 
with cheque processing. 
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NSW Government 
Currently, there are three shared service operators in the NSW Government: Service 
First, BusinessLink and Health Support Services. There are moves afoot to put their 
functions to tender to achieve competitive pricing and greater flexibility of operations. 
According to the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet,15 a 2009 review of 193 
public and private SSCs in the US, EU and Asia Pacific by the Hackett Group Shared 
Services Performance Study found that:
•	 Shared service reform delivers over 20 per cent reduction in cost with improved 
levels of service and quality;
•	 71 per cent of shared services operations plan to achieve over 20 per cent reduction 
in costs; and 
•	 61 per cent of shared services operations have achieved over 20 per cent in savings. 
If diverse spheres of private and government activity can achieve greater efficiency 
and effectiveness through sharing services without full amalgamation, then surely the 
same can be done in local government.
Assessing alternative structures 
The Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government (ACELG) in 2011 took a 
fresh and objective look at the results of consolidation in local government both in 
Australasia and the rest of the world.16 It concluded that:
“ Ongoing change in local government is unavoidable, and consolidation in its various forms 
will be part of that process. As a general rule benefits of some sort do accrue when councils 
adopt mechanisms to collaborate or consolidate with other local authorities. Potential 
benefits are reduced or lost when the process is flawed due to inadequate planning and 
consultation or a failure to consider all the options available and precisely what each could 
achieve.”
Its primary research finding was that “there is little evidence that amalgamation will 
automatically yield substantial economies of scale. What is more obvious is that 
various forms of consolidation have the capacity to yield economies of scope”. It also 
added, “In the case of more remote councils with small populations spread over large 
areas, consolidation (whether amalgamation or shared services) may not be feasible”. 
Economies of scope come from sharing services whereas economies of scale come 
from purely size. 
The verdict is in: Sharing services makes sense, simply getting bigger does not. 
In exploring future structures of local government one should not confine oneself to 
the binary choice of status quo versus amalgamation. Other choices in between these 
extremes can achieve both the efficiency of scale (through service outsourcing) and 
scope (via shared services), and the effectiveness of specificity (by local place man-
agement) and speed (from codified practice with time limits). This means exploring the 
possibility of virtual councils. 
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Conclusion 
Local governments’ share of GDP is much lower in Australia than in other countries. 
Yet the average residency of Australian councils is much larger than that of local gov-
ernment authorities in most other countries. There is no empirical evidence either here 
or overseas that larger councils result in lower costs, rates, fees and charges. Indeed, 
in NSW, larger councils charge higher rates. Mergers distract from the real issues, 
which are massive under-spending on capital works and dysfunctional development 
approval processes.17 
The administrative reality is that the efficiency and effectiveness of a local council is 
not just a function of its size, but its speed, scope and specificity in delivering services 
whether processing rate notices, repairing roads, answering enquiries or considering 
development applications. Speed and scope require:
•	 Front-office place management focusing on the particular problems of a local place; 
•	 Mid-office strategic management making strategic decisions locally and regionally; 
•	 Back-office process management achieving economies from specialist providers.
Most council frontline services require very local attention, in which small councils 
excel. Urban planning and large developments need a regional focus through regional 
institutions. Routine corporate services and public works need scale to capture econ-
omies, which either outsourcing or SSCs do best. 
The political reality is that people believe small is beautiful – they want their local council 
centred on their neighbourhood. Residents identify with distinct neighbourhoods not 
amorphous regions. People expect their local councils to address micro issues within 
their local community, but expect the state government or joint state/local government 
bodies to address wider regional issues. They want impartial authorities divorced from 
vested interests to determine development applications based on long-term urban 
planning strategies agreed at a local, regional or state level depending on the signifi-
cance of the project. 
Citizens should be free to decide what size municipality they want. State governments 
could put lower and upper limits on this, for example, 20,000 to 100,000, except for 
remote rural councils whose populations are small and scattered. Councils would be 
required to transfer those services that would benefit from being done on a larger 
scale to an SSC, and those decisions that need to be done at a regional level to 
joint regional political (for example, Regional Organisations of Councils), statutory (for 
example, Regional County Council) or judicial bodies (for example, Joint Regional 
Planning Panels). 
The SSC would be jointly owned and governed by its member councils. It would be 
run strictly as a business providing works, maintenance, IT, financial services, planning, 
and so on, to participating councils, and their ROC, RCC or JRPP on a fee-for-service 
contract basis. 
To ensure that an SSC gave value for money, there would be a sunset clause on its 
exclusive mandate. Thereafter, councils, ROCs and JRPPs would be free to choose 
alternative suppliers if they offered better value for money. The SSC would be required 
to cease those services for which it had insufficient clients. This would ensure it never 
took its clients for granted, thereby always giving them good service. 
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Finally, the choice for politicians and the community is not just one of the status quo 
versus amalgamation. Of the options available, the virtual council model would deliver 
the best of both worlds: small councils able to focus on local needs through intensive 
place and client management, but with the capacity to buy-in services economically 
from a regional shared service centre cooperative or a specialist private or not-for-
profit provider. 
If we want true reform of local government then we need to recast it, not just reas-
semble what exists on a bigger scale. Otherwise we risk repeating the mistake of 
Australia Post, which in merging its mail sorting operations created a monster in the 
notorious Redfern Mail Exchange.
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Australia is one of the most highly urbanised countries in the world. Eighty per cent 
of our population live in cities with more than 100 thousand people and over 60 per 
cent living in the four largest state capitals, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. 
These cities are also some of the lowest density metropolitan areas in any developed 
country. This creates a lot of congestive pressure: the farther flung the population and 
the farther from employment, the greater the demand for longer road trips, thus roads, 
and very spread out public transport networks, where available. 
Our cities are the biggest engine rooms of our economy. Today, our cities are held 
back by inadequate systems of governance and the chasm between higher level met-
ropolitan planning at a state government level, and the delivery and fulfilment of those 
plans at the local government level. 
Goldilocks and the three bears is an effective analogy: Federal Government is far too 
big to play an ongoing role in metropolitan governance; state government is not as big 
as Federal Government, but it has competing priorities in regional and rural areas; and 
local government, being ‘baby bear’, is far too small to shoulder the burden of well-
coordinated and integrated planning – land use, transport, infrastructure, economic 
planning for any entire metropolitan area (with the notable exception of Brisbane). 
In three of the four large metropolitan areas – Sydney, Melbourne and Perth – local 
government is too small scale to do other than very locally focused place manage-
ment. Cities are not just places, they are systems – economic, transport and social 
systems – that must be integrated and well distributed. State government, doing all 
the work in delivering systems, often inevitably has a silo-based approach to cities 
with low levels of integration between transport and land-use planning. Sometimes the 
different systems fail to speak to each other. And this lack of integration is the other 
key problem of metropolitan governance. 
Metropolitan governance is essential if our cities are to be the prosperous, productive 
and liveable places they need to be to ensure national prosperity. Everyone around 
Australia has a real vested interest in how well our cities are run, however far away 
from them they may live. Stronger and more effective metropolitan governance is fun-
damental to Australia’s future success. 
Stronger metropolitan governance would deliver clear-sighted focus that understands 
the important of place management, good design and liveability, as well as the delivery 
of good systems that any great city needs. 
Of our state capitals, only Brisbane has a city government that actually governs the 
whole city. The Kennett Government in Victoria consolidated councils in the 1990s, 
but arguably did not go far enough, and what was achieved came at a high political 
cost. Perth is attempting to tackle the problem now. Sydney has yet to do so and the 
city has suffered with congestion, poor growth management and low housing afford-
ability as a result. 
Because of the small scale of local government, there is an uncomfortable and often a 
fraught tension between state and local government, particularly in New South Wales 
(NSW), with much less trust and confidence in the planning system and our gover-
nance than there should be.
Under-sized, under-capacity, disempowered local government makes it much harder 
to manage population growth and demographic change. Large metropolitan regions 
must become polycentric, where there are well-distributed urban centres with levels of 
economic activity and job density, to reduce congestion and long travel times. Small 
local governments, as well intentioned and hard working as they are, simply cannot 
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deliver the outcomes necessary. They don’t have the power and they don’t have the 
means. Stronger metropolitan governance may make the difference between our 
cities being truly successful and globally competitive or not and gradually losing their 
competitiveness as well as their prosperity. Our cities’ decline will also bring national 
decline. 
It is time for a new federal compact that acknowledges the importance of strong met-
ropolitan governance, and for a clear understanding of which level of government is 
responsible for what. 
Historical context
Like the tiny hamlets and villages that were the nucleus for the creation of local gov-
ernment for most of our metropolitan areas (even city governments were not very big), 
local government is still small scale, despite the growth of our large cities into conur-
bations. Each local government forms only a small sliver of the metropolitan whole. 
Metropolitan government is very small scale compared with other cities in our peer 
group. 
In the mid-19th Century, many decades before universal suffrage, colonial (now state) 
governments were seen as being run by the few, not by the many. Local governments 
were often created from a strong urge for those who were not part of ‘the few’ to have 
democratic representation. To a considerable extent, local government was formed by 
a democratic impulse on the part of small communities. In fact, some of the ‘few’ who 
held power in the colonial legislature in NSW resisted the creation of local government 
because it meant that there would, necessarily with representation, be a new tax on 
land in the form of council rates.
These small and very local historical origins of local government cast a big shadow on 
the way local government operates today, in Sydney in particular, but our other large 
major metropolitan cities as well. It has always been very fragmented, built around 
tiny settlements and hamlets. The biggest exception to this is Brisbane, which, due to 
some inspired political leadership in 1924, merged 20 local governments into Brisbane 
City Council. This has been to Brisbane and South-East Queensland’s great advan-
tage ever since.
As our urban populations exploded from the mid-1850s, so did the number of local 
governments. And most Australian cities did not, as many other large cities in the 
English-speaking world and Brisbane did, unite local government into a larger, stron-
ger, more empowered whole. 
The biggest example is New York, when what are now the five boroughs – Manhattan, 
Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx and Staten Island – merged into one big metropolitan 
government. The new City of New York created the governance framework to make 
the great urban moves of the late 19th and early 20th centuries possible, such as 
what is now the lifeblood of the city, the subway that runs across the length of those 
five former separate boroughs. There were other great results of strong metropolitan 
government as well: the bridges, the highways, and later, the airports. This strong 
metropolitan governance model set the framework that made it possible for New York 
to become the financial and economic capital of the free world.
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Where we are today
The deficit of metropolitan governance
Many Australian cities, above all Sydney, now have what can only be called a sig-
nificant metropolitan governance deficit compared with many other cities in the 
developed world, such as New York, San Francisco, Chicago and Singapore, which 
is really a city-state. In addition, London is located very much at the centre of British 
Government unlike the national capitals in Australia, the United States (US) or Canada. 
Despite its centrality and the lack of state governments layered between local and 
national government in the United Kingdom (UK), the British Government felt the need 
to re-establish a Greater London Authority in the last years of last century to establish 
a stronger system of metropolitan governance to support London’s role as a great 
world city.
Australian state governments, for perfectly understandable reasons, have compet-
ing priorities in rural and regional areas. Despite these other priorities, the issues of 
transport and land-use planning, water supply and storage (everything, in fact, that we 
would call infrastructure today, except local roads, footpaths and local parks) were put 
squarely at the foot, if not landed in the lap, of colonial, later state government. This 
was a function of the size, resources and thus the capability of local government to be 
able to do any more.
The deficit of metropolitan governance has made it really hard to manage growth in 
a coordinated and effective way, particularly in Sydney. On the one hand, the noble 
principle of subsidiarity – that decisions should be made as locally, at the lowest level 
of government possible – has made metropolitan governance much more difficult. 
The smaller the community, the harder it is to grasp (beyond local level) place man-
agement, and to understand how important it is to manage population growth and 
systems growth in a wider metropolitan context.
The reflexive view at a local level can sometimes be that “managing wider national and 
metropolitan population and economic growth is not our problem”. The mandate of 
local government councillors is to serve the local community, and that means today’s 
local community, not the wider metropolitan community. And there is often a low level 
of focus on intergenerational equity. At the scale in which local government operates, it 
is a rational and completely explicable response to say “we are small, we like the way 
things are we do not want any change. Do whatever you need to but don’t do it in my 
street or backyard”. 
Fragmented metropolitan governance cannot by definition have the strategic capacity 
to plan and deliver what is needed to manage population growth, nor the resources to 
make the necessary investment in infrastructure. In addition, small-scale local govern-
ment does not have the administrative reach or the broad political mandate needed 
to manage growth in a positive way that delivers the housing, the jobs, the prosperity 
and liveability or to ensure processes that will prioritise productivity and prosperity as 
well as community. 
The fact that our state governments are principally challenged with building the infra-
structure and setting the strategic tone for planning our large cities means there is 
often a dual and clear tension between government departments and agencies 
charged with delivering systems, and economic planning, treasury and finance depart-
ments with their concentration on minimising debt and capital expenditure. Often each 
system operates within its silo area and there is no ‘coming together’, consensus or 
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accord between these government departments, none of whose core business is 
place making, but rather, systems or service delivery. Stasis and inertia are often the 
result. Either that or the reverse where there can be sudden fitful spurts of activity from 
a particular agency or department without any clear cohesive or integrated internal 
logic from a whole of government perspective, or from the perspective of the whole 
metropolitan region. This is bad governance. And very bad for sound planning and 
management in their widest senses. 
A Swiss academic, Daniel Kubler, a political scientist from Zurich who has studied 
Australian metropolitan governance in some detail, has noted that conflict between 
the NSW Government and local government in metropolitan Sydney: 
“ … increases the likelihood of blockades within the joint decision system … as a consequence  
of failed structural reforms (that is, council amalgamations which are often seen as being 
politically motivated) the geopolitical fragmentation of the Sydney metropolitan area is high, 
but quite typical of Australia. Indeed in international comparison, Australian metropolitan 
areas are roughly three to 10 times more fragmented than their comparable counterparts on 
other countries, such as Canada, for example. Only Brisbane – thanks to the annexation of 
20 suburbs in 1924 – has an institutional structure that is comparable to the situation found 
in other OECD countries … (the most significant tension for metropolitan governance) is the 
one leading to conflicts between local councils, and the states. It stems from the tension 
between local interests and the regional scope necessary for planning the development of 
the wider metropolitan area.”1
Kubler went on to observe that state government-initiated metropolitan planning 
strategies can be delivered only with the support of local government, and that the 
compliance of local government with state-wide metropolitan objectives cannot be 
assumed:
“ There is a dilemma of how to reconcile local government’s day-to-day control of new 
developments with the pursuit of longer term and metropolitan-wide strategic aims. 
Resolving this dilemma is the key to achieving area wide governance in Australian 
metropolitan areas.”2
Vertical fiscal imbalance
We need to understand the problem in the context of the current significance of met-
ropolitan regions to a nation’s economic success. Many learned authors have written 
about this, Edward Glaeser and Enrico Moretti to name just two. The title of Glaeser’s 
recent book, The triumph of the city – how our greatest invention makes us richer, 
smarter, greener, healthier and happier,3 says it all.
It’s important to understand the challenge of metropolitan governance within the 
scope of our current system of federalism. Our federal system is characterised by 
extreme vertical fiscal imbalance. The Commonwealth Government raises nearly all 
(approximately 75 per cent)4 total government revenue, and delivers many of the really 
expensive services (welfare payments to name a big one). It then provides tied and 
untied grant funding to the states of just under half the states’ total revenue, and dis-
tributes direct federal funding to schools, hospitals, roads and infrastructure, which are 
not, strictly speaking, its responsibility. This direct distribution creates the expectation 
that the Commonwealth Government (whoever is in power) will come to the financial 
rescue of any deserving urban project – because no other level of government is finan-
cially able. 
In the middle of World War II, state governments relinquished the power to levy 
income tax or any other major taxes, and they have not been very keen to take that 
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responsibility back. State governments levy some taxes – principally stamp duties, 
land tax and payroll taxes – and deliver almost all the services and systems to metro-
politan areas and elsewhere. State governments build and run the hospitals, schools, 
roads, trains, and set the strategic planning framework for metropolitan government. 
They are the level of government most intensively engaged in the business of service 
delivery in our metropolitan regions. 
Who does what?
Which level of government does what has become very blurred in recent decades in 
response to an understandable collective, bipartisan political response to community 
pleas to stop blame shifting and just fix things through financial assistance, direct or 
otherwise. But it has confused who is responsible for doing what. So the picture will 
continue to be confusing absent a major renegotiation of the federal compact.
We now have the confusing, even for some, confounding situation in which the current 
Commonwealth Government is prepared to provide funding for roads and highways 
but not for urban rail – at a time when good mass transit is known to be a major 
productivity, liveability and international competitiveness-enhancer and congestion-
reducer in all cities, our own included.
Poor metropolitan governance confounds the issue of who is responsible for what. 
It thereby reduces accountability and leads to blame and cost shifting, which is the 
opposite of good governance.
This is an even more fundamental issue when it becomes clearer and clearer that 
in the post-resource construction boom in the coming years and decades, it will be 
the capability and the productivity of our human capital – otherwise known as our 
people – that will determine future national success. The resources sector accounts 
for around half of our export earnings but less than 15 per cent of our gross domestic 
product (GDP). Our GDP is overwhelmingly sourced from the material between our 
collective ears, and will be for the foreseeable future.
And people overwhelmingly live in our large cities. Our cities generate 80 per cent of 
our GDP. So it is in our cities that we face the biggest national challenges – ensur-
ing continued economic growth and higher productivity, and managing demographic 
change (with increasing pressure on the health system) and population growth. With 
an ageing population, there will be fewer working-age people for each person aged 
over 65 (traditionally thought to be over working age). In 1970, there were seven 
working-age people for each person over 65; in 2010, there were five; and by 2050, 
there will be 2.7. That will take us, approximately, to where Japan’s demographics are 
now, which will put a lot of pressure on the need for those who are in the workforce to 
work more productively than they do today. 
Demographic ageing and other societal forces mean that the fastest growing house-
hold type is the single-person household. Between 2006 and 2031, there will be a 
30 per cent increase in single-person households – 1.3 million. Many of these single 
people are women. Thirty per cent of women will reach retirement age without a 
partner.
These combined forces will enhance the need for more compact, denser, walkable or 
transport-accessible communities. Added to this is the new phenomenon of younger 
families being increasingly willing to trade space and quiet suburbia for inner-city com-
pactness and convenience – the dominance of the two working-parent households 
with children makes this inevitable. 
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These demographic and societal forces lead to the need for more compact housing 
choices and denser settlement. This will put a great deal of pressure on our defec-
tive metropolitan governance system to deliver the housing that is not only wanted, 
but needed. Without reform, the tension and the dissonance that Professor Kubler 
described will become even more intense. We just won’t get the cities that we need 
and want for the future. 
Where we need to go
There is often a big, even chasmic gap between the discussion about macro issues 
raised in national policy like the Intergenerational Reports and the micro discussions 
about, for example, whether a row of buildings in a neighbourhood should be single, 
two or three storied or more. But they are all part of the same puzzle and even the 
same conversation, and need to be mutually respected as such.
Our cities are a matter of strategic national importance and deserve a lot more ‘big city 
thinking’. As the locus of so many of our people and so much of our economic output, 
they have to be. 
At a metropolitan level, productivity can be enhanced through flexibility, such as flex-
ible trading hours, flexible work practices to include wider sections of the population, 
and higher workplace participation, good education standards and skills training, 
investment in productive infrastructure and not too much congestion.
Productivity can also be enhanced though working with the economics of agglomera-
tion: These agglomeration benefits are strongest where workers, businesses, products 
and suppliers are all close to their markets. This is particularly true for the high value-
added services that are concentrated in our cities, such as financial and business 
services, and the ICT industries. But agglomeration cannot just happen in our CBDs 
alone. It has to be clumped through metropolitan regions. The only successful large 
metropolitan region this century will be a polycentric ‘city of cities’.
Productivity at its core, as dry as it sounds, means making the best use of our 
resources – our people above all – so that we can do more with less. More outputs 
with fewer inputs. Productivity is much closer to the real notion of sustainability than is 
often understood.
How do we get there?
1.  Encourage smaller local governments to find pathways to amalgamation to create 
and benefit wider communities of interest. This can be through giving greater 
responsibility, powers and financial capacity to larger scaled local government. The 
carrot will always work better than the stick. 
2.  Build stronger subregional planning into the system and create clear accountabili-
ties for it. There will always be a discussion around how many subregions there are 
for our large cities, and there will never be 100 per cent consensus about where the 
lines should be drawn. But it is possible, and it is a very important element of stron-
ger metropolitan governance. In an ideal world, local governments would cover 
the same territory as each subregion of larger metropolitan areas. That way, local 
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government can be empowered to do the important job of subregional planning 
that always falls to state government, and not always successfully for the aforemen-
tioned reasons. That way too, the principle of subsidiarity could really work. 
3.  Metropolitan planning commissions could be a way of bridging the gap between 
under-scaled local government and arguable overscaled state government. It could 
be the all-important bridge between local place management, and systems plan-
ning and subregional planning. Metropolitan planning commissions will only work if 
the various key functions and service delivery areas of government are included and 
are part of the team – together with more empowered, larger local governments so 
that governance in our cities can be well integrated and coordinated. Larger and 
more empowered local governments will be able to play a greater role. 
Conclusion
If we don’t tackle the metropolitan governance problems we have, our cities will not go 
into sudden decline. But they will, over time, fail to fulfil their true potential. And every-
one, present and future, will be the poorer for it. No city in the competitive globalised 
world can thrive with weak and fragmented governance where the fight between local-
ism and metropolitan ‘big city thinking’ is an ongoing battle with uncertain, fraught and 
adverse outcomes.
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Infrastructure – who should build it, maintain it and, ultimately, pay for it – continues 
to be a regular feature of political, industry and media commentary and debate. 
Paradoxically, infrastructure, despite the fact that it is usually large and physical, is 
generally treated by the public as invisible. It is only when it fails that its existence is 
acknowledged. 
Failure can be catastrophic, such as a bridge collapsing, an issue that is particularly 
troubling in the United States these days. More commonly, the failure is gradual, as the 
infrastructure fails to deliver the level of service that the public expects, such as the 
current debate in Australia regarding our public transport systems. 
Infrastructure usually involves significant expenditure, so the planning for it is usually 
very long term. It is for this reason that historically governments plan, deliver and fund 
infrastructure. 
New forms of financing are being explored due to constraints affecting government 
budgets, and the fact that Australia’s constitutional framework doesn’t match the 
responsibility for delivery of infrastructure or the ability to fund it effectively.
This chapter proposes that public infrastructure shares many characteristics with 
telecommunications carriers, thereby providing a basis for adopting the infrastructure 
policies of telecommunications carriers for the provision of public infrastructure in 
Australia. 
Infrastructure: The key to growth
Defining Australia’s public infrastructure problem
There are two main parts to Australia’s public infrastructure problem.
The first part of the problem is reflected in public infrastructure deficiencies. Australia’s 
public infrastructure is ageing, its maintenance requirements are increasing, and many 
public infrastructure assets are reaching, or have reached, user capacity. The state of 
the nation’s infrastructure is in decline, and with it, the efficient functioning of its cities 
and regional areas.
The Productivity Commission referred to widely held views that deficiencies in 
Australia’s infrastructure are holding back productivity growth and affect the amenity of 
cities and regional areas.1 
Ageing, inefficient infrastructure and infrastructure deficiencies increase costs and 
create barriers to population growth, and more importantly, workforce growth. They 
also increase costs to business and reduce productivity. 
Australia’s infrastructure problem is the congestion on roads, and at ports and airports. 
Public transport systems are plagued by overcrowding and disruptions to service 
caused by breakdowns and signal failures. Water wastage is being caused by broken 
pipes and leakage from irrigation channels.
Infrastructure deficiencies are a huge economic burden. The social costs of conges-
tion in Sydney alone have been projected to exceed $7 billion by 2020, and it has been 
estimated that by that time, the cost of urban congestion to the national economy will 
exceed $20 billion.2 
The second part of Australia’s public infrastructure problem is reflected in the verti-
cal fiscal imbalance created by the Commonwealth Government collecting revenue 
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in excess of its spending responsibilities (through the collection of income tax, Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) and fuel excise) and the state governments having insufficient 
revenue to finance their spending responsibilities. The effect of this vertical fiscal imbal-
ance is two-fold: 
1.  The states do not raise enough revenue (from the collection of property and vehicle 
taxes and payroll tax) to invest in public infrastructure without Commonwealth 
Government assistance; and 
2.  Any increase in revenue generated by increased economic activity flowing from 
investment in public infrastructure goes to the Commonwealth Government rather 
than to state governments. 
While state governments are best placed to deliver public infrastructure because of 
their connection with the communities to whom they supply relevant services, the 
vertical fiscal imbalance paradoxically creates a considerable disincentive for state 
governments to invest in public infrastructure. This effect is magnified when taking 
into account the income foregone because of diminished economic activity flowing 
from the deficiencies in public infrastructure, for example, missing out on increases in 
property taxes because of reduced growth in property values. 
Benefits of investing in infrastructure
Investing in new infrastructure and the maintenance or upgrading of existing infra-
structure provides both economic and social benefits, directly and indirectly, for all 
Australians.
Economic infrastructure is infrastructure that directly serves the economy, such as 
roads and ports. Such infrastructure enables business to reduce costs and improve 
productivity. 
Social infrastructure serves a social function, such as schools and hospitals, and these 
arguably have an indirect effect on the economy by improving education and health to 
alleviate the burden on welfare.
Direct economic benefits can be measured in terms of reduced costs (in time or 
money) or increased revenue. Access to a new road directly benefits road users by 
reducing the time of a journey and therefore the fuel and wear-and-tear costs of a 
vehicle. New road infrastructure also benefits businesses and consumers by reducing 
the time and cost of providing goods and services. 
Indirect economic benefits are benefits felt more widely because of the direct eco-
nomic benefits. Improvements in business productivity and profit that flow from cost 
reductions or increases in volume can lead to greater investment by business in 
employment or capital works.
The social benefits of infrastructure can be measured by improvements in quality of 
life or amenity. Schools and hospitals provide obvious direct social benefits, such as 
education and health to students and patients. They can also indirectly benefit the 
wider population by reducing the spread of illness or reducing reliance on welfare by 
improving employment opportunities.
Furthermore, infrastructure can provide both economic and social benefits con-
currently. In addition to the health benefits that hospitals provide, improvements in 
community health can contribute to a greater participation in the workforce because 
of less absenteeism due to illness. Over and above the economic benefits of a new 
road are the social benefits of improving access to services that hospitals and schools 
provide.
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
138
S E C T I O N  3 . 4
Investment in infrastructure is important to enable the nation’s cities and regional areas 
to grow. It is both the economic and social benefits of infrastructure that attract and 
retain people. Investment in infrastructure is needed to provide:
•	 An acceptable cost of living; 
•	 Employment opportunities; 
•	 Access to services; and 
•	 A satisfying level of amenity. 
As cities grow, the economy grows, and a failure to address Australia’s infrastructure 
problem will make it more difficult to attract the kind of people who will contribute to 
economic growth. 
Responding to the infrastructure problem
Any response to the public infrastructure problem must focus on investing in public 
infrastructure in our major capital cities, and more specifically, central business districts 
(CBDs). CBDs are Australia’s economic growth engines. They have been experienc-
ing compound annual growth of 3.5 per cent over the last decade or so, with many 
exceeding 4.4 per cent growth. Australia’s major capital cities are among Australia’s 
top 10 economic contributors.3 
The response to the public infrastructure problem should be driven at the federal level 
of government. Both the Productivity Commission and the National Commission of 
Audit acknowledge the paramount role of the states in identifying and delivering infra-
structure. This is consistent with the distribution of powers under the Constitution, 
which leaves the responsibility for infrastructure in the hands of the states (by omis-
sion). It also recognises that most infrastructure will benefit users and residents within 
a particular state, so the state governments are in the best position to assess the 
merits of an infrastructure project to meet local needs. 
However, this responsibility vested in the states ignores the vertical fiscal imbalance and 
the fact that the Commonwealth Government holds the purse strings. The states rely 
on receiving a proportion of the GST collected by the Commonwealth Government to 
cover their spending commitments. So despite the states’ constitutional infrastructure 
powers, they depend on federal funding to enable them to deliver local infrastructure. 
Given the benefits of investing in infrastructure for the nation as a whole, the 
Commonwealth Government’s relative financial strength and ability to analyse national 
networks for more efficient provision of infrastructure mean it has considerable power 
and scope to set the policy for investment in Australia’s infrastructure. 
Arguably, the Commonwealth Government’s two main roles are coordinating the 
development of nationally significant infrastructure and linking federal funding with 
requirements for efficient infrastructure delivery by the states. The former is well in 
hand with the recent amendments to the constitution of Infrastructure Australia. The 
latter is still a work in progress.
However, adopting a CBD focus along with Commonwealth Government coordina-
tion and funding will not necessarily lead to better infrastructure outcomes without 
also taking into account the private sector’s approach to investing in infrastructure and 
ensuring there are links between the delivery of infrastructure and usage. 
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Nature of infrastructure assets
Public infrastructure assets share many characteristics with the infrastructure assets 
of telecommunication carriers, which provide a basis for state governments to act like 
telecommunications carriers in making infrastructure investment decisions.
Part of a network
A telecommunication carrier’s infrastructure is a network of copper and fibre optic 
cables, and related technology. In a similar way, public infrastructure can be viewed as 
a network, one made of electrical wires, gas lines, water pipes, roads and rail.
Natural monopolies
Most public infrastructure assets are natural monopolies. Natural monopolies occur 
when no competitive market exists because it is more efficient for one provider to 
supply the relevant market than for two or more providers to do so. 
The sheer size and cost of most infrastructure mean that large economies of scale are 
required to produce an efficient outcome, which creates a natural barrier to competi-
tion. Duplicating infrastructure assets would increase the average cost of providing 
the service and would be a wasteful use of resources. It would be useless to have 
two bridges, side by side, providing an identical route to one destination. It there-
fore makes sense that the provision of public infrastructure has traditionally been the 
domain of government. 
However, being a natural monopoly doesn’t have to mean that a public infrastructure 
asset is destined to be the sole domain of governments as is arguably demonstrated 
by certain characteristics that public infrastructure shares with telecommunications 
carriers.
A telecommunications carrier provides the infrastructure used to provide telecommuni-
cation services. It has the characteristics of a natural monopoly because it is inefficient 
to duplicate the infrastructure to create a competitive market. However there is clearly 
a free market in telecommunications services because multiple telecommunications 
service providers are allowed to share the existing infrastructure to provide telecom-
munications services to their respective customers.
Regulated market
As a result of its natural monopoly, the Commonwealth Government has intervened to 
impose a regulated market on the telecommunications carriers to ensure that consum-
ers are not disadvantaged by the conditions of the natural monopoly, which creates 
the potential for higher prices and lower levels of delivery than would be achieved in a 
competitive market.
Public infrastructure is not subject to a regulated market per se; however, political 
necessities, such as the need to provide equitable access to basic services to users 
regardless of their ability to pay, potentially have the same effect on access and price.
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Approach to investing in infrastructure 
From the advent of morse code and the telegraph, to telephones and exchanges and 
then to mobile phones and towers, telecommunications carriers continually invest in 
new and existing infrastructure. If they do not, it will be difficult to maintain service 
levels as breakdowns increase, and it will then be difficult to retain and attract custom-
ers. Carriers would also miss out on the benefits of adopting new technology, such as 
reduced input costs, and the potential for new or increased revenue. 
Failure to invest in public infrastructure has a similar effect on a city’s ability to retain 
and attract people, and it leads to lost opportunities for cost efficiencies or economic 
growth.
A telecommunications carrier benefits from agglomeration economies that occur when 
a large number of users are able to share the same infrastructure thereby reducing the 
cost of delivery to each user. The telecommunications carrier is then able to provide 
the service to locations that are more remote. 
Although the provision of telecommunications infrastructure to rural areas is less effi-
cient because there are fewer users and delivery costs are higher, there is recognition 
that absorbing the higher cost of providing that service has many benefits, such as 
broadening its market, creating loyalty and providing an expanded service to its cus-
tomers. It is the infrastructure that services the many that provides the opportunity to 
provide infrastructure to service the few. 
The same principal applies to governments. The provision of public infrastructure to 
cities delivers the opportunities to provide infrastructure to the regional areas because 
of the economic growth it generates. Despite the higher cost of providing regional 
infrastructure, there are economic and social benefits in doing so. 
There are two significant points of difference in the telecommunications carrier’s 
approach to investing in infrastructure. These points of difference are exactly the issues 
that a response to Australia’s infrastructure problem needs to address. The first is that 
the vertical fiscal imbalance disincentivises state governments from investing in public 
infrastructure because increased revenue flowing from economic growth bypasses the 
states and goes straight to the Commonwealth Government. The second is that the 
telecommunications network is supplied on a user-pays basis. 
Delivering infrastructure on state government budgets
Traditional funding approach
Historically, governments have taken the lead role in providing and funding infra-
structure in Australia. Before the 1980s, the public sector owned and financed most 
infrastructure, and private enterprise constructed it under a system of competitive 
tendering. 
In the 1950s, the public sector provided, operated and maintained 92 per cent of 
the nation’s infrastructure. By 2002, this had reduced to 71 per cent, largely due to 
privatisations. However, still a significant proportion is in public ownership.
In general, privatisation of important public assets has been, and continues to be, 
politically unpopular. 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
140
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
141
S E C T I O N  3 . 4
The recent budget cuts highlight the Commonwealth Government’s reduced appe-
tite for debt, which will inevitably constrain its capacity to invest in new infrastructure 
projects and maintain existing infrastructure assets. In addition to budget cuts, the 
Commonwealth Government is contending with an unsustainable decline in fuel excise 
revenue because new technologies have led to lower fuel consumption, which reveals 
the flaw in linking revenue with a measure that does not reflect actual use. Therefore, 
the need for more innovative funding options is apparent. 
There is now a clear trend towards reducing government ownership of infrastructure 
assets, and ensuring that government investment in infrastructure be tied to transpar-
ent cost benefit analysis, and charging users for the services provided by infrastructure.
Transparent pricing with hypothecation funding of service delivery
Part of the response to Australia’s infrastructure problem needs to consider options 
for increasing revenue – through either the introduction of new taxes or user charges, 
both of which tend to be unpopular. In Hong Kong, a congestion charge was rejected, 
despite positive results from models, because of a perception that it was a revenue 
raising exercise.4 
However, public support for user charges can be achieved provided there is a clear 
link between use and service. For instance, explicit opposition to London’s congestion 
charge was over 40 per cent prior to its introduction, but fell by almost half within three 
months. Explicit support for the charge rose to almost 60 per cent over the same 
period.5 
Similarly, there appears to be significant evidence that the level of public support for 
new taxes is higher if revenues are hypothecated to investment in tangible benefits. 
For example, support for an increase in tobacco taxes was found to increase from 
47 per cent to 84 per cent if hypothecated for health or other community benefits.6 A 
proposal in LA County to introduce a new sales tax hypothecated to the delivery of 12 
new transport projects over 20 years received the support of 75 per cent of voters.7 
Regardless which funding option is used, in addition to increased public support, one 
of the benefits of transparent pricing with hypothecation funding of service delivery is 
that it provides users with a better understanding about the balance between the cost 
they pay and the level of service they receive. 
It can also lead to a more efficient use of the service as each user makes an assess-
ment of the costs versus the benefits of use. A congestion charge is a good example, 
as users who determine that the benefit in using a road subject to a congestion charge 
is no greater than the benefit in using an alternate route will alter their use accordingly. 
This allows a more efficient use of the charged road by alleviating congestion.
Transparent pricing with hypothecation funding of service delivery can also lead to 
more equitable pricing for a service by ensuring that the users deriving the most 
benefits from the service are making the greatest contribution to the provision of the 
service. For example, current road-related charges in Australia, being vehicle regis-
tration fees and fuel excise, lack transparency and are linked to the nature and fuel 
efficiency of a vehicle rather than the use of roads. When one considers also that fuel 
tax credits are provided to heavy vehicles, it is clear that potentially those users who 
derive the most benefit from the roads make comparatively smaller contributions to 
the provision of roads and road maintenance. 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
142
S E C T I O N  3 . 4
Linking delivery of infrastructure with use of the asset
For some infrastructure assets, the obvious link between delivery and use will be user 
charges. Road users should pay a road charge to reflect the cost of providing access 
to, and maintenance of, the roads. Utility users pay consumption charges and service 
fees to reflect the cost of goods and to provide access to, and maintenance of, the 
pipes or power lines.
If users can be charged for the service of an asset, that asset should be capable of 
generating a commercial return. This return should be used to attract private sector 
involvement in the provision of the asset.8 
In some cases, user charges will not be appropriate. However, the service will still 
provide net economic or social benefits. In these cases, user charges, even with trans-
parent pricing with hypothecation funding, will not be appropriate. There will also be 
situations in which the level of user charges cannot meet the spending requirements 
of the service delivery. For example, the level of public transport fares and volume of 
passengers is not sufficient to meet the cost of providing the service. 
Value capture mechanisms provide an innovative way to link delivery with use of an 
asset beyond the direct user to a broader group of beneficiaries. It also spreads the 
cost of service delivery across them. This may be a useful way to link delivery with use 
where user charges would not meet funding requirements or would not be appropriate.
While there are many types of value capture mechanisms, the common thread 
between them is that they seek to impose a cost on those who benefit from the effi-
ciencies and improvements in amenity created by the infrastructure to which they are 
attached. For example, there is evidence that residential property values in the transit 
catchment area of a rail transit project can increase by up to 45 per cent. The impact 
is even greater on commercial property in the catchment, with up to a 65 per cent 
increase in value.9 
A betterment levy such as the Business Rates Supplement imposed on businesses 
in London in connection with London’s Crossrail project seeks to capture a portion 
of the increases in property values or commercial value created by the delivery of 
new infrastructure.10 Tax Incremental Financing (TIF) seeks to capture increases in tax 
revenue that are expected to be created from rising property values (land tax) and 
improved business profitability (business income tax). A TIF was introduced as part of 
the Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) project in 2008, which was expected to deliver 
US$328 million in incremental tax revenue based on the increase in property values 
from US$320 million in 2008 to US$3.52 billion by 2038. Studies already suggest that 
the value of properties near DART stations is between 12.6 and 13.2 per cent higher 
than elsewhere.11 
Investments in infrastructure by a telecommunications carrier will be funded from its 
profits. Where existing profits are deficient, investments will be funded from future 
profits (the projections of which can be used to obtain finance from banks or investors). 
It is therefore reasonable to consider funding public infrastructure from future increases 
in tax revenue. Banks or investors require sound economic rationale to support their 
investment. Politicians and taxpayers are no different, which is why project assess-
ment needs to take into account the financial value created by the project. 
However, the application of these approaches will always be problematic because of 
the different taxes levied by different levels of government in Australia. Local authori-
ties will benefit from rates that increase as property values increase. In addition, state 
governments will benefit from increased stamp duty and land tax arising from those 
increases. The main winner, however, is likely to be the Commonwealth Government, 
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with increases in income and capital gains taxes arising from those increases in value. 
The paradox, as noted previously, is that the states are primarily responsible for deliv-
ering the infrastructure that leads to these increases. This suggests that hypothecation 
of user charges is a perhaps a more desirable approach, as it avoids these difficult 
constitutional issues.
Conclusion
Economic infrastructure underpins the performance of Australia’s economy. It is imper-
ative that we continually invest in and maintain our stock of infrastructure to ensure 
Australia remains globally competitive.
A telecommunications carrier enjoys a regulated monopoly return; the same logic 
could be applied to the provision of substantial economic infrastructure. Hypothecation 
of those user charges to the investment in, and maintenance of, the asset means that 
the community is more likely to recognise the benefit of investing in, and paying for, 
that asset.
The public prefers a more transparent link between the two. Politicians undoubtedly 
will be attracted to propositions that are electorally more compelling. 
The challenge is that purely having a link between revenue and expense doesn’t nec-
essarily account for externalities, such as environmental impacts.
Not all infrastructure is capable of hypothecation, but certainly where it is, it should be 
required to be considered in making investment decisions. 
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Why we can do better than a ‘grand bargain’ to 
resolve overlapping roles and responsibilities
Whenever the issue of duplication of Commonwealth and state responsibilities in the 
Federation rears its head, commentators tend to offer up either of two ‘solutions’:
1.  Revert to the original constitutional arrangements – the idea that the nation’s 
Founders got it right at the beginning and we should invoke and apply the rules 
as originally intended. In other words, we should restore a clearer divide between 
national security and commerce-related functions that the Commonwealth performs 
and social services provided by the states.
2.  Negotiate a ‘grand bargain’ to trade-off responsibilities between the two levels 
whereby the Commonwealth retains control of, for example, health, in exchange for 
giving states full responsibility for, say, schools.
Both approaches rest on a foundation of federalism principles that create a tension 
between ‘subsidiarity’ – that is, that functions are performed at the lowest level of 
government practicable – and ‘national interest’ where nationally important issues are 
managed at a higher level in the system.1
Problems with the traditional way of thinking about 
roles and responsibilities
There are a couple of things wrong with the two ‘solutions’ when thinking about delin-
eation of roles and responsibilities in the Federation. 
First, the fact that the debate has not progressed despite these offered solutions 
shows that they don’t necessarily help. Why? Because the centripetal forces in our 
Federation are such that neither is practical. In a world of complex interdependencies, 
it has become too difficult to draw a clear line of responsibility between discrete port-
folio areas. Meanwhile, citizens’ expectation of governments to ‘do something’ in the 
wake of a scandal or crisis continues to grow. This, combined with the desire of politi-
cians to influence or take the lead on important areas of government activity, creates 
an imperative for involvement in an issue that compromises efforts to establish and 
sustain a pure division of responsibilities between the top two levels of government.
Secondly, although subsidiarity and national interest are important concepts, people 
will often presume that when the former prevails, state responsibility for the issue is 
implied. Conversely, when national interest is the overriding concept, the assumption 
is that the Commonwealth should be in control. With increasing globalisation, however, 
the subsidiarity principle may point towards national-level responsibility for an issue or 
service, while national interest issues need not suggest that sole responsibility should 
rest with the Commonwealth. Indeed, if a matter is crucially important to the nation – 
think of Australia’s response to the threat of terrorism post-9/11 – then it is likely that 
all nine jurisdictions need to be involved to address it. In other areas, it is possible 
to achieve a national approach or response to a problem through inter-jurisdictional 
coordination among states, without the need for Commonwealth involvement. 
In a federation, unlike in a unitary state, power is both divided and shared.2 This 
produces a number of benefits that have been variously described3 but can be 
summarised as follows: A federation ensures equity in treatment of all citizens while 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
146
S E C T I O N  3 . 5
enabling choice, providing checks on power, promoting pluralism in our democracy 
and supporting innovation.
Delivering those benefits requires power to be divided and shared in a way that is:
•	 Effective by spreading risk and responsibility between levels of government, allowing 
for specialisation, innovation and alignment with need; and
•	 Efficient by avoiding duplication and overlap of activity, and thereby supporting an 
efficient allocation of government resources.
The subsidiarity principle conflates efficiency and effectiveness considerations into one 
concept, and begs further questioning to understand what is meant by responsibility 
resting with the lowest level of government practicable. Efficiency and effectiveness, 
while still subject to considerable interpretation, are more measurable than ‘subsid-
iarity’. They allow us to pose very specific questions, even if the answers are not 
straightforward, such as, ‘which layer of government can be most responsive to client 
needs?’ and ‘which layer of government can deliver the services at lowest cost?’
A better way to think about delineating roles and 
responsibilities
So how should we approach the problem of overlapping roles and responsibilities in 
our Federation? 
‘Responsibilities’ is usually taken to mean ministerial portfolios such as defence, infra-
structure and health. While rarely considered in detail, ‘roles’ would most sensibly refer 
to the main functions exercised by governments. These fall into three main categories: 
1.  Service delivery – program or grants management and provision of services 
whether they are universal or tailored; in-person or online; information, entitlement 
or product-based.
2.  Regulation – interpreted as the responsibility to ensure compliance with legislated 
or administrative standards or contractual obligations. This can be done within gov-
ernment by an arms-length regulator that is typically accountable to a minister.
3.  Policymaking – processes associated with policy advice, development and 
implementation, including legislative and regulatory policy and support for decision-
making processes (notably Cabinet and budget processes).
One of the problems with federalism debates to date is that the participants often trip 
up on the issue of ‘funding’ as a role of governments in a federation. Funding, more 
correctly, is an enabler of the three broad functions listed above. The fact that funding 
distribution among jurisdictions is being considered (via the tax review) in parallel to 
the White Paper on the Reform of the Federation underlines this important distinction 
and makes a breakthrough on federal reform a genuine possibility. Funding must align 
to the business being carried out by the respective governments, but it is the cart that 
goes after the horse.
If it is unrealistic (as argued earlier) to remove duplicated responsibilities by either 
returning to the status quo ex ante or negotiating a grand bargain that will ‘stick’, then 
it may be possible to get closer to a solution by focusing instead on who performs 
which of the three key roles within a given area of responsibility. Could we accept, 
for example, that the states should perform all regulatory and service delivery roles in 
school education, but that there is a legitimate joint policy role that could be shared 
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between the national and state governments? If so, it may be possible to achieve a 
more focused and fruitful discussion about how to properly share that policy role and 
to put in place more effective controls against ‘over-reach’.
Focus on roles rather than responsibilities
To see how this approach might work in practice, following are three examples, one 
each from an economic, social and environmental portfolio, to which the effective-
ness and efficiency tests are applied to determine which layer of government should 
exercise the respective roles of:
•	 Service delivery; 
•	 Regulation; and 
•	 Policymaking. 
The following examples are illustrations only that oversimplify the detailed consider-
ation required. Each role would need to be examined in more depth, and assumptions 
properly exposed and tested. It is very unlikely that the ‘solution’ would be self-evident, 
even in the less-contested responsibility areas for which there is relatively minimal 
overlap. But given our nation’s experience with increasing centralisation, and the value 
that arises from federal coordination and cooperation, the outcome would likely have 
more ‘stickability’ than one that just hands full responsibility for a portfolio area to one 
layer of government or the other.
Example 1: Transport portfolio
Service delivery should be managed at state level on both effectiveness and effi-
ciency grounds. It is effective because it ties into city planning and ensures alignment 
with longer term urban development, and efficient because states are better able to 
procure and manage transport contracts, and they can develop innovative models for 
joint ventures and cost recovery. 
Regulation arguably could be state-based for reasons of relative effectiveness, particu-
larly with respect to intrastate safety and interoperability. But a case could be made, 
on economy of scale grounds, for a national regulator of interstate transport. This 
might lead to a conclusion that there be state-based regulation, which would include 
monitoring compliance with national (not necessarily Commonwealth) standards for 
interstate transport.
Policy functions would be usefully exercised at the state level for efficiency and effec-
tiveness, as this would achieve alignment with regulatory and delivery approaches. 
However, there would be a strong case for integration with national infrastructure and 
economic development policies. For that reason, policy functions in transport might be 
shared, but with a clear division: The states would agree to national standards (thereby 
avoiding the rail gauge problem) without the Commonwealth, but all nine jurisdictions 
would coordinate on transport aspects of national infrastructure policy. 
Example 2: Human services portfolio
Service delivery would be more effective at the state level given the proximity to the 
client and opportunity for local tailoring and innovation. However, taking account of the 
relationship to national income tax and benefits provision via Centrelink, there are effi-
ciency grounds for the Commonwealth to take responsibility. This suggests a shared 
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delivery role with clear delineations between benefit and voucher provision on the one 
hand (that is, where financial transactions are the basis), and face-to-face service pro-
vision through state-owned or managed agencies on the other hand.
Regulation of providers at the national level would be more efficient for services that are 
universal in nature, but regulation arguably would be more effective at the state level 
given proximity to the large number of regulatees and the ability to better take account 
of the local context. We might infer from this a shared regulation role, with clear delin-
eations between regulation of universal entitlements and regulation of contracted 
service provision for case management or cohort-specific services. Alternatively, there 
could be national regulation of the latter to ensure distance between the regulator and 
service deliverer.
Policy arguably should be nationally coordinated on both efficiency and effective-
ness grounds to enable appropriate intersection between universal services and 
tailored services. This assumes that universal services are delivered (at least in part) 
by the Commonwealth, in which case such national coordination should involve the 
Commonwealth rather than be purely state-based. Conceivably, though not necessar-
ily recommended, the Commonwealth could lead policy development (in consultation 
with the other jurisdictions), and ‘delegate’ the detail of policy concerning case man-
agement or cohort-specific services to the states. To delegate such powers, however, 
the Commonwealth would first need to explicitly acquire them, that is, constitutionally. 
Example 3: Environment portfolio
Service delivery in this context is to ‘the environment’ rather than the public, who as 
users of the environment are the beneficiaries rather than the prime object of gov-
ernment action. Delivery would need to be a shared enterprise between state and 
Commonwealth because, while environmental diversity is important and implies 
localised management on effectiveness grounds, political boundaries are not mean-
ingful. It is efficient, therefore, to think in terms of a national approach to servicing the 
environment. 
Regulation’s focus, in considering effectiveness, is on the interaction of different envi-
ronments (for example, marine and land) and the natural and manmade environments 
(for example, urban perimeters). This interaction is localised, implying state responsi-
bility for regulation. From an efficiency perspective, when we think about regulating 
air and water quality, it would be relatively less costly if done nationally. Environmental 
regulation relating to planning could more efficiently be done, however, at the state 
or local government level. Together these considerations suggest that states should 
retain regulatory control but they should regulate against nationally agreed standards 
to ensure consistency and to maximise efficiency for businesses. 
Policy would be performed most effectively and efficiently at the national level. If we 
think of environmental outcomes, we think nationally or even globally. It doesn’t make 
much sense to think of state environmental outcomes, again because sovereign 
borders are less meaningful. Moreover, localised environmental issues are often local 
government rather than state government concerns. Environmental policy therefore 
should be a national role that sits squarely with the Commonwealth, not least to 
ensure alignment with international treaty obligations.
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How to deal with shared roles
As the examples show, the efficiency and effectiveness test still produces unclear 
results – for example, because it might be more efficient for one role to be performed 
by the Commonwealth but more effective for that same role to be performed by the 
state. 
How is it possible to resolve such tensions?
There are two ways to answer this: 
1.  The first option is to make a judgement that on balance it is better if the role is 
performed at one level or the other. 
2. The other option is to conclude that the role should be shared. 
Making the ‘on balance’ judgement requires tackling the questions of durability and 
alignment with the spirit of the federation – that is, determining whether there is the 
national will to sustain the arrangements. In other strong federations, such as Germany, 
there is a clear understanding that the division and sharing of power between the 
central and the constituent governments is underpinned by the principle of comity. 
This apt, if rather archaic, word refers to the idea of harmonious collaboration around 
a common goal. It is the goodwill and common understanding necessary to uphold 
the joint commitment to a federation. It is a very relevant concept for Australia’s 
federal system, but is only implicit in our arrangements. And as one commentator has 
observed, neglecting the principle of comity “risks an overly legalistic and static view of 
how federations operate”.4 
No one can reasonably predict or ascribe the degree of national will to elevate an 
issue from being one that is effectively managed at the state level, perhaps through 
coordination among the eight jurisdictions, to one that involves either relinquishing 
power entirely to the centre, or sharing it. However, it is possible to have a structured 
negotiation about whether ‘on balance’ a role should be performed solely at one level 
of government, or exercised jointly. 
Broadly, the key questions for the ‘on balance’ discussion take three forms related to 
three scenarios:
1.  If the issue is whether a role should be performed at either the state or the 
Commonwealth level, the key question is, ‘which result aligns better with our 
concept of federalism and will therefore prove more sustainable?’
2.  If the issue is whether a role should be done in a way that ensures a national 
approach but it is unclear if that should imply Commonwealth involvement, the key 
question is, ‘what value is obtained by having the Commonwealth involved – what 
specifically is brought to the table?’
3.  If the issue is that a role should clearly be performed jointly and not just in a coordi-
nated or complementary manner (noting that this is most likely to be a policy role), 
the key question is, ‘how do we create the right governance to clearly articulate the 
respective contributions of jurisdictions so that:
a) There is no overlap; and 
b)  Appropriate weight is given to the perspectives and input of all those involved in 
the joint exercise of the role?’
Scenarios 2 and 3 are the most challenging to contemplate because we are so 
used to the Commonwealth bringing funds to the table. Who would hesitate to say 
that, in scenario 2, funding equates to a significant ‘value add’ or that, in scenario 
3, the Commonwealth shouldn’t have the loudest voice given its underwriting of the 
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
150
S E C T I O N  3 . 5
exercise? What is exciting about the white paper process is that governments have a 
chance to imagine a situation in which funding is not the determinant. Instead, they 
can consider different types of comparative advantage among the jurisdictions, and 
where the complementary skills and capacities lie. Doing so enables a case-by-case 
approach to considering which layer of government (or indeed, which government) 
should do what within the ‘shared role’ space. 
Conclusion
We have a great opportunity to update our federal design. Yet we will only succeed in 
producing a durable, efficient and effective set of roles and responsibilities if we: 
•	 Think afresh and from a first-principles basis; 
•	 Resist the temptation to fall back on principles that are only half useful; and 
•	 Avoid the habit of starting with the question ‘who is the funder?’ 
None of this is straightforward. However, agreeing the specific roles that governments 
perform and defining what ‘comity’ means in Australia’s Federation are useful first 
steps towards thinking about how power should be divided in our Federation and 
what governance should be put in place to keep a check on blurred lines or centralis-
ing tendencies. 
Endnotes
1 This chapter is based on work that Nous Group has done with clients, and through its own research and experience.
2 Elazar 1987, Exploring federalism, the University of Alabama Press.
3  See for example, Twomey and Withers 2007, Federalist Paper. Australia’s Federal Future: A report for the Council for the Australian 
Federation, Council for the Australian Federation.
4 Leanardy 1999, The Institutional Structures of German Federalism, accessed at: library.fes.de/fulltext/bueros/london/00538008.htm
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In announcing the Terms of Reference for his government’s White Paper on the 
Reform of the Federation, Prime Minister Tony Abbott spoke of the “need to clarify 
roles and responsibilities so that the states are, as far as possible, sovereign in their 
own sphere”. As a former state premier, I welcome this recognition of the role of the 
states. At the same time, I strongly sympathise with current state premiers and chief 
ministers who are now coming to terms with the withdrawal of $80 billion in proposed 
funding to the states and territories. 
Federalism works
We hear a lot about the supposed drawbacks of federalism. When the recent 
Commission of Audit report claimed that “the current operation of the Federation 
poses a fundamental challenge to the delivery of good, responsible government in 
Australia”, many commentators took it as an invitation to throw around words like 
‘wasteful’, ‘multifaceted’ and ‘ineffective shambles’ in relation to the federal system 
itself. This criticism is nothing new. In fact, in 2007, Victoria, along with the other states 
and territories, commissioned Professors Anne Twomey and Glenn Withers to counter 
the prevailing negativity about federalism with some reminders about its benefits.1
Twomey and Withers pointed out that federalism provides a check on power, divid-
ing and limiting the amount of it that any one government can enjoy. It offers choice 
and diversity, as citizens can vote for one party at a federal level, and another at 
a state level. It allows for the customisation of policies to the needs of the people 
they will affect. After all, a policy that works well in Tasmania may not work as well 
in Alice Springs. Federalism also allows healthy competition between states. As the 
first Minister for Innovation in Australia, I can confirm that Victoria’s massive efforts in 
science, technology and innovation were driven in part by our awareness that under 
Premier Peter Beattie, Queensland was moving in the same direction. 
Another benefit of federalism is that it allows creativity. States are forced to innovate 
to meet their distinctive challenges, and to compete with other states. Successful 
innovations can then be picked up by other states or by the Commonwealth, while the 
damage caused by failed policies is limited. 
Last but not least, there are great benefits in cooperation. Most important national 
reforms require the agreement of one or more of the states and territories – often all 
of them. This means that eight governments will examine a proposed reform carefully 
and critically. The end result acquires a greater depth of insight as well as greater 
popular legitimacy.
The framers of our Constitution, of course, had no idea of the challenges we would 
face today. But in fact they recognised this uncertainty, and gave us a system with both 
flexibility and resilience built in. As Twomey and Withers put it, “Federalism is regarded 
as one of the best governmental systems for dealing with the twin pressures produced 
by globalisation – the upward pressure to deal with some matters at the supra-national 
level, and the downward pressure to bring government closer to the people”.
At this moment in our history, Australia has been a federation for exactly as long as it 
was a collection of independent colonies. Our model of federalism has served us well. 
Despite our small population, we are now the world’s 12th largest economy, with a 
median wealth among the highest in the world. We enjoy a stable democracy and a 
vibrant multicultural society. When much of the rest of the world struggled through the 
Global Financial Crisis, Australia maintained an economy with low inflation, low interest 
rates, low unemployment and solid growth. 
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Our achievements are more than economic. The latest report from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Better Life Initiative rated Australia 
above average in 10 of the 11 life dimensions it examined. We are at the top when it 
comes to governance and civic engagement, and close to the top when it comes to 
environmental quality and health status. We rate in the top 20 per cent in the areas of 
housing, personal security, jobs and earnings.2 
Now, all of this may have been achieved by six self-governing British colonies – but 
I doubt it. Our Federation has given us a good start in life. Of course no system is 
perfect, and every system evolves. Australian federalism today differs from the 1901 
version in a number of important ways. One of them was spotted by a founding father 
early on: Alfred Deakin said that the newly minted Constitution left the states “legally 
free, but financially chained to the chariot wheels of the Commonwealth”. As a former 
State Treasurer, I can confirm his prescience. Vertical fiscal imbalance is the bane of 
most federations, and in Australia we have it worse than many. Vertical fiscal imbalance 
refers to the mismatch between what the various levels of government in Australia are 
required to do, and the amount of revenue they are able to raise to do it. The states 
still have primary responsibility for the two biggest costs in the country – health and 
education – and nowhere near the ability to pay for them. They are indeed ‘chained 
to the chariot wheels of the Commonwealth’ and, moreover, subject to crippling cuts 
without warning, as in the last Federal Budget.
Massive cuts to the states was not the best way to start a process of federal reform, 
but it has precipitated a conversation we need to have about a better alignment of 
revenue, roles and responsibilities within the Federation, and about how we can work 
together to meet the challenges we face. It is important to find the right balance. Calls 
to abolish the states are completely unrealistic, but so is any suggestion that we can 
turn back the clock.
I believe that the best response to the challenges we face today is one of coopera-
tive federalism: agreement upon objectives, jurisdictional flexibility in working towards 
those objectives, and strong accountability for commitments made. But we also need 
to make other changes to the structure and governance of the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) itself.
Reforming the COAG
Attending the COAG over a number of years, I was often reminded that Australia has 
an advantage over many other federations in that we can fit all our heads of govern-
ment around one table. Step one towards reforming our Federation today, I believe, is 
to elevate the status and improve the governance of the COAG. The COAG currently 
has no real official status. It is run out of the Prime Minister’s office, and meets at his or 
her convenience. This is not where it belongs. After all, the Prime Minister represents 
just one of the parties around the COAG table. The COAG should be an independent 
body, with an independent secretariat, and a regularised meeting schedule – twice-
yearly at first, then moving to quarterly. There should be an agreed forward agenda 
(no surprises) and the states must have the right to place items on that agenda. This 
would allow full play to that great benefit of federalism: its responsiveness to local 
concerns.
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Along with a newly elevated status for the COAG must come a dramatic improve-
ment of its governance standards. Over the last decade we’ve seen enormous 
improvements in the standards of governance for corporate boards, superannuation 
funds and not-for-profit organisations. There is no question that this has improved 
performance. The world is heading in the direction of greater transparency and more 
rigorous standards of governance. But so far the COAG hasn’t evolved in this direc-
tion. The Commonwealth and the states must work together on a medium-term 
strategic agenda to focus priorities. First ministers also need to increase the involve-
ment of ministerial councils, line ministers and line agencies in the COAG process, 
giving them actual delegated responsibilities and accountabilities for delivering reform. 
An independent COAG Secretariat could help develop best practice governance stan-
dards for what is an extremely important decision-making body.
Further, the chances for effective cooperation at the COAG would be greatly increased 
by an agreed code of conduct among its members. It is inconceivable that board 
members of a major company, who are responsible for the interests of tens of thou-
sands of employees and shareholders, would stop on the way to the boardroom to 
give a ‘chest-beating’ press conference about their intentions for the meeting. Any 
government cabinet that behaved in this way would also be seen as dysfunctional 
indeed. And yet this is precisely what happens before each and every COAG meeting. 
Given that the decisions taken by the COAG affect many millions of people, meetings 
should be about policy, not posturing. Just as governments are careful to maintain 
cabinet solidarity, so the COAG should hold itself to a similar standard.
The recent Commission of Audit called for an emphasis on ‘competitive federalism’. As 
I have noted, a level of healthy competition between states is one of the benefits of a 
federation. However, we should be careful that we don’t end up with destructive com-
petition between states, displayed as chest-beating and parochialism, combined with 
a disdain for collaboration in the national interest. We should also be careful that we 
do not get into a situation in which we are competing in a ‘race to the bottom’ of lower 
taxes, but also lower quality services. And we should be careful that we don’t end up 
with a fragmented patchwork of different rules and regulations that stifle domestic and 
international trade; a situation in which it might once again be easier, for example, to 
sell gas across the borders of Europe than across the state borders of Australia. 
What gets measured, matters
There is little point in governments cooperating towards agreed goals if no one 
is tracking progress. Until it was wound up in June this year, I chaired the COAG 
Reform Council (CRC), which was tasked with monitoring progress towards goals set 
out in the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) of 2008. In this position, I was regularly 
reminded of the importance and challenges of measurement. To return to the corpo-
rate analogy: No successful company would commit enormous amounts of money 
to an initiative without carefully tracking its progress and impact. COAG agreements 
involve large investments of taxpayers’ money. Performance reporting will therefore 
continue to be essential, which is why I support the establishment of a new Federation 
Reform Council, which can independently monitor the timetable, milestones and prog-
ress of any new arrangements agreed to as part of the white paper.
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Good performance reporting requires two things: 
1. High-quality data; and 
2. High-quality performance indicators against which it can be measured.
Without the first, of course, the second is useless. While the CRC was recognised 
internationally as being at the forefront of performance reporting, it is also true that 
in some areas we struggled with data that was out of date or otherwise not fit for 
purpose. In other areas, the data simply wasn’t there at all. This was sometimes the 
case, for example, when we tried to report on rural or regional outcomes. Without 
data, there’s no performance reporting. And without performance reporting, there’s no 
accountability.
To get the best from performance reporting, it needs to be outcomes-based. Most 
stakeholders agree that this is good in principle, but difficult in practice. When you’re 
operating with long timeframes and progress is not closely tracked, it’s easy to lose 
sight of the ‘program logic’ – that is, the link between inputs, activities, outputs and 
outcomes. This relates to the previous point about data quality. Without a strong evi-
dence base, governments are tempted to revert to relying on inputs and activities 
rather than outcomes to measure performance. This in fact happened in some areas 
under the IGA. The new Federation Reform Council I am proposing would need to 
make the gathering of high-quality data and outcomes-based reporting a priority.
Conclusion: Building the grand bargain
The Abbott Government’s decision to commission the White Paper on the Reform of 
the Federation is timely. But the issue of federal reform is not just one for politicians, 
academics and opinion leaders. It concerns the whole nation. We need to decide 
what kind of federation we need to be to become the country we want to be. For 
this reason, I support a Federation Convention – or perhaps even a series of conven-
tions – to be held this year or the next. This would support the white paper process, 
and ensure the participation of as many people as possible in what is an extremely 
important national conversation.
Federation was an enormous achievement won by passionate and idealistic nation-
builders. As Elena Douglas wrote, “They saw the nation’s promise writ large: a continent 
as a country; the story of a nation born of a desire for union alone, without bloodshed 
or tears, here to show the world how it was done. The Federalists saw Australia as 
a moving new chapter in the human story”.3 The Australian Federation has, I think, 
lived up to its promise, but any such enterprise requires continual strengthening. A 
reformed COAG, with stronger standards of governance and accountability, discussed 
and debated at a national Federation Convention, will set us up well for the future.
Endnotes
1 Twomey, A and Withers, G 2007, Australia’s Federal Future, Federalist Paper 1, Council for the Australian Federation, April.
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Better Life Index, accessed at www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org.
3 Douglas, E 2013, ‘What today’s politicians can learn from the federalists’, Australian Financial Review, 9 August.
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Federation in 1901 is now the middle point between 2014 and arrival of the First Fleet 
in 1788. Despite this, I suspect that most Australians see federation as being more a 
creature of the first half of Australia’s political existence than our second half. If they 
have one at all, most views of federation are probably shaped by its 19th Century 
imagery – dusty, whiskery elderly men in overly formal dress – rather than its 20th 
Century political and economic outcomes. 
This is a shame, because behind the federation process in the 19th Century was the 
political courage to undertake a radical reform process, in pursuit of the opportuni-
ties created by new political and economic structures, as well as broader strategic 
concerns about Australia’s place in the world. Despite being conceived in the 19th 
Century, federation was a child of the 20th Century, and the challenge for us now is 
to think of the next stage in its development and the opportunities that a new wave of 
reforms could create.
Past
Federation has delivered enormous economic benefits to Australia. In an insightful 
analysis1, Professors Anne Twomey and Glenn Withers usefully summarised the ben-
efits that nations receive from an effective federation into what they termed the six Cs:
1.  Checks on power: An effective federation protects the individual from an overly 
powerful Government and ensures greater scrutiny of government action. 
2.  Choice in voting options: This ranges from the time-honoured tradition of people 
voting for one party at the national level and another at the state level, to the choice 
to move between states – as Victoria found to its cost in the late 1980s.
3.  Customisation of policies: Federations allow policy customisation to meet the 
needs of people and communities they directly affect across a large and increas-
ingly diverse nation with substantial differences in climate, geography, demography, 
culture and income.
4.  Cooperation: A joint approach to reform is encouraged, which means that pro-
posals tend to be more measured and better scrutinised, and this ultimately gives 
reform proposals greater legitimacy and potential for bipartisan support.
5.  Competition: Federations create incentives between states and territories to 
improve performance, increase efficiency and prevent complacency. In fact, Withers 
and Twomey actually showed that, despite having an extra layer of government, 
federations have proportionately fewer public servants and lower public spending 
than unitary states. This idea is supported by actual change in Australia’s public 
sector employment in which the proportion of the total workforce employed in the 
entire public sector has declined over 30 years from 25 per cent to 16 per cent.2 
6.  Creativity: Successful innovations in one state can be picked up by other states 
and policy failures avoided. For example, the introduction of Casemix funding, 
which has revolutionised the funding of hospitals in Australia, began in Victoria 
in the early 1990s and gradually extended to almost every other state and to the 
Commonwealth. In 2011, the savings from using the standardised Casemix model 
of costs was estimated to be around $4 billion per year, for an estimated annual 
expenditure of about $10 million in maintaining the system.3 
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To that list, you could also add Withers and Twomey’s assessment that:
7.  Federalism increased Australia’s prosperity by $4507 per head in 2006 dollars and 
this amount could be almost doubled if our federal system was more financially 
decentralised.4 
8.  Countries with federal systems have tended to outperform unitary states over the 
last 50 years, even allowing for the intrinsic difficulties in making these sorts of 
assessments.5 
It bears reiterating that the cost of government, measured as a share of gross domes-
tic product (GDP), is lower in Australia than in almost all comparable countries.6 It is 
therefore also reasonable to suppose that federation is at least partially responsible for 
successive Australian governments being able to offer relatively high levels of services 
to its citizens at an internationally competitive cost. Significantly, this cost is lower than 
in many unitary states, including the United Kingdom and New Zealand, giving the 
lie to the often asserted idea that state-level government is an intrinsic drag on an 
economy.
This type of mythology is not just related to the costs of federation. There are also 
persistent myths about the broader Australian economy. Analysis that delves beyond 
the superficial layer of political rhetoric shows that contrary to received wisdom: 
•	 The resources sector in Australia has had less impact on the economy than com-
monly imagined, and consequently its wind down will have less impact; 
•	 The Commonwealth Government currently has a revenue problem more than an 
expenditure problem; and 
•	 An examination of national savings rates shows that we actually were reasonably 
effective in saving the proceeds of the resources boom.7
Present
My proposals are therefore not based on the failure of our Federation. On the contrary, 
they are based on the opportunities that could be created by a new practice of gov-
ernment in Australia, occurring within our current political structures.
In my own career, in the senior levels of two state public services and the 
Commonwealth public service, I have seen the emergence of this new practice of 
government in both theory and practice. Not by coincidence, this emergence has 
occurred at the same time as a series of major economic and public sector reforms 
of the 1980s and 1990s, all of which created a period of unprecedented economic 
wealth and opportunity in Australia.
One of the most striking aspects of those reforms was the degree to which they were 
driven through federation processes. Under consecutive Liberal and Labor Party 
Premiers, Victoria advocated for, and helped drive, successive waves of the National 
Reform Agenda (NRA). The NRA established broad, measurable, strategic outcomes 
for state governments. This was the basis for massively simplifying specific purpose 
payments from Commonwealth governments, which as a result dropped from more 
than 90 to just six, with states having responsibility and a financial incentive for improv-
ing their performance over time. The nation therefore owes Victorian Premiers Jeff 
Kennett and Steve Bracks, and NSW Premier Nick Greiner, a great debt for their 
work in pushing the Commonwealth into adopting the NRA. The recent decision to 
abolish the Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, the body responsible 
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for monitoring states’ progress towards their NRA goals, is therefore a very retrograde 
step. It means that the states will now legitimately feel that they cannot rely on the 
Commonwealth as an institution to keep its word. 
Central to this new practice of government is the idea of subsidiarity or devolution, 
in which central governments should perform only those tasks that cannot be more 
effectively performed at an intermediate or more local level. That idea would of course 
have been instantly recognisable to those involved in the federation discussions, 
although probably more from their innate political chauvinism rather than a desire for 
more efficient public administration. 
Not by coincidence, the implications and opportunities of subsidiarity have also 
become clearer in the last 30 years, as successive waves of economic and public 
sector reforms have created national wealth and opportunity. But subsidiarity is 
not necessarily the product of neo-liberal market reforms and there is sometimes 
equally as much interest in the idea from the community sector as from conservative 
‘anti-centralists’.8 
In operation, subsidiarity suggests that we should operate systems with associated 
political accountability through levels of government where the expertise lies. If state 
governments operate schools, for example, then they should have the revenue to 
do that, without confusing the public through multiple levels of accountability. It also 
suggests that in the human capital area, the Commonwealth should confine itself to 
high-level regulation, the payment of benefits (such as pensions) and the publication of 
data on performance (such as My School). 
In essence, we need to shatter the illusion that the Commonwealth is the ‘Swiss army 
pocketknife’ of government in Australia and the current state of aged-care services is 
a graphic example of the dangers of believing in that illusion.
Conversely, the benefits of taking a subsidiarity approach are now increasingly clear. 
As already noted, Casemix funding has substantially reduced growth in the cost of 
hospital services in Australia. Even the most cursory glance at the United States (US), 
which uses a market approach to the provision of healthcare services, shows that 
Australia’s healthcare outcomes are achieved at considerably lower cost and with 
arguably greater social equity. The vast disparity in cost in the US between the same 
procedures done in different hospitals is well documented,9 and its economic inef-
ficiency is hard to reconcile with the evangelical view of market efficiency advanced by 
some in Australia.
In education, in states like Victoria, there has also been a concerted effort to provide 
school councils and principals with greater autonomy in the operation of public 
schools. There is still a substantial debate about the exact role of increased autonomy 
in improving school outcomes, but a recent Victorian Competition and Efficiency 
Commission report found that what was crucial was the extent to which “local deci-
sion making can activate the known drivers of educational improvement, including the 
quality of teaching and leadership”.10 As a former Director General of Education, I can 
confirm the veracity of that assertion. It is also hard to believe that increased centrali-
sation is the answer to meeting the diversity of educational needs of 880,000 students 
across 2200 schools.11
It is also noteworthy that many of the reforms developed in Victoria in education and 
health were closely linked to international thinking from researchers like Osborne and 
Gaebler,12 whose work on concepts such as the purchaser/provider split, performance 
measurement and standardised funding arrangements were deeply influential on the 
Clinton Administration in the US.
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Three further observations support the benefits of subsidiarity as an organisational 
principle for a federation of the 21st Century: 
1.  The Productivity Commission’s Blue Book, which compares the cost of service 
delivery across state jurisdictions, has shown that in Victoria, where devolution has 
been a long-term, bipartisan political objective, per capita cost of hospitals13 and 
schools14 has been lower than in most other states. 
2.  In aiming to improve outcomes for indigenous Australians, which is one of our 
nation’s greatest systemic public policy failures, the greatest opportunities lie in the 
devolution of decision making and accountability to local communities. Indeed, the 
success and the challenge of many of the initiatives championed through the Cape 
York Institute for Policy and Leadership are closely linked to their building of local 
autonomy, and the ability of local communities to plan and shape service delivery in 
their local area.
3.  It is clear to me that Commonwealth departments have now lost all capacity for 
effective interventions in large-scale service delivery systems, such as schools 
and hospitals. Even if there were a popular desire to centralise these services in 
Canberra, which is hard to believe, there is good reason to believe that this would 
now substantially damage those services because of this lack of capacity.
Future
This has been the story of the last 30 years. But it is possible to see the stars now 
aligning to use the subsidiarity principle to crack more of the hardest public policy nuts, 
including the long-term funding of transport infrastructure, schools and healthcare. 
The Grattan Institute’s recent series of reports15 on the long-term budget challenges 
facing all levels of government describe the increasing unfavourable economic head-
winds that the Australian economy will face into the foreseeable future. In particular, 
they present two unpalatable truths that are evidence of a burning platform requir-
ing a leap towards subsidiarity. First, though not uncontested, increases in Australian 
government spending are being driven above all by health spending, stemming not 
from an ageing population but from the fact that people are seeing doctors more 
often, having more tests and operations, and taking more prescription drugs. Second, 
claims of a ‘massive infrastructure gap’ are not borne out by analysis of state and ter-
ritory budgets, which have spent more on infrastructure in each of the past five years 
than in any comparable year since the Australian Bureau of Statistics first measured 
infrastructure spending in the 1980s.
At the national level, we also now have a conservative government that is rooted 
in a philosophy that has traditionally been sceptical of centralisation. The new tools 
created by information technology mean that this inclination can now be supported by 
systems and analysis giving political leaders greater confidence in local-level account-
ability. In addition, internal government research shows that citizens intrinsically prefer, 
and rate more favourably, services that are planned and delivered at the local level.
Recent decisions of the High Court suggest that the judicial branch of government is 
also increasingly sceptical of centralisation. The decision in Williams No 116 hints that 
the remedies for judicial dissatisfaction with the Commonwealth Government using 
executive authority to fund programs may go beyond a simple requirement for debate 
in Parliament. Professor Anne Twomey has suggested that one of the broader rami-
fications of the Williams decision may be that the Commonwealth is forced to take a 
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less ‘coercive’ approach to negotiating with the states in areas such as education 
funding.17 
As I have noted elsewhere,18 it is also the case that our currently centralised system 
is becoming increasingly sclerotic, in part because of excessive ministerial office inter-
ference in service delivery and rapidly oscillating extremes in views about ministerial 
accountability. One way to improve this situation is to be far more explicit about the 
division in accountability between ministers and public servants and, as part of that 
process, by making ministerial advisers accountable in the same ways as public ser-
vants. Putting subsidiarity into practice also puts the ‘cookie jar’ of service delivery 
further out of reach of the hands of ministerial political advisers, who often have no 
expertise in service delivery, by making the departments they work with more focused 
on long-term strategy and priority setting.
But the fundamental obstacle to change in our Federation has been one of the world’s 
most severe cases of vertical fiscal imbalance, which since World War II has been 
our Federation’s Achilles’ heel. Among other side-effects, it has encouraged state 
governments to develop what might be called a ‘Willie Sutton’ mentality in which the 
Commonwealth is seen as the only source of revenue.19 We need to do better than 
this as a philosophy for meeting the future needs of funding infrastructure and other 
essential services. The truth is that the states now prefer to go to the Commonwealth, 
rather than handle the more challenging task of gaining community support for gen-
erating the revenues needed to support the services they provide to the community. 
To that extent, being shackled to the Commonwealth and its revenue raising capacity 
is really a matter of choice, not constitutional necessity. As the recent Commission of 
Audit highlighted, it is now possible to imagine alternative funding systems that would 
shift this mindset.
Proposals
I therefore conclude by offering five examples of how this could be done in practice 
and that are predicated on subsidiarity. In implementation, they would meet our 
growing demands for infrastructure and services, and reinvigorate and reform our 
Federation for the 21st Century.
First, as suggested by the Commission of Audit, the Commonwealth should walk its 
own talk on schools by assigning responsibility for schooling to the states and trans-
ferring an agreed share of income tax revenues to them for that purpose. This would 
have the added virtue of cleaning out the programmatic confetti that has traditionally 
been sprinkled by Commonwealth Ministers across the education sector, to the great 
detriment of the sector as a whole. There is also considerable merit in the broadly 
mooted proposal to increase the rate and coverage of the Goods and Services 
Tax and transferring the extra revenue generated to the states to support growing 
demands on public hospitals. 
Second, state governments should be encouraged to develop a land tax, or property 
charge, with a broader base of applicability but at a much lower rate than currently 
applies. Substantial portions of this new revenue stream should be hypothecated 
to transport improvements, particularly public transport. This would have the added 
equity advantage of making asset-rich inner-city dwellers draw down some of their 
windfall gains in property value over time. This is a legitimate policy goal because 
these gains are, in part, a product of historic infrastructure investments funded from 
general revenue, especially for the purposes of roads and public transport as well as 
general urban amenity. At the moment, the only people paying direct, hefty charges for 
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public infrastructure are the least well off in major cities, struggling to afford a house 
and land package in outer suburban developments. They pay for marginal extensions 
to inherited urban infrastructure or tolls on freeways, and a more distributed lower rate 
property tax could start to redress this inequity. 
Third, as cautiously suggested in a report by the Productivity Commission,20 state gov-
ernments could extend road-use charging to existing freeways, highways and major 
arterial roads within cities. This revenue would be hypothecated towards the build-
ing and maintenance of these classes of roads and availability-based payments to 
PPP consortia where needed for new roads. This funding could be further augmented 
by the fuel taxes collected by the Commonwealth also being hypothecated towards 
building and maintaining roads. The community is legitimately angry about the idea of 
paying more for roads, when the original intention was that fuel tax would go towards 
this function. Transferring most of these tax revenues to the states could be part of 
an historic settlement to partition government roles in transport in favour of state and 
local governments, and it would roll back the current process of the Commonwealth 
second-guessing other governments. 
Having each major city pay this combination of property and road charges into their 
own pool to finance their roads and public transport systems would be a substantial 
step towards providing the infrastructure needed by our major capital cities. These 
cities currently generate an enormous percentage of national wealth but their taxes 
effectively disappear into consolidated revenue at the Commonwealth level. This 
approach would also provide the resources and legitimacy to fill one of Australia’s 
most pressing gaps in governance: city-wide planning of the sort that was traditionally 
provided by statutory bodies like the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works.
Conclusion
None of this would be an easy political sell and would need political leadership capable 
of building a comprehensive political strategy, and a realistic communication plan that 
would help ordinary citizens understand that strategy. It would, however, play to what 
should be the strength of politicians: their ability to build alliances towards strategic 
objectives, rather than as micromanaging CEOs. 
It would also have the advantage that devolution is a strategy that, in theory at least, 
has the capacity to create bipartisan consensus. As the reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s show, this is a prerequisite for political acceptance and avoiding rollback by 
subsequent governments. As the Hon. John Howard remarked recently, successful 
reform requires the community to accept that it is fair and in the national interest, and 
a devolution-based argument has a better chance of making that case compared with 
‘fait accompli’ policy proposals suddenly dumped in front of voters.
This would be a major change in Australia’s practice of government. It would 
mean, among other things, a dramatically different role for the public service at the 
Commonwealth level, one that was focused on providing strategic and technical 
advice to government and far less involved in service delivery. 
In modern terminology it would probably even be called ‘disruptive’ or ‘transforma-
tional’. But that is intrinsically what the federation process represented in the 19th 
Century. It is also striking that some of the core players in this transformation would 
be the state premiers, the same group who were central to the process that culmi-
nated 114 years ago. What we need now is a group of premiers who are interested 
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in ‘saving’ the Federation that their political predecessors helped create. They would 
do this not by transferring more of their power to the centre, but by being the conduit 
through which more power and accountability flows into the local governance struc-
tures that states and local government are best suited to build and support. 
For many years, the tide of funding and authorisation within our Federation has flown 
towards Canberra. As economic headwinds shift, this tide is now turning and business 
as usual will increasingly struggle to make headway. But as Shakespeare reminds us 
in his play about political leaders contemplating change, a tide “taken at the flood, 
leads on to fortune. Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in 
miseries”. 21
What we need now is political leadership prepared to ride with that tide.
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Vocational Education and Training (VET) in Australia is a diverse sector. It has more 
than 1.9 million enrolments in courses spanning Certificate I–IV programs including 
apprenticeships, and Diplomas and Advanced Diplomas. These courses are deliv-
ered by more than 5000 Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) including public 
Technical and Further Education (TAFE) institutions, a diverse range of for-profit and 
not-for-profit non-government providers, schools and major firms. VET has a porous 
and growing interface with secondary schools at the Certificate level, and with higher 
education at the Diploma level. 
Commonwealth involvement in technical education was limited until the 1970s when 
it became more involved in supporting the apprenticeship system. Most significantly, 
from 1974 the Australian Committee on Technical and Further Education (the Kangan 
Report) laid the basis for significantly increased Commonwealth involvement through 
the development of a new TAFE system.1 
VET in Australia is still the formal responsibility of the states and territories. But in the 
last two decades, a major process of cooperative reform between the Commonwealth 
and the states has seen VET develop from largely state-based systems of public pro-
viders to a more national system underpinned by the concept of a national training 
market.
This chapter:
•	 Charts the evolution of those reforms through the process of cooperative federalism;
•	 Summarises the outcomes of the reforms; and 
•	 Outlines lessons for other areas for which national approaches are required regard-
ing state responsibility for service delivery. 
Origins and context of national training reform
By the mid-to-late 1980s, the opening up of the Australian economy to international 
competition and consequent industry restructuring highlighted the inadequate skills 
base of the Australian workforce. There was increasing recognition at all levels that 
the existing arrangements for skills development were not fully meeting the needs of 
individuals seeking skilled employment or the firms and industries more exposed to 
the global economy. 
In 1987, the Commonwealth Government integrated its functions relating to TAFE (and 
post-school education and training generally) with its employment and training port-
folios. The Commonwealth Minister released major Ministerial Statements signalling a 
clear intention to ensure that VET more effectively met emerging industry and labour 
market skills needs.2 This portfolio integration was progressively implemented in all 
states and a new national Ministerial Council spanning training and employment was 
established. At state and national levels, peak industry bodies and industry leaders 
were given a formal and direct role in shaping decisions on the future of VET.
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National Training Reform Agenda
These new portfolio and Ministerial Council arrangements developed what came to be 
called the National Training Reform Agenda (NTRA). Key elements of the agenda were:
•	 A decision by the new Ministerial Council in 1989 to replace different state-based 
training standards and time-based apprenticeships with a new system of national 
Competency Based Training (CBT) with courses based on these competency 
standards to be nationally recognised. A joint Commonwealth and state National 
Training Board (NTB) was established in 1990 to oversee the process of develop-
ment of competency standards. 
•	 The need for a framework for Australia-wide recognition of training undertaken in 
any one jurisdiction using these standards was identified. The National Framework 
for the Recognition of Training (NFROT) was enacted in 1992 as part of a broader 
mutual recognition agreement covering regulated goods, services and occupations. 
It was intended to create greater freedom for goods and services providers (and 
skilled personnel) to engage anywhere in Australia, meaning that registration as a 
training provider in one state applied in all states. 
NFROT provided common standards for the registration of training providers, allowing 
providers other than TAFE to enter into, and operate in, the emerging VET market. 
Work also began on an integrated Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF) spanning 
all sectors of education. 
The reform impetus came from both Commonwealth and state officials and minis-
ters. Significantly, individual states took a leading role in the development of specific 
national reforms including NFROT. 
A national training market
The concept of a training market emerged from the broader impetus around the 
opening up of the Australian economy and key themes of broader public sector 
reforms – including the separation of the roles of government in funding, policy, regula-
tion and service delivery. This envisaged purchasing services from a wider range of 
service providers. The concept of a training market was strongly advocated in a 1990 
report on the training costs of award restructuring (the Deveson report)3 to diversify 
sources of skills supply to meet increasing need and demand. 
The concept of a training market – like any market – is an arena in which a related 
set of services is supplied by providers to users of those services who present their 
demands (requirements) to a chosen provider. ‘Related’ means either that the services 
are substitutable for each other in use (for example, similar training provided by differ-
ent organisations), or that there are many providers who can supply more than one of 
them with the same staff and facilities. In the VET context, the providers are training 
organisations, TAFE institutes and others. The users are the individuals seeking train-
ing and the enterprises seeking workforce skills.
A  F e d e r A t i o n  F o r  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
168
S E C T I O N  4 . 3
To function well, a market must be competitive. There must be rivalry among provid-
ers to present the best value for money in terms of quality (broadly defined, including 
tailoring to users’ particular needs and convenience in mode of supply and intrinsic 
excellence of what is delivered) and price. Users must be able to choose among 
providers and products to best meet their needs. Effective market operation requires 
ready availability of information about what is available and its quality.
In parallel with the development of the national training market concept, the 
Commonwealth and state governments were engaged in major negotiations about 
the future funding arrangements for VET. The Deveson report also identified significant 
additional growth requirements for VET. In response, the Commonwealth signalled its 
willingness to commit additional funding to VET, but it was concerned that if it did 
so, the states would reduce their investment. This reflected the general problem of 
cost shifting in areas of shared funding responsibility, exacerbated by the vertical fiscal 
imbalance in our Federation.
To address the cost-shifting problem, in 1991, the Commonwealth offered to commit 
substantial growth funding to the VET sector. This was conditional upon the states 
agreeing to the Commonwealth assuming full responsibility for VET funding offset by 
adjustment to grants to the states. Although most states gave the proposal serious 
consideration, it was ultimately rejected. A compromise was reached under which the 
states agreed to maintain their financial inputs in the first year of a three-year funding 
agreement and their outputs for the following two years in exchange for substantial 
additional Commonwealth funding. 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) also agreed to establish the Australian 
National Training Authority (ANTA) under Commonwealth legislation to oversee com-
pliance with the funding agreement and to drive the implementation process of the 
NTRA. ANTA was governed by an industry-based board reporting to a Ministerial 
Council, with industry-dominated State Training Authorities also established in each 
jurisdiction. 
Effective implementation of national training reform 
One of the first things that ANTA set in train in 1993 was a comprehensive review 
of the national training reforms to assess whether they were delivering what was 
intended. If not, the review was to determine what the problems were and what should 
be done to ensure the success of the reforms. The review was commissioned and 
carried out by a core team of six led by one of the present authors, assisted by 11 
others. The report was entitled Successful Reform: Competitive Skills for Australians 
and Australian Enterprises.4 
The review included extensive consultations with all stakeholders in the national train-
ing system. It focused on the extent to which a national training market was developing 
and whether it was functioning satisfactorily. The review found a number of concerns 
with the progress of the reforms. 
At the heart of these was the way the reforms had been set up and implemented: “… 
the reforms have been constructed from a supply-side perspective and driven by a 
top-down policy approach. Efforts directed at demand side issues appear centralist in 
approach”.5 
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The main findings of the review were that:
“ The supply of publicly recognised training is heavily focused on courses or parts of courses. 
This focus is limiting the delivery of the more modular and flexible approach required by 
enterprises and the emergence of new training products and services. The current concept 
of the training market is too limited, with many elements necessary for a properly functioning 
market missing. There is limited knowledge about the match between supply and demand 
and the market is not accessible to smaller enterprises. Government regulation of and 
intervention in the market is constricting rather than fostering its development. Consumer 
information about the price, quality and other attributes of training is missing.”
The report went on to argue that key elements of reform were not working well 
together. In particular: 
•	 The competency framework added limited value to enterprises; 
•	 National curriculum limited diversity of provider responses; 
•	 Accreditation of courses, recognition of training programs and registration of provid-
ers were not well understood or accessible, and they were costly for participants; 
•	 Assessment issues were unresolved; and 
•	 Insufficient attention has been paid to implementation of the National Qualifications 
Framework.
The review also concluded that “microeconomic reform in the publicly funded voca-
tional education and training sector has been tackled only obliquely”.
The review made 30 recommendations for reform, too many to detail here, but central 
to them were:
•	 More effective integration of the key elements of the national training market within 
a single market facilitation agency through ANTA, including legislation to give effect 
to NFROT; and
•	 To shift the focus of the reforms to the demand side, to phase in a major element of 
‘user buys’ or ‘user choice’, the power to direct government funding for off-the-job 
training to a particular provider being placed in the hands of the employer and the 
employee being trained jointly. The context for this was training under a formal, 
contractual employer/employee arrangement, i.e. an apprenticeship or traineeship, 
in which there was a strong mutual interest between employer and trainee. This 
would ensure that providers would need to be responsive to the requirements of 
both those receiving training and those using the resulting skills. 
The review also made recommendations to broaden the approach to development 
and application of competency standards (a recommendation largely overlooked).
Apart from the separation of funding from training provision inherent in its proposals, 
the review recommended clear definition and separation of roles and responsibilities 
for policy, strategy, planning and coordination, operational management and market 
facilitation from the actual delivery of training.
This approach broadly mirrors elements in other public sector and national reforms of 
that era. Indeed, that clear definition and clear separation of roles must be a funda-
mental element in any approach to reforming service delivery in areas (such as health) 
where a national approach – that is, one involving both major levels of government – is 
needed, and indeed in intergovernmental relations generally. 
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Implementation of reforms
The ANTA Board acted on the review recommendations, gaining agreement from the 
Ministerial Council to:6 
•	 Incorporate functions related to competency standards and national recognition into 
the ANTA structure through a new standards and curriculum council; and
•	 Begin the phased introduction of user choice for apprenticeships and traineeships 
from 1996 based on agreed national principles (including access by providers 
across the states).
User choice was piloted and then progressively introduced in each jurisdiction, albeit 
with some jurisdictions excluding some areas of apprenticeship from full contestability. 
To establish the provider market, the states and territories established lists of approved 
providers (RTOs) meeting minimum requirements and delivering courses based on 
national competency standards leading to an AQF qualification. Funding for providers 
was based on prices set by each state or territory based on course duration and cost, 
with fees also regulated. Additional funding could be provided in areas of thin markets, 
rural and regional provision or to address equity issues. With prices fully regulated 
by government, price signals between the key participants in the market were, and 
are, largely absent. Competition was only in terms of quality (very broadly defined, as 
noted).
A series of state- and territory-based markets developed, with states and territories 
resisting proposals from ANTA for greater consistency in pricing and access by provid-
ers to funding across jurisdictions.
The NFROT guidelines were substantially enhanced, and model legislation developed 
for, and adopted by, all jurisdictions to underpin mutual recognition of courses and 
providers. 
Subsequent reforms led to the direct alignment of national competency standards 
with AQF qualifications so that an RTO had scope of registration in a particular indus-
try or occupational sector. State-based course accreditation processes were largely 
discontinued, meaning that providers were then able to effectively provide across juris-
dictions once they were registered in one state – but they were still required to enter 
into contractual arrangements in each state to deliver government-funded programs. 
The review recommendations relating to the establishment of a national training 
market oversight body were not pursued and ANTA itself was abolished in 2005, with 
its funding and national policy role resumed by the Commonwealth. Oversight of stan-
dards and quality was undertaken through a National Quality Council reporting to the 
Ministerial Council serviced by an independent secretariat. The secretariat function will 
now also be absorbed into the Commonwealth Department. 
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Outcomes from reforms
In terms of the outcomes of these reforms, the key elements of the national training 
market – provider registration and national competency standards and qualifications 
– are now central to the architecture of VET in Australia. Those key elements now fall 
largely under the responsibility of the Commonwealth Government following agree-
ment by most jurisdictions to the establishment of the Australian Standards Quality 
Agency (ASQA) as the national VET provider regulator (Victoria and Western Australia 
still register and audit state-based VET providers) and the Commonwealth’s assump-
tion of oversight of national VET provider and competency standards. 
The move to a national regulator reflected growing recognition that differences in state 
interpretation of the provider registration standards under mutual recognition was 
leading to inconsistencies in the application of the standards. This was leading to loss 
of confidence in quality and outcomes, and major inefficiencies and transaction costs 
for national providers and companies.
While the central architecture of the national training market has endured, there has 
been ongoing and strongly contested debate about the adequacy of the provider 
registration standards (with significantly strengthened standards now pending final 
approval and implementation) and, similarly, unresolved debate about the adequacy 
of the current competency standards framework in terms of contemporary learner and 
workplace needs.
KPMG undertook evaluations of the initial user choice pilots and the full implementa-
tion of user choice in 1999.7 These early evaluations found strong benefits in terms of 
provider responsiveness and employer influence over provider choice, but with less 
awareness of user choice by apprentices and trainees. They also foreshadowed con-
cerns about the quality of provision in areas of rapid growth – concerns reflected in 
subsequent reviews of the quality of traineeships in several jurisdictions.
The KPMG evaluation noted that it is difficult to separate the effect of user choice from 
other measures, in particular strong marketing of apprenticeships and traineeships, 
the effect of employer subsidies, reforms to training standards and content, and the 
generally buoyant labour market conditions that prevailed in Australia until recently. 
Since the introduction of user choice, apprenticeship and traineeship numbers have 
grown strongly; however completion rates, particularly of traineeships, have remained 
low. Traineeship numbers have been inflated by the extension of traineeships and 
employers, subsidies to existing workers and to part-time employees, something 
exploited by some providers. Governments, particularly the Commonwealth, were 
until recently reluctant to tighten the use of subsidies. But when they did, the rapid 
decline in traineeship intakes highlighted the extent to which the traineeship market 
had been inflated by public subsidies. 
There has been far less concern about quality and inappropriate provider behaviour 
in the apprenticeship market, despite substantial growth in that market – with new 
providers generally being industry-based organisations including group training organ-
isations, and for-profit organisations with strong industry and enterprise relationships. 
Commitment by existing tradespeople, supervisors and industry leaders to their trades 
and the apprenticeship system have served as an important internal quality control. 
Employer and student satisfaction levels with VET programs here have also been rela-
tively high. 
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Markets in VET, like other markets, appear to operate most effectively when the qualifi-
cation being provided is valued, where the employer has a strong understanding of the 
outcomes to be delivered by the qualification, there are reasonable rates of return and 
the conditions for contracting out of services are met. 
Under current state-based funding arrangements, it has not been possible to fully 
extend the benefits of the architecture of the national training market – national stan-
dards, qualifications and provider regulation – to publicly funded VET delivery. National 
providers and firms must therefore continue to transact different contractual require-
ments, pricing and even course duration requirements in each jurisdiction. This means 
that one of the original agreed principles, that there should be a national training 
market not limited by state boundaries, does not exist in practice.
Notwithstanding these varied experiences, a simple test of the long-term outcomes 
of user choice is to observe that that term is now rarely used in VET. Employers have 
become accustomed to selecting their provider of choice. RTOs including TAFEs have 
embraced the benefits of being able to market directly to enterprises, to leverage other 
training opportunities with enterprises from their apprenticeship and traineeship rela-
tionships, and to partner with other service providers. 
Within TAFE institutions, managers have been able to drive internal reforms includ-
ing setting revenue targets, focusing staff on client relationships and introducing more 
flexible delivery practices. In short, there would be little or no support for a return to the 
previous arrangements.
The principle of user choice is now being extended to the new student entitlement 
model in VET, also agreed by the COAG. Although, indications are that these models 
will vary significantly between jurisdictions as states and territories seek to limit VET 
outlays in a constrained fiscal environment.
The other major area of national reform VET funding remains unresolved, with VET 
funding levels now badly lagging growth in schools and higher education. 
Implications for reform in service delivery in a federal 
system
The process of cooperative reform has transformed Australia’s VET system from 
separate state and territory systems of public VET providers to a national system 
underpinned by national recognition of standards and qualifications, and national 
regulation of providers. 
The key elements of the national training market – national recognition and national 
regulation – have not only endured, they have effectively become responsibilities of the 
Commonwealth, while the funding and operational responsibility for VET has remained 
with the states. Within the next few years, government funding for VET will be almost 
fully contestable as the principles that drove user choice are further extended.
The major elements of the national VET system and the training market were devel-
oped through an intensive period of cooperative reform between the Commonwealth 
and the states, driven by both levels of government through policy objectives and 
decisions of both Ministerial Councils and the COAG. 
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VET is not the only area of service delivery in which a national approach will better 
serve the community than separate and different approaches state by state. In health, 
for example, it is a clear preference of the Australian community that all Australians, 
wherever they live, should have access to healthcare of at least a given standard, even 
though delivery and important aspects of policy are best carried out by the states. 
Thus, the lessons from the experience of reform in VET may have useful implications 
for reform in other areas. These lessons include:
•	 The role of developing and agreeing to the vision for the reforms and their high-level 
architecture has been undertaken at a national level in the Commonwealth-State 
Ministerial Council on VET and in the COAG itself. 
•	 Operational management has largely remained with the states. However, where 
national consistency in areas such as quality, standards and data is required, those 
functions are best performed by national bodies.
•	 There are clear benefits in having diverse providers operating in a competitive market 
–  benefits in terms of responsiveness to the needs of individuals and enterprises, 
and in terms of value for money.
•	 Markets for delivery of government-funded services must be well designed and 
effectively regulated. In particular:
–  A strong regulatory and quality-assurance framework must be established to 
ensure that only providers that meet a rigorous quality standard can participate; 
–  The purpose of public subsidies and how they are set must be transparent and 
linked to policy objectives. Poorly designed subsidies will distort provision and 
lead to poor-quality outcomes. 
•	 Provider markets must be dynamic but stable. Where scale is likely to be needed to 
attain best practice efficiency and outcomes, provider numbers, quality and ability of 
providers to make a reasonable return on investment are matters that governments 
should be concerned with, as government ultimately bears the risk of provider and 
market failure.
•	 The above lesson implies a need for independent monitoring of the operation of the 
functioning of the market and, if required, market oversight.
•	 Good information systems and flows are important to allow users of the services 
to find providers to meet their needs, to access objective information about their 
performance and to enable government to monitor the market. Data must be con-
sistent and comparable. 
•	 Pricing of subsidy levels and user contributions need to be carefully considered. 
Three approaches can be considered: 
1.  Where there are alternative providers and users have access to good informa-
tion and bear some significant part of the cost of accessing the services, pricing 
could be left to normal competitive processes. 
2.  Competitive tender processes conducted by a funding body could be used.
3.  Where there are few providers and limited information on which users can base 
choices, a process to establish efficient prices based on periodically examining 
the cost structures of best practice providers may be preferred. Such processes 
are not straightforward to set up, but such a process is used, for example, in 
hospital funding.
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•	 Service delivery is generally a local activity and is best funded and managed at that 
level. However, where national markets exist or national skills imperatives must be 
met, it is desirable that programs and funding operate on a consistent basis across 
jurisdictions.
•	 Reform is not a once-for-all matter but an ongoing process in which arrangements 
are modified in response to changing circumstances and experience. Accordingly, 
cooperation to monitor, evaluate and adjust the reform framework needs to be 
ongoing. An independent market oversight body in VET (as recommended in 
Successful Reform) might have hastened overdue assessments of the operation 
of the training market, particularly from the point of view of individual users and 
enterprises.
Adopting a national approach to reform and ongoing operation of an area of service 
delivery will inevitably involve tensions between national consistency and national 
markets on the one hand, and the principle of subsidiarity (i.e. the principle that roles 
should rest at the lowest level capable of carrying them out effectively) on the other. 
In a federal system, such tensions will arise in any area of joint involvement of the 
levels of government. These tensions must be resolved in the circumstances of the 
particular area of service delivery. But they should not be seen as a reason for not 
pursuing a national approach in which – with a good policy framework, careful design 
and clear allocation of roles and responsibilities – there are significant benefits for the 
community.
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In areas of overlapping authority, coordination between the Commonwealth and the 
states is essential. But this has often proved problematic. To orient and direct the 
policy system, outcomes must be specified. But can realistic outcomes be speci-
fied in advance? Further, how can they be reconciled with continuous improvement? 
Performance management should encourage learning from experience. In practice, 
does performance management foster micromanagement and gaming – or rather, 
does it encourage the exchange of information about success and failure, and hence 
stimulate improved on-the-ground practice? 
Indigenous affairs, because of its complexity, is an ideal site for exploring this design 
challenge. Indeed, responding to criticisms concerning a plethora of overly centralised 
and often cross-cutting programs, the Abbott Government has foreshowed a notable 
development in its own approach. In place of the existing array of individual programs, 
it proposes to consolidate spending and to introduce a regional administrative struc-
ture. To take account of ‘local’ circumstances and capabilities, it aims to allow service 
designs to be contextualised. These are welcome initiatives. But many responsibilities 
will properly remain with state governments. The challenge of coordinating this more 
decentralised structure with existing state arrangements remains. 
This chapter argues that, to match the new approach to its own service delivery, a new 
approach to the coordination of federal-state activity is also needed. For guidance, we 
look to the pragmatist or ‘learning by doing’ frameworks that have developed in both 
the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). These arrangements are consis-
tent with the decentralising ambitions of the Abbott Government. They are consistent 
with the desire to move prime responsibilities for service design away from the centre 
to regional or local levels. But coordination with state programs will still be required. 
Is it possible to establish agreements about overall outcomes that are also consistent 
with local responsibility for service design? Is it possible to establish an accountability 
structure that encourages the exchange of information about successes and failures 
and that thus nourishes continuous improvement? 
Any approach would need to accommodate three not immediately compatible impera-
tives: local discretion, central accountability and continuous improvement. All three are 
critical if an effective performance framework is to be introduced. How can this circle 
be squared? 
In proposing a fresh approach, we look first at existing coordination arrangements. 
Have they led to an improvement of on-the-ground practices? Have they involved 
goals that can change and develop as experience accumulates? If the answer is 
negative, is there an alternative? Here we describe arrangements that have devel-
oped in the EU to manage similar challenges of policy coordination. Could analogous 
approaches be applied in an Australian setting?
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Indigenous affairs: A case study of centralised 
coordination
This section briefly reviews the present Commonwealth-state accountability and 
performance framework. Has it encouraged continuous improvement? And has it 
been based on outcomes that are realistic and that can be adapted as experience 
accumulates?
Closing the gap target
The most recent major step in coordinating federal and state approaches to indig-
enous affairs occurred after the 2007 election. The Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) was the platform for national policy development. In 2008, the COAG agreed 
to six ambitious targets to ‘close the gap’:
1. Close the gap in life expectancy within a generation;
2.  Halve the gap in mortality rates for indigenous children aged under five within a 
decade;
3.  Ensure all indigenous four-year olds in remote communities have access to early 
childhood education within five years;
4.  Halve the gap for indigenous students in reading, writing and numeracy within a 
decade;
5.  Halve the gap for indigenous students in Year 12 attainment or equivalent attain-
ment rates by 2020; and
6.  Halve the gap in employment outcomes between indigenous and non-indigenous 
Australians within a decade.
How should the targets be conceptualised? 
There would seem to be two options: 
1.  They could be conceived as the beginning point for a top-down process of policy 
design, which cascades from the centre, through the states, and down to area and 
local officers. In this case, they become precise national targets, the achievement 
for which governments can subsequently be held accountable. This also ensures 
that leadership in policy design is located at the centre. Regional and local agents 
are then primarily responsible for implementing these centrally conceived designs. 
2.  Initial targets may be better conceptualised as the beginning point for a more 
complex and partially decentralised policy process. In this case, the centre can be 
expected to set overall directions. But precise service designs are largely left to 
agents who can adapt outcomes to local contexts. But then these local agents are 
also accountable for how they exercise their discretions.
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Feasibility of closing the gap
In the events, the 2008 ‘closing the gap’ targets were treated as definitive goals. 
Governments acted as though fully accountable for their achievement. But a number 
of responsible authorities also questioned their feasibility. Did this have any impact on 
the initial or subsequent policy conversation? Were any targets modified or adapted? 
Did the monitoring and performance management regime build on or embody such 
reservations in its assessments?
The supporting notes to the various national agreements underline the magnitude of 
the challenge involved in the targets. For example, the gap in life expectancy was to 
be closed within 25 years. According to the supporting notes, “This equates to an 
annual improvement in life expectancy of 0.5 years for males and 0.4 years for females 
… Gains of this magnitude have taken around 60 years to achieve in the Australian 
population as a whole”.1 
On employment outcomes, Jon Altman has shown that the espoused goals were 
deeply problematic: 
“ Research shows that between 1996 and 2006 less that 50,000 new jobs were created 
for Indigenous Australians. To halve the employment gap by 2016 will require between 
71,000 and 106,000 new jobs, an extremely ambitious target given that only about 140, 
000 indigenous people are currently employed. There are enormous variations in projected 
indigenous jobs required depending on the region of residence … The chance of finding 
mainstream employment in remote Australia is limited owing to geographic isolation.”2 
In the absence of employment, “closing gaps and ending disadvantage” is a mischie-
vous fiction. Altman notes dryly, “Goals expressed in such statistical terms become 
somewhat rhetorical and hollow if they are not matched by effective policy action or 
analysis of the causes of socioeconomic difference, and if such goals do not reflect 
indigenous aspirations”.3 
Further evidence of the problematic nature of the basic goals is to be found in 
other official reports. For example, in discussing schooling, the Strategic Review of 
Indigenous Expenditure notes: 
“ Even by year three at school (average age eight), a very large gap has been established 
between the learning outcomes achieved by indigenous and non-indigenous students 
… The size of the gap varies widely by jurisdiction and location ... it is widest in the 
Northern Territory in some remote schools no indigenous students meet national minimum 
standards.”4 
In relation to health, the report comments that, “Clearly achieving the COAG targets for 
indigenous life expectancy will be a major challenge with some commentators already 
labelling the target ‘aspirational’”.5 A report, Aspirations versus reality: closing the gap 
by 2030 by W Hoy, is cited.6 In relation to economic participation, the whole burden 
is referred to the Indigenous Economic Development Strategy, which was released 
in 2012. Independently of the Altman criticism, the Strategic Review of Indigenous 
Expenditure paper notes that to meet the stated target, an extraordinary 100,000 jobs 
would need to be created over a single decade. 
These qualifications had no impact on the framing of the targets or their use in 
performance assessments. The system exhibited no routine capacity to create a 
conversation around such qualifications or, if they had merit, to assimilate their impli-
cations. Reflecting the highly centralised character of the whole process, the targets 
rather became central to the performance management process. An elaborate per-
formance management structure was introduced, which took the targets as definitive. 
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Despite accumulating a substantial body of evidence about outcomes, this per-
formance management regime had no capacity to influence the basic policy and 
implementation framework. Nor did it have any impact on on-the-ground practice. 
The closing the gap targets were embodied in an intergovernmental agreement 
(National Indigenous Reform Agreement – Closing the Gap, 2009) and six National 
Partnership Agreements (covering remote service delivery, economic participation, 
health outcomes, early childhood development, remote housing and remote public 
internet access). Three periodic reports were then introduced to survey progress: 
•	 An annual assessment by the COAG Reform Council (CRC); 
•	 A biennial assessment by the Productivity Commission; and 
•	 An annual report by the Prime Minister. 
The CRC’s assessment
The work of the CRC illustrates the problematic nature of such centrally determined 
outcomes.7 They became definitive benchmarks for judging whether governments 
were working effectively or ineffectively. But can they also be adapted in the light of 
later evidence and experience? 
Look at the work of the CRC. Until its very last year, its mandate specifically precluded 
assessment and review of the basic framework. Its brief was to: 
•	 Provide a comparative analysis of the performance of governments; 
•	 Report on progress under National Partnerships that support the National 
Agreements; 
•	 Report on the performance of governments under various National Partnerships 
with reward payments; 
•	 Provide an independent assessment of whether predetermined performance 
benchmarks (our emphasis) have been achieved prior to reward payments being 
made; and 
•	 Report to the COAG on the aggregate pace of activity across the COAG reform 
agenda. 
Council reports and documents indicate the measures and indicators that were used 
to judge performance. For example, here are some recent findings:
•	 Based on trends since 1998, only the Northern Territory is on track to close the gap 
in death rates by 2013; 
•	 There has been little improvement in indigenous reading and significant increases in 
indigenous numeracy since 2008 – the only Year 3 reading improvement was driven 
by gains in WA and Queensland;
•	 Between 2006 and 2011, the national gap widened in employment, labour force 
participation and unemployment; and
•	 Australia is close to the target of enrolling 95 per cent of indigenous four-year olds in 
remote communities in early childhood education by 2013.
According to a former CRC chair, Paul McClintock, while the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial relations “is recognised internationally as best prac-
tice”, the framework lacks overarching conceptual coherence.8 In an interview just after 
his retirement, McClintock was blunt in his criticism of an overly centralised structure: 
“If you have a federation of sovereign states, trying to run it by sending down missives 
from Canberra is a really bad way to run a nation … The whole federal space is as 
confused as it has ever been. There is real doubt about what is going to happen”.9 
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The Productivity Commission’s assessment
The biennial Productivity Commission report is as elaborate as the CRC assessment. 
A recent review noted its developing scale.10 In 1995, the first reporting year, the 
assessment filled 689 pages and involved 100 indicators in 10 service frameworks. 
By 2002, it had grown to two volumes, with 300 indicators in 22 service frameworks. 
In 2011, the service frameworks had increased to 24. The 2011 report, which is the 
most recent, covered some 750 pages. Results are presented against 12 prime and 
37 specific sub-targets. The data is presented in aggregate and state-based terms. 
Where the data allows, it is also disaggregated according to regional location and 
gender, among other categories. The report emphasises the extent to which out-
comes and circumstances vary by location.
The Productivity Commission’s report (like the CRC) also takes the closing the gap 
targets as definitive. It does not draw on its findings to question their basic feasibility 
or to suggest how, in the light of experience, policy frameworks might be modified or 
adapted. 
According to the 2011 report: 
“ There are wide gaps in outcomes between Indigenous and other Australians ... Outcomes 
have improved in several areas. In those jurisdictions with long term data, the mortality 
rate for Indigenous people declined by 27 per cent between 1991 and 2009, leading to 
a narrowing (but not closing) of the gap with non-Indigenous people in those jurisdictions. 
In particular, Indigenous young child (0–4 years) and infant (0–12 months) mortality rates 
declined by over 45 per cent between 1991 and 2009 (in the three jurisdictions for which 
data are available: WA, SA and the NT). 
“ Nationally, Indigenous home ownership has increased, and Indigenous people are achieving 
better outcomes in post-secondary education, employment and income. However, outcomes 
in these areas have also improved for non-Indigenous people, leading to little or no closing 
of the gaps. In other areas, there has been less progress. There has been little change 
in literacy and numeracy, most health indicators and housing overcrowding for Indigenous 
people. Rates of child abuse and neglect substantiations and adult imprisonment have 
increased for Indigenous people but there has been recent improvement in juvenile 
detention rates.”11
The report routinely acknowledges not only the difficulty of defining outcomes but also 
the problematic nature of the causal structure, which is implicit in the selection of indi-
cators. The report “does not set best practice benchmarks or ‘league tables’, it is the 
performance of government as a whole, not agencies and benchmarks that is under 
scrutiny”.12 The idea of ‘government as a whole’ is not explained. 
Commenting on this broad aspect of the framework, Professor Alan Fenna, director of 
Curtin University’s Institute for Public Policy, observed:
“ Translating the complex, contested, qualitative world of public policy into agreed upon and 
meaningful quantitative indicators is difficult. Ensuring that those indicators are accurately 
linked to output-outcome causalities that are often unclear is more challenging still. And 
finally doing that across levels of government in a federal system in a way that will provide 
learning and increase accountability makes it all a decidedly ambitious if not Herculean 
task.”13 
McGuire and O’Neill14 update an official 2010 assessment of the impact on actual 
outcomes of all this analysis. Their findings are not positive. The official 2010 evalu-
ation15 had urged a more ‘strategic’ approach. By this, it meant that the Productivity 
Commission review should be more than “simply a data collection for the nation”. It 
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proposed more attention to best practice examples and the inclusion of case studies 
of specific approaches. In their update, McGuire and O’Neill find nothing much has 
changed. They conclude that “the target audience (for the Productivity Commission 
report) is the central and line agency managers responsible for budget preparation ... 
evidence of the influence on processes to improve service delivery is limited”.
Accountability and performance management framework
The foregoing discussion suggests that the accountability and performance manage-
ment framework is critical. But the present framework sustains a centralised and 
top-down approach. An elaborate language and narrative has been created that 
allows the COAG, the Productivity Commission and the associated federal and state 
treasury and finance departments to engage each other with seemingly minimal or 
no effect on actual on-the-ground practices. There is no evidence that this report-
ing framework itself encourages continuous improvement much less reconciles local 
discretion with central accountability. This accords with analyses in other systems of 
similar performance management regimes, which concludes that such targets distort 
local priorities, force local officials to game the system or induce courses of action that 
are largely or wholly irrelevant to local contexts and needs.16 
Is there a design that can square the circle between local discretion, central account-
ability and continuous improvement? Is there a design that would allow outcomes 
to be adapted in the light of experience? Here we turn to the differently structured 
arrangements that have developed in EU.
Pragmatist governance in the EU
Following the extensive privatisation of public utilities, the EU and national authori-
ties faced the new challenge of instituting appropriate accountability and coordination 
regimes, for example, covering energy, telecommunications and food standards. 
A new approach gradually emerged, one that has been deliberately designed to 
encourage ‘learning by doing’. This pragmatist or experimentalist approach17 took 
shape as prescriptive regulation, directives and more legalistic forms were found 
increasingly ineffective and a source of conflict between Brussels and member states. 
From the mid-to-late 1990s, the general pattern of governance evolved towards 
arrangements that emphasised learning and that accorded discretion to states in their 
pursuit of agreed goals but held them accountable for their use of these discretions.
This approach developed as a response to two fundamental features of the gover-
nance challenge. The first concerned available knowledge. The actors were unclear 
both about their medium-term goals and the most effective way to realise them. The 
second fundamental feature concerned power. No single actor possessed sufficient 
authority to impose her will. Even where the Commission had legal power, such as in 
relation to competition policy, the complexity of local cases pointed to a design that 
devolved a significant role to national authorities. A similar structure was also desirable 
in cases like data privacy where the environment was extremely fluid or volatile. 
This pragmatist or experimentalist approach emerged serendipitously in the EU quite 
independently of an analogous development in the US. But in formal terms the two 
developments share common features. The general features of this pragmatist or 
experimentalist approach are first described and then applications and impacts are 
discussed.
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Irrespective of its institutional patterns, the basic framework involves four broad func-
tional principles: 
“ First, framework goals (such as ‘adequate education’ or ‘good water status’) and provisional 
measures for establishing their achievement are established … through consultation 
between the centre and the local units and relevant outside stakeholders … Second, local 
units are explicitly given broad discretion to pursue these ends as they see fit ... But third, 
as a condition of this autonomy, local units must report regularly on their performance 
and participate in a peer review in which their results are compared with those of other 
units employing other means to the same general ends. These reviews require the local 
units to describe and explain their efforts to peers and superiors; to show that they have 
considered alternatives; and to demonstrate that they are making progress by some jointly 
acknowledged measure of success, or are making plausible adjustments if not.”18 
The centre provides services and inducements that facilitate this disciplined compari-
son of local performances and mutual learning. 
The objectives that are introduced to guide the development of the overall policy 
system are not (as in the closing the gap case) prescriptive. Rather, the initial goals are 
provisional and corrigible – they evolve as experience accumulates. According to Sabel 
et al, “a large fraction of the norms are indicative or presumptive rather than manda-
tory … rules will be continuously revised in the course of application … (Moreover) 
rule departures (are treated) diagnostically as symptoms of systemic problems and 
opportunities for systemic improvement”.19 
Incentive designs reinforce these outcomes. Their distinctive goal is “to induce actors 
to engage in investigation, information sharing and deliberation about problems with 
multiple dimensions that are only dimly understood”. For example, grant programs in 
the US “award large grants … through a competitive process in which … applications 
are judged on the extent to which they demonstrate capacities to plan and self-assess, 
to share and make use of information about their own and peer performances, and to 
coordinate with critical stakeholders in both the public and private spheres”.20 
This focus on both substantive and process outcomes reflects uncertainty about how 
broad goals are to be achieved. It builds in incentives to discuss the means by which 
agents propose to achieve the agreed outcomes. The uncertainty around means 
suggests the merit of making this conversation explicit. Thus the accountability and 
performance management system focuses on the potential of different processes or 
approaches to deliver more effective outcomes. “(Agents) often have discretion to 
depart from rules when they believe it would be counterproductive to follow them. 
This discretion, however, is limited by the requirement that this is done transparently 
in a manner that triggers review, and, if her judgment is sustained (leads to a) prompt 
rewriting of the rule to reflect the new understanding.”21 
In translating these general principles to the EU, Sabel and Zeitlin22 note some of the 
distinctive features that have emerged: 
1.  The application of these general principles has occurred through a variety of institu-
tional arrangements such as fora, networked agencies and councils of regulators. 
There is no ‘one best design’ for the performance management regime. In keeping 
with the pragmatist spirit of the design, organisational arrangements should reflect 
contexts, including the standing of the relevant actors, the political imperatives to 
which they must respond and the general state of knowledge in the relevant policy 
space.
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2.  The reporting arrangements can be designed to make a number of contributions to 
continuous improvement. For example, through its overall mandate and consulta-
tion and reporting arrangements, a peer review exercise could achieve a variety of 
performance impacts: 
“ A single institutional mechanism, such as a formal peer review exercise, can perform a 
number of distinct governance functions, such as assessing the comparative effectiveness 
of different national and sub-national implementation approaches, opening up opportunities 
for civil society actors to hold governments accountable at national and EU levels, identifying 
areas where new forms of national or transnational capacity building are required, and/or 
contributing to the redefinition of common policy objectives.”23 
3.  The voluntary and informal character of these arrangements mean they can work 
beneath or around purely legal ambiguities or opacities. “The process of socialisa-
tion and the consensus that it generates is … largely informal, in the sense that it 
was neither directly anticipated by, nor much less can it be deduced from, the direc-
tives and other legal instruments establishing various regulatory decision-making 
processes.”24 
4.  A fourth feature relates to the learning that results from the exchange of experience 
and the mutual accommodation that it encourages. “Practices and institutions are 
expected to become mutually responsive but not to converge to a single and defini-
tive best practice.” Indeed, this approach “is especially well suited to heterogonous 
settings such as the EU, where local units face similar problems, and can learn 
much from their separate efforts to solve them even though particular solutions will 
rarely be generalisable in any straight-forward way”.25 
5.  Finally, the experimental framework has its own inducements to compliance. This 
involves a more subtle set of incentives than directly prescriptive and punitive 
regimes. These are based on a structure that involves repeated interaction, which 
can incline the parties towards accommodation. In practice, the risk to present 
reputation and the potential damage to future interactions can both encourage 
moderation. The reporting framework can also be designed to encourage a con-
versation through which the participants come to recognise plausible and superior 
alternatives to their current practice. Moreover, the focus of the regulatory forums 
can shift from rules to frameworks for creating rules. “For example, where national 
authorities disagree with the European Food Safety Authority both parties are 
obliged to make their arguments and their expert advice transparent.” Similarly, in 
the case of competition policy, the Commission can intervene in national cases but 
must formally justify its decision to others in the network. Moreover, “this right of 
challenge extends horizontally as well as vertically since any member of the network 
can demand a review of another national competition authority’s handling of the 
case”.26 
The federated character of the overall system also builds in strong disincentives to 
non-participation. This arises from the resources that the central authority can use to 
discipline persistent recalcitrance. Thus, the Florence Electricity Forum coordinates the 
EU-wide electricity regime. In cases of disagreement on the part of national authori-
ties, the Commission “has periodically threatened to invoke its formal powers under 
EU merger, anti-trust and state aid rules whose application would make the intransi-
gent or obstructionist parties worse off than a compromise reached at the Forum”.27 
Ultimately, the Commission can try to deploy its funding or legal authorities. But in 
practice, this has been infrequent.
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In sum, the EU has created a structure that seeks to reconcile continuous improve-
ment in performance, local discretion in service or regulatory design and ongoing 
central accountability. How relevant might such arrangements be to Australia?
Conclusion
The basic challenges that have been addressed through these pragmatist processes 
in the EU involve conditions that parallel those in Australia. Take the indigenous affairs 
case again. There is uncertainty not only in defining realistic outcomes but also in 
determining the means by which these outcomes can be sought. Moreover, arrange-
ments are needed that can connect sovereign entities and facilitate their mutual 
learning. The EU design reconciles these elements. 
Despite extensive discussion of federal arrangements in Australia, there has hitherto 
been no attention to the potential of the pragmatist arrangements outlined here.28 This 
alternative surely deserves consideration. Of course, assessment requires more analy-
sis than has been possible here. And any implementation arrangements would need 
to assimilate outcomes from a variety of regions and jurisdictions as well as meeting 
political needs for national reporting. 
On the other hand, the evidence concerning the impact of present arrangements 
in Australia seems clear. An elaborate apparatus has been set up. This creates an 
appearance of effective governmental leadership and control. But the targets that 
have been adopted (albeit with generous intent) seem problematic. And the elaborated 
performance assessment framework seems largely disconnected from on-the-ground 
practice. 
The EU alternative is based on three elements: 
1. Initial, centrally determined outcomes that are provisional and corrigible; 
2. Local agents that enjoy discretion in implementing these outcomes; and
3. The condition for this discretion is accountability for its use. 
With a new regime to manage indigenous policy emerging at the federal level, it 
would also seem opportune to recast the federal-state framework. This Chapter has 
explored a design that is congruent with the decentralising aspirations of the Abbott 
Government, indeed one that might have much wider application in the general field of 
federal-state relations.
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